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. . . The Hydra had a prodigious dog-like body, and eight or nine 
snaky heads, one of them immortal; but some credit it with fifty, or 
one hundred, or even ten thousand heads. At all events, it was so 
venomous that its very breath, or the smell of its tracks, could 
destroy life. 
Athene had pondered how Heracles might kill this monster and, 
when he reached Learna, driven there in his chariot by lolaus, she 
pointed out the Hydra 's lair to him. On her advice, he forced the 
Hydra to emerge by pelting it with burning arrows, and then held his 
breath while he caught hold of it. But the monster twined around his 
feet, in an endeavour to trip him up. In vain did he batter at its 
heads with his club: no sooner was one crushed, than two or three 
more grew in its place. 
An enormous crab scuttered from the swamp to aid the Hydra, and 
nipped Heracles's foot; furiously crushing its shell, he shouted to 
Iolaus for assistance. Iolaus set one corner of the grove alight and 
then, to prevent the Hydra from sprouting new heads, seared their 
roots with blazing branches; thus the flow of blood was checked. 
Now using a sword ... Heracles severed the immortal head, part of 
which was of gold, and buried it, still hissing, under a heavy rock 
beside the road to Elaeus. The carcass he disembowelled, and 
dipped his arrows in the gall. Henceforth, the least would from one 
of them was invariably fatal. 1 
1 Robert Graves, The Greek Myths, Complete ed. (London: Penguin Books, 1992), 470. 
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ABSTRACT 
For 'insurgent actors' like al-Qaeda or Jaish al-Mahdi, the ability to replace 
their losses with new recruits is one that can significantly affect the likely intensity 
and success of their campaigns. Weakening this capacity to regenerate is thus a 
seemingly promising means of combating insurgent threats. However, being able to 
manipulate insurgent regeneration is far from a simple undertaking; one that a number 
of governments have struggled to realise. The central purpose of this thesis is to 
provide a greater understanding of how governments can favourably influence an 
insurgent actor's capacity to regenerate. It seeks to achieve this by exploring: why do 
the regenerative capacities of insurgent actors weaken? The exploration of this 
question takes the form of a two-level examination of three insurgent actors whose 
capacity to regenerate weakened in the past. Namely, the Front de liberation du 
Quebec (FLQ) of Canada, the Movimiento de Liberaci6n Nacional - Tupamaros 
(MLN-T) of Uruguay, and the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) ofNorthem 
Ireland. 
At the first level, this thesis examines the extent to which the FLQ, MLN-T, 
and PIRA's regenerative capacities weakened because of a 'decrease in recruitment' 
and an 'increase in attrition'. This thesis found that, while a declining intake of 
recruits played the greater role in weakening the FLQ's capacity to regenerate; it 
played at most an equal, and arguably lesser, role than a burgeoning loss of personnel 
in weakening the MLN-T and PIRA's regenerative capacities. These results raise 
implications about: (1) how the literature conceptualises the relative strength of a 
decrease in recruitment and an increase in attrition as catalysts of regenerative decay; 
and (2) how policy-makers should approach the task of weakening an insurgent 
actor's capacity to regenerate. 
At the second level, this thesis examines the validity of five prescriptions that 
are prominently highlighted in the literature as being the most efficient means for a 
government to either reduce an insurgent actor's recruitment or increase its attrition. 
This thesis found that, concerning the former, 'discrediting the insurgent actor's 
ideology' has considerable strength, employing 'selective government repression' has 
mixed validity, and 'ameliorating grievances' has little explanatory power. Regarding 
the latter, this thesis found that 'improving the government's intelligence collection 
capabilities' has clear validity, while 'restricting civil liberties' has little explanatory 
power. These results raise implications about how governments should seek to 
weaken an insurgent actor's capacity to regenerate by either attempting to reduce its 
intake ofrecruits or increase its loss of personnel. 
vi 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Declaration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111 
Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1v 
Abstract ............................................................................................ v 
INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . ... 1 
RESEARCH QUESTION AND KEY CONCEPTS . . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . . . . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .... . . .. 3 
Insur;gent Actors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 
Regeneration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 6 
Determining Regenerative Capaciry Strength . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... . . . . . . . . 7 
REGENERATIVE CAPACI1Y DETERIORATION AND THE LITERATURE . . . . . . . . .... . . ... 10 
RESEARCH OBJECTIVES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 
Cases and their Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 
Data Collection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 
LAYOUT OF THE THESIS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 
CONCEPTS, RELATIONSHIPS, & MEASUREMENT .......................... 26 
RECRUITMENT, ATTRITION, AND REGENERATIVE DECAY ............................ 26 
A DECREASE IN RECRUITMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 
The Collective Action Frame Concept . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 
The Prescriptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... 32 
The Amelioration of Grievances .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . ..... .. .. .. .. .. .. .... ... . .. .. 32 
Selective Government Repression . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 
Discrediting the Insurgent Actor's Ideology ............................................... 40 
AN INCREASE IN ATTRITION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... 44 
The Improvement of the Government's Intelligence Collection Capabilities . . . . . .. 44 
The Restriction of Civil Liberties . . .. .. . . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. .. . .. . . .. . .. . . .. 4 7 
CONCLUSION ............................................................................... 51 
FRONT DE LIBERATION DU QUEBEC .. .. .. .. . .. .. .. .. .. .. . . .. .. .. .. .. . . .. .. 52 
THE RISE OF QUEBEC NATIONALISM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 
THE FLQ ............................................................. '; . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 59 
Collective Action Frame . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 
Diagnosis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 
Prognosis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... 65 
Justificatory Arguments ....................................................................... 67 
Recruitment Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70 
THE CANADIAN GOVERNMENT AND ITS SECURI1Y FORCES .......................... 71 
vii 
THE FLQ'S REGENERATIVE EXPERIENCE ............................................. 72 
The October Crisis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... 7 4 
The Weakening of the FLQ's Regenerative Capacity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78 
ANALYSIS ................................................................................... 79 
A Decrease in Recruitment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80 
The Amelioration of Grievances . . .. .. . . .. .. .. .. . .. . .. . .. . .. .. . . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. .. .... . .. .. . . . 80 
Selective Government Repression . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84 
Discrediting the Insurgent Actor's Ideology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87 
CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91 
MOVIMIENTO DE LIBERACION NACIONAL -TUPAMAROS ............ 93 
CUBA AND CRISIS: THE FOUNDATIONS OF AN INSURGENCY ........................ 94 
THE MLN-T ............................................................................ 100 
Collective Action Frame . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106 
Diagnosis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106 
Prognosis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . ... 108 
Justificatory Arguments . . . .. .. . .. .. .. .. .. . . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. .. . . .. . .. .. .. . . ... 110 
Recruitment Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112 
THE URUGUAYAN GOVERNMENT AND ITS SECURITY FORCES ..................... 113 
THE MLN-T's REGENERATIVE EXPERIENCE ........................................ 116 
The Preparatory Phase, 1965 - Ju!J 1968 .. .. .... .. .. .. .. . .. .. .. .. . .. . .. ... .... .. .. 116 
The Rise of the Tupamaros, August 1968 -August 1971 . . .. . .. . . . . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. 117 
The Decline ofthe Tupamaros, September 1971- 1973 .............................. 121 
ANALYSIS ................................................................................. 126 
An Increase in Attrition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128 
The Improvement of the Government's Intelligence Collection Capabilities ........ 128 
Restricting Civil Liberties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..... . . . . . . . ... 132 
A Decrease in Recruitment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136 
The Amelioration of Grievances 136 
Selective Government Repression ......................................................... 138 
Discrediting the Insurgent Actor's Ideology .. . .. . .. .. . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . .. 140 
CONCLUSION ............................................................................ 141 
PROVISIONAL IRISH REPUBLICAN ARMY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144 
THE ROOTS OF CONFLICT IN NORTHERN IRELAND ................................. 145 
THE PIRA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152 
Collective Action Frame . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 156 
Diagnosis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156 
Prognosis . . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. .. .. .. . . . . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . . . . . . ... .... .. . ..... . .. .... 158 
Justificatory Arguments .. .. ... . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . ... . .. .... .. . .. . ... 160 
Recruitment Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164 
viii 
THE BRITISH AND NORTHERN IRELAND GOVERNMENTS AND THEIR 
SECURITY FORCES ...................................................................... 166 
THE PIRA's REGENERATIVE EXPERIENCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169 
The Rise efthe PIRA, December 1969- June 1972 .................................. 169 
The Deterioration ef the PIRA 's Regenerative Capaci(y, Jufy 1972 - 1977 .. .. .. .. ... 172 
The PIRA Regains its Feet, 1978 - ................................................. 177 
ANALYSIS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180 
An Increase in Attrition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182 
The Improvement of the Government's Intelligence Collection Capabilities . . . . . . . 182 
Restricting Civil Liberties .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .... .. ... 191 
A Decrease in Recruitment ......................................................... . 
The Amelioration of Grievances 
Selective Government Repression ........................................................ . 
Discrediting the Insurgent Actor's Ideology ......................................... . 
CONCLUSION ........................................................................... . 
CONCLUSION 
193 
193 
197 
198 
201 
204 
AN INCREASE IN ATTRITION VERSUS A DECREASE IN RECRUITMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205 
EXAMININGTHE DYNAMICS OF INSURGENT RECRUITMENT AND ATTRITION ... 210 
The Amelioration ef Grievances . . .. . . . . .. . .. . . . . .. . .. . . . . .. . .. . . . . . . . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . . .. 210 
Selective Government Repression ........................................................ 211 
Discrediting the Insurgent Actor's Ideolo!!JI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213 
Improving the Government's Intelligence Collection Capabilities ......................... 215 
Restricting Civil Liberties . . .. . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . .. . .. . .. . . . . . . . .. . .. . . . . . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . 216 
FINAL THOUGHT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. 217 
Bibliograpl?J . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 219 
CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
If there were no regeneration there could be no life. If everything regenerated 
there would be no death. All organisms exist between these two extremes. 1 
On 16 October 2003, just over two years after the horrific attacks against the 
World Trade Centre and the Pentagon, Donald Rumsfeld, then Secretary of Defence 
of the Bush Administration, penned a memo to four of his top aides.2 The subject of 
this missive was America's progress in the 'global war on terror'. Not surprisingly, 
given the sieve-like nature of Washingtonian politics, Rumsfeld's memo soon found 
its way into the hands of the press. What was surprising, however, was the tone of 
Rumsfeld's musings - candid and introspective, in contrast with the Secretary's (and 
broader Administration's) generally upbeat diagnosis of the fight against jihadist 
violence. 3 Indeed, where only a month earlier Rumsfeld had assured United States 
Air Force personnel that the 'war on terror' was a "war we're going to win";4 he was 
1 Richard J. Goss, Principles of Regeneration (New York and London: Academic Press, 1969), 1. 
2 These were: Deputy-Secretary of Defence Paul Wolfowitz, Under-Secretary of Defence for Policy 
Douglas Feith, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Richard Myers, and Vice-Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff General Peter Pace. 
3 Bradley Graham, "Rumsfeld questions anti-terrorism efforts," The Washington Post, 23 October 2003, 
1, Dave Moniz and Tom Squitieri, "Rumsfeld memo prompts praise and told-you-so's," USA Today, 23 
October 2003, 6, Thom Shanker, "Rumsfeld sees need to realign military fight against terror," The New 
York Times, 23 October 2003, 12. 
4 Donald H. Rumsfeld. Town Hall Meeting: Remarks as Delivered by Secretary of Defense Donald H. 
Rumsfeld, Soto Cano Air Base, Honduras, 20 September 2003. Accessed: 28 February 2006. Available 
from: http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/2003/sp20030920-secdef2075.html. 
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now asking his key lieutenants: "Are we wmnmg or losing the Global War on 
Terror?"5 
The most notable aspect of Rumsfeld's memo, however, was not its candour; 
but rather, how the Defence Secretary conceptualised 'success'. To Rumsfeld, 
America's relative position in the 'global war on terror' was a function of the ability 
of al-Qaeda and like-minded entities to replace arrested or killed personnel with new 
recruits - what in biological terms would be described as their capacity to regenerate. 
From this perspective, the United States is 'winning' the 'war on terror' if the 
regenerative capacity of violent jihadist actors is weak or nonexistent. Or, in 
Rumsfeld' s words, if "we are capturing, killing or deterring and dissuading more 
terrorists every day than the madrassas and radical clerics are recruiting, training and 
deploying against us."6 Conversely, America is 'losing' the 'war on terror' if the 
jihadists are able to attract enough new recruits to offset their losses, if not expand 
their membership base. 
However, while the Defence Secretary was relatively clear about how the 
United States could determine whether it was winning or losing the 'global war on 
terror', he was less so regarding how America could actually engender success. That 
is, what actions the American Government needs to take in order to influence and 
ultimately weaken the regenerative capacities of such actors as al-Qaeda and Jemaah 
Islamiah. For the most part, Rumsfeld's conceptualisation of this issue was lacking, 
consisting primarily of vague questions to his associates about what they thought 
should be done (e.g. "Does the US need to fashion a broad, integrated plan to stop the 
next generation of terrorists? ... Do we need a new organization? How do we stop 
those who are financing the radical madrassa schools?").7 
Though over three years have since passed, it still appears that the question of 
how to weaken the regenerative capacities of the various jihadi groups is one the 
wider Bush Administration has yet to adequately answer. As the American 
intelligence community acknowledged in April 2006, although "United States-led 
5 Donald H. Rumsfeld. Global War on Terrorism, GlobalSecurity.org, 16 October 2003. Accessed: 28 
February 2006. Available from: 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/dod/d20031016sdmemo.pdf. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid. 
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counterterrorism efforts have seriously damaged the leadership of al-Qa'ida and 
disrupted its operations . . . activists identifying themselves as jihadists . . . are 
increasing in both numbers and geographic dispersion."8 Numerous scholars and 
security commentators have reached a similar conclusion. For instance, Benjamin and 
Simon state in their 2006 book, The Next Attack: "It is no longer possible to maintain 
that the United States is winning the War on Terror. The number of terrorists is 
growing, as is the pool of people who may be moved to violence."9 
RESEARCH QUESTION AND KEY CONCEPTS 
This thesis is an attempt to provide scholars and officials with a greater 
understanding of how governments can favourably affect the regenerative capacities 
of such groups as al-Qaeda, Jemaah Islamiah, and Jaish al Mahdi ('the Mahdi Army'). 
It seeks to achieve this goal by investigating more broadly the regenerative dynamics 
of 'insurgent actors' - the term this thesis uses to denote non-state entities (like the 
aforementioned) that engage in politically-motivated violence. Specifically, this 
thesis will explore the question: why do the regenerative capacities of insurgent 
actors weaken? Before it can outline how it will conduct this exploration, this thesis 
must first undertake three key tasks. Namely: (1) providing more information about 
the unit of analysis, 'insurgent actors'; (2) locating and defining 'regeneration' as it 
applies to insurgent actors; and (3) explaining how this thesis will determine the 
strength of an insurgent actor's capacity to regenerate. 
8 Declassified Key Judgments of the National Intelligence Estimate "Trends in Global Terrorism: 
Implications for the United States" dated April 2006, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 26 
September 2006. Accessed: 9 October 2006. Available from: 
http://www.dni.gov/press _releases/Declassified _NIE_ Key _Judgments.pdf. 
9 Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, The Next Attack: The Failure of the War on Terror and a 
Strategy for Getting it Right (New York: Owls Books, 2006), 126. See also: Mark Danner, "Taking 
stock of the forever war," The New York Times Magazine, 11 September 2005, 47, James Fallows, 
"Bush's lost year," The Atlantic Monthly, October 2004, 72, Peter R. Neumann, "Europe's jihadist 
dilemma," Survival 48, no. 2 (2006): 76-8. 
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Insurgent Actors 
The unit of analysis of this thesis are insurgent actors. These are: any non-
state entity that seeks to transform the political status quo through the use, and the 
threat of use, of violence. Two determinants of this definition require further 
clarification. First, the political status quo refers to the prevailing 'structures of 
governance' (such as socio-economic systems, sovereignty, and trade regulations) that 
determine the distribution of resources (both within and between nation-states). 
Second, in accordance with Back's writings on the subject, violence denotes acts of 
aggression (both attempted and successful), which are undertaken with the intention 
of causing harm (pain or injury) to another human being. 10 It is important to note that, 
although this thesis devised the term 'insurgent actor', it based the above definition of 
the concept on a wide consensus about what characterises the "nonruling group" of an 
'insurgency' .11 
Prominent examples of insurgent actors (both historical and current) include: 
the Hukbalahap of the Philippines, Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) of Spain, Sendero 
Luminoso ('Shining Path') of Peru, Hezbollah of Lebanon, and Jemaah Islamiah of 
Indonesia. As these examples imply, insurgent actors can: (1) assume varying 
organisational types (ranging from the hierarchical "pyramid structure" of the Italian 
Brigate Rosse, to the more nebulous and informal connections of al-Qaeda); 12 (2) 
operate mono-nationally (i.e. primarily limited to a particular nation-state, such as the 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam of Sri Lanka) or trans-nationally (like the Armenian 
10 Allan Back, "Thinking clearly about violence," Philosophical Studies 117, no. 1-2 (2004): 224. 
11 An 'insurgency', in this sense, is seen as a conflictual relationship between a "nonruling group and 
the ruling authorities"; in which the former seeks to overturn, and the latter maintain, the political status 
quo. See: David J. Kilcullen, "Countering global insurgency," The Journal of Strategic Studies 28, no. 
4 (2005): 603, Frank Kitson, Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency, Peacekeeping 
(London: Faber, 1973), 3, Thomas A. Marks, Maoist Insurgency since Vietnam (New York: Frank Cass, 
1996), 4, Ariel Merari, "Terrorism as a strategy of insurgency," Terrorism and Political Violence 5, no. 
4 (1993): 219, Steven Metz and Raymond Millen, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the 21st 
Century: Reconceptualizing Threat and Response (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 2004), 2, Bard E. 
O'Neill, Insurgency and Terrorism: Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare (Washington, D.C.: 
Brassey's Incorporated, 1990), 13, Julian Paget, Counter-Insurgency Campaigning (London: Faber and 
Faber Limited, 1967), 14, Robert Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency: Experiences from 
Malaya and Vietnam (London: Chatto & Windus, 1966), 28. 
12 Vittorfranco S. Pisano, "The Red Brigades: A challenge to Italian democracy," Conflict Studies, no. 
120 (1980): 10, Xavier Raufer, "Al Qaeda: A different diagnosis," Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 26 
(2003): 394. 
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Secret Anny for the Liberation of Armenia, which conducted numerous attacks across 
Europe and the Middle East); and (3) be motivated by differing ideologies (such as 
the revolutionary socialism of the Greek Epanastatiki Organosi 17 Noemvri, the 
Kurdish nationalism of the Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan, and the Salafism of the 
Algerian Groupe Salafiste pour la Predication et le Combat). Groups like the 
Loyalist paramilitaries in Northern Ireland, the Ku Klux Klan in the Untied States, 
and the Argentinean 'death squad', Alianza Anticomunista Argentina, are not 
examples of insurgent actors, since they do not seek to reshape the political status quo, 
but rather, "to maintain the power of the state ... or to preserve advantages held by 
particular groups."13 
In the wider conflict studies literature, many commentators label as 'terrorist' 
(or a derivative thereof) the type of group that this thesis has classified as 'insurgent 
actors'. This thesis favours the latter term over the more popular former for two 
reasons. First, as numerous scholars have highlighted, 'terrorist' is a pejorative term; 
"generally applied to one's enemies and opponents, or to those with whom one 
disagrees and would otherwise prefer to ignore."14 Its use thus signifies more the 
casting of a "moral judgment," rather than the conveying of a desired impression to 
facilitate comprehension.15 'Insurgent actor', in contrast, while by no means a value-
free term, lacks many of the negative connotations associated with 'terrorist'. Second, 
to paraphrase Weinberg, Pedahzur, and Hirsch-Hoefler, 'terrorist' "has become an 
'essentially contested concept', one whose meaning lends itself to endless dispute but 
no resolution."16 Thus, the literature dedicated to the study of conflict would be better 
served by abandoning 'terrorist' and, in its place, concentrate on existing and/or new 
13 Christopher C Harmon, Terrorism Today (London and Portland: Frank Cass, 2000), 31. For an 
examination of the differences between pro-state and anti-state violent non-state actors, see: Steve 
Bruce, The Red Hand: Protestant Paramilitaries in Northern Ireland (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1992), 269-80. 
14 Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 31. See also: 
Martha Crenshaw, "Thoughts on relating terrorism to historical contexts," in Terrorism in Context, ed. 
Martha Crenshaw (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995), 8, Grant Wardlaw, 
Political Terrorism: Theory, Tactics and Counter-Measures (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1989), 4-5. 
15 Brian Michael Jenkins, The Study of Terrorism: Definitional Problems (Santa Monica: RAND, 1980), 
10. 
16 Leonard Weinberg, Ami Pedahzur, and Sivan Hirsch-Hoefler, "The challenges of conceptualizing 
terrorism," Terrorism and Political Violence 16, no. 4 (2004): 778. 
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concepts (such as insurgent actor); the meanings of which will hopefully engender 
greater acceptance and, in tum, allow for greater comparability between studies. 
Regeneration 
While the designation 'insurgent actor' has been developed by this thesis, 
'regeneration' is an established term. A quick perusal of the broader literature soon 
reveals two general meanings for the expression. The first of these is attitudinal in 
nature, denoting concepts of rebirth and renewal of one's mental and/or spiritual 
outlook. Saint Thomas Aquinas provides an example of this use of regeneration when 
he states: "Baptism is spiritual regeneration; inasmuch as a man dies to old life, and 
begins to lead the new life."17 The second meaning, meanwhile, is physiological in 
nature, referring to the "process by which organisms reconstitute lost parts of the 
body."18 Goss wrote his famous observation that opened this chapter in the context of 
this second notion of regeneration. 
In the conflict studies literature, both these meanmgs of regeneration are 
evident. Abuza, for instance, employs regeneration in the term's attitudinal-sense to 
describe the Abu Sayyaf Group's recent transformation from what was essentially a 
criminal gang to a 'terrorist organisation' with deep links to al-Qaeda and Jemaah 
Islamiah. 19 However, the majority of authors who discuss regeneration in the context 
of insurgent actors do so in accordance with the term's physiological meaning. From 
this perspective, insurgent actors are 'organisms', and their 'parts of the body' (which 
are lost and replaced) are individual members. For example, the Foreign Affairs 
Committee of the British House of Commons stated in 2003 that: 
17 Saint Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, vol. 3 (New York: Benziger Brothers, 1981), 2382 (Q. 
66, Art. 9, Part III). 
18 Jeremy P. Brockes, Anoop Kumar, and Cristiana P. Velloso, "Regeneration as an evolutionary 
variable," Journal of Anatomy 199, no. 1-2 (2001): 3-4, Richard J. Goss, "The natural history (and 
mystery) of regeneration," in A History of Regeneration Research: Milestones in the Evolution of a 
Science, ed. Charles E. Dinsmore (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991 ), 17-8, Anthony J. 
Schmidt, Cellular Biology of Vertebrate Regeneration and Repair (Chicago and London: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1968), 4. 
19 Zachary Abuza, "Balik-terrorism: The return of the Abu Sayyaf," (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 
2005), 10-44. 
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We welcome the capture of a number of senior al Qaeda figures ... We 
nonetheless conclude that those that remain at large . . . retain the capacity to 
lead and guide that organisation towards further atrocities. We further conclude 
that al Qaeda has dangerously large numbers of 'foot soldiers', and has 
demonstrated an alarming capacity to regenerate itself. 20 
7 
Likewise, the Australian Government, in its White Paper on Transnational Terrorism, 
observed that: ''Despite the attrition they have suffered, terrorist networks such as 
Jemaah Islamiyah are flexible and resourceful. They have a capacity to regenerate."21 
Lastly, in reference to the ongoing war in Iraq, General (Ret.) John Keane declared 
that: "One of the insurgency' strength is its capacity to regenerate ... We have killed 
thousands of them and detained even more, but they are still able to regenerate. They 
are still coming at us. "22 
Given this dominant usage of the term in the literature, this thesis defines 
insurgent regeneration as the process by which insurgent actors replace lost personnel 
(i.e. those who have been either killed or arrested) with new recruits. As this 
definition suggests, regeneration is an interplay between two phenomena: recruitment 
(an insurgent actor's intake of recruits) and attrition (an insurgent actor's loss of 
personnel). 23 
Determining Regenerative Capacity Strength 
Given that the goal of regeneration, in both organisms and insurgent actors, is 
to counteract or repair 'damage', this thesis will ascertain the strength of an insurgent 
actor's capacity to regenerate by the extent to which the actor's recruitment offsets its 
attrition. Thus, an insurgent actor's regenerative capacity is strong if its intake of 
2° Foreign Affairs Committee, "Tenth Report of Session 2002-03, Foreign Policy Aspects of the War 
Against Terrorism," (London: House of Commons, 2003), 51. 
21 Commonwealth of Australia, Transnational Terrorism: The Threat to Australia (Canberra: 2004), 76. 
Jones shares this perspective of the Australian Government, stating that Jemaah Islamiah has been able 
to survive the "massive arrests of its members" over the past four years because of its "capacity for 
regeneration, made possible by deep roots in Indonesia that go back long before n officially came into 
being." Sidney Jones, "The changing nature of Jemaah Islamiyah," Australian Journal of International 
A~irs 59, no. 2 (2005): 177. 
2 Cited in: Bryan Bender, "US military worried over change in Iraq attacks," The Boston Globe, 24 
April 2005, 1. 
23 This meaning of 'attrition' differs slightly from its usage in the Strategic Studies literature, where the 
term generally denotes the "gradual and piecemeal process of destroying an enemy's military 
capability." Carter Malkasian, A History of Modern Wars of Attrition (Westport: Praeger, 2002), 1. 
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recruits either exceeds or is relatively equal to its loss of personnel. The German Rote 
Armee Fraktion (RAF) during the early- to mid- l 970s is an example of an insurgent 
actor with a strong capacity to regenerate. In May 1972, two years after the group's 
formation, the RAF (comprising a 'hardcore' of approximately thirty people) 24 
launched its first major offensive; bombing police stations, American military bases 
and offices of the Springer Press. The response of the West German authorities was 
both instant and fervent; entailing a "nationwide search operation . . . on a scale 
hitherto unknown in the Federal Republic."25 By mid-July, the police had arrested 
virtually the entire RAF membership. As Pluchinsky states: "The RAF, as a terrorist 
gang, ceased to exist."26 Despite outward appearances, however, the group's heart 
continued to beat. Under the direction of the RAF's imprisoned leadership, a 'second 
generation' emerged; the members of which were primarily drawn from the various 
political groups that had formed since mid-1972 to protest Bonn's alleged torture of 
the captive RAF members. 27 By April 1975, the second generation had gained 
sufficient strength to undertake its first major operation: seizing the West German 
embassy in Stockholm. Despite losing six of its members in this attack,28 the RAF 
continued to attract new recruits; reaching an estimated strength of thirty in 1977.29 
Due largely to this fortification, the RAF was able to embark on its most infamous 
wave of violence: beginning in April 1977 with the assassination of Siegfried Buback, 
the Federal Prosecutor-General; and culminating six months later with the dramatic 
24 Jeremy Varon, Bringing the War Home: The Weather Underground, the Red Army Faction, and 
Revolutionary Violence in the Sixties and Seventies (Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University of 
California Press, 2003), 215, Joanne Wright, Terrorist Propaganda: The Red Army Faction and the 
Provisional IRA, 1968-86 (Basingstoke and London: Macmillan, 1991), 190. 
25 Stefan Aust, The Baader-Meinhof Group: The Inside Story of a Phenomenon, trans. Anthea Bell 
(London: The Bodley Head, 1987), 213. 
26 Dennis A. Pluchinsky, "An organizational and operational analysis of Germany's Red Army Faction 
terrorist group (1972-91)," in European Terrorism: Today & Tomorrow, ed. Yonah Alexander and 
Dennis A. Pluchinsky (McLean, VA.: Brassey's (US), Inc., 1992), 46. 
27 Christoph Rojahn, "Left-wing terrorism in Germany: The aftermath of ideological violence," Conflict 
Studies, no. 313 (1998): 7. 
28 Peter H. Merkl, "West German left-wing terrorism," in Terrorism in Context, ed. Martha Crenshaw 
(University Park, PA.: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995), 185. 
29 Rojahn, "Left-wing terrorism in Germany." Silke Maier-Witt, a former member of the second 
generation, provides a similar figure, estimating the groups strength in 1977 at over twenty-five 
members. Cited in: Harriet Rubin, "Terrorism, Trauma, and the Search for Redemption," Fast 
Company, no. 52 (2001): 162. 
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events surrounding the kidnapping and eventual murder of Hanns-Martin Schleyer, a 
leading Berlin industrialist. 30 
Alternatively, this thesis deems that an insurgent actor's capacity to regenerate 
is weak if its intake of recruits clearly falls short of its loss of personnel. Accordingly, 
an insurgent actor's regenerative capacity is weakening if the relationship between the 
actor's recruitment and attrition shifts from the former exceeding or relatively-
equalling the latter, to the former clearly falling below the latter. The violent 
Khalistani movement during the 1990s is an example of insurgent actor that 
experienced the weakening of its once-robust capacity to regenerate. Beginning in the 
late-1970s, India witnessed the emergence of a fluid association of groups - initially 
led by J arnail Singh Bhindranwale, an orthodox Sikh preacher - that sought the 
establishment of 'Khalistan' - an independent Sikh nation-state, primarily 
encompassing the Indian state of Punjab - through the use of both political and 
violent means. 31 Though this broad movement was increasingly active during the 
early-1980s, it was not until 1984 that the Khalistani insurgency began to seriously 
threaten the Indian Government's authority. The catalysts for this growth in intensity 
were: (1) the Indian Army's bloody and destructive assault against Sikh militants 
besieged in the Golden Temple (the holiest site in Sikhism) in June 1984; and (2) the 
anti-Sikh riots that erupted in Delhi following the assassination of Indira Gandhi, the 
Prime Minister of India, by two of her Sikh bodyguards four months later. Both of 
these events triggered an increase in Sikh alienation and boosted support for the 
violent Khalistani movement. 32 By 1986, Punjab's police force estimated that the 
insurgency comprised of "300 to 500" 'hardcore' militants, with another "3,000 to 
30 These events are known collectively as the Deutscher Herbst ('German Autumn'), and involved: 
Schleyer's initial kidnapping (during which his driver and three body-guards were killed); the hijacking 
of a Lufthansa flight by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) in support of the RAF; 
the eventual storming of the hijacked flight by West German Commandos in Mogadishu; and 
Schleyer's murder. For more information, see: Hans Josef Horchem, "Terrorism and government 
response: The German experience," The Jerusalem Jounal of International Relations 4, no. 3 (1980): 
50-1, Margit Mayer, "The German October of 1977," New German Critique, no. 13 (1978). 
31 For an overview of the origins of the conflict, see: Gurharpal Singh, "Understanding the 'Punjab 
problem'," Asian Survey 27, no. 12 (1987): 1268-77, Gurpreet Singh, Terrorism: Punjab's Recurring 
Nightmare (New Dehli: Sehgal Book Distributors, 1996), 1-2, 10-6. 
32 Sanjoy Hazarika, "Sikh's mood: Insulted, hurt and out for revenge," The New York Times, 6 July 
1984, 2, Paramjit S. Judge, Religion, Identity and Nationhood: The Sikh Militant Movement (Jaipur: 
Rawat Publications, 2005), 94. 
Introduction 10 
4,000 'on the periphery' ."33 Over the next five years, the Indian Government sought 
desperately to curtail the insurgency's rise; arresting an annual average of 2,600 
'extremists', and killing 560, from 1986 to 1990. 34 Nevertheless, the violent 
Khalistani movement was largely able to offset these losses with new recruits. As 
Wallace notes, official estimates of the movement's strength "remain[ed] relatively 
constant" over this period - i.e. 300 to 400 'hardcore' militants and approximately 
2,000 associated members.35 
The tipping point for the violent Khalistani movement crune in autumn 1991. 
As a result of a change in political and security force leadership, the Punjabi police's 
adoption of a highly-aggressive (and controversial) counterinsurgency approach (as 
Singh states, "[m]assacres by terrorists were countered by massacres by the security 
forces"), and a drrunatic increase in the number of security personnel in Punjab, the 
Khalistani movement's loss of personnel doubled.36 Concurrently, due to the broader 
Sikh public's growing distaste for the actions of the militants, and seeming desire for 
a return to normalcy, the Khalistani movement's intake of recruits dropped.37 As a 
consequence, the movement's capacity to regenerate was severely circumscribed and, 
in tum, its membership strength plummeted. According to Singh, "by 1993, most of 
the leading [Khalistani] military organisations had been smashed."38 
REGENERATIVE CAPACITY DETERIORATION AND THE LITERATURE 
To scholars and officials searching for guidance about why the regenerative 
capacities of insurgent actors weaken, the conflict studies literature is both a help and 
33 Steven R. Weisman, "In Punjab, the young are particularly restless," The New York Times, 29 June 
1986, 3. 
34 V.N. Narayanan, Tryst with Terror: Punjab's Turbulent Decade (New Dehli: Ajanta Publications, 
1996), 60, South Asia Terrorism Portal. Annual Casualties in Terrorist Related Violence, 30 May 2002. 
Accessed: 28 October 2006. Available from: 
http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/ countries/india/states/punjab/ data_ sheets/annual_ casualties.htm. 
35 Paul Wallace, "Political violence and terrorism in lnida: The crisis of identity," in Terrorism in 
Context, ed. Martha Crenshaw (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995), 357-8. 
36 Gurharpal Singh, "Punjab since 1984: Disorder, order, and legitimacy," Asian Survey 36, no. 4 
(1996): 413-4, South Asia Terrorism Portal. Annual Casualties in Terrorist Related Violence. 
37 K.P.S. Gill, "Endgame in Punjab: 1988-1993," Faultlines: Writings on Conflict & Resolution 1, no. 1 
(1999): 66. 
38 Gurharpal Singh, "India's Akali-BJP alliance: The 1997 Legislative Assembly elections," Asian 
Survey 38, no. 4 {1998): 401. 
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a hindrance. On the one hand, the existing scholarship is insightful; outlining two 
contrasting explanations for the phenomenon of regenerative capacity deterioration. 
The first of these is that an insurgent actor's capacity to regenerate is likely to weaken 
if its intake of recruits declines. This notion formed the basis of the British and 
Malayan Administration's campaign against the Malayan Races' Liberation Army 
{MRLA) during the Malayan Emergency (1948-60). Through such measures as 
resettling Malayan-Chinese peasants into fortified 'New Villages' and increasing 
developmental assistance, the British and Malayan Administration sought to 
'separate' the MRLA (both physically and attitudinally) from its sources of recruits.39 
The second explanation is that an insurgent actor's capacity to regenerate is likely to 
weaken if its loss of personnel increases. This concept underlay the Military 
Assistance Command, Vietnam's (MACY) 'strategy of attrition' against the Viet 
Cong during the Vietnam War (1959-75). Relying on the superior firepower and 
mobility of the American military, the MACY sought to inflict a level of casualties on 
the Viet Cong that would eventually push the insurgent actor over its "crossover 
point" - that is, the point at which the Viet Cong's losses would exceed its ability to 
replace them. 40 
However, m providing these explanations, the literature raises two new 
questions; its answers to both of which are problematic. The first of these concerns 
the relative strength of the contending explanations. From a logical perspective, both 
an increase in attrition and a decrease in recruitment are valid sources of regenerative 
capacity deterioration. After all, the strength of an insurgent actor's capacity to 
regenerate is a reflection of its ability to offset its losses with new recruits. Intuitively, 
39 Eric M. McFadden, "Contemporary counterinsurgency operations: History as a guide to assist in the 
development of the Joint Interagency Task Force," Comparative Strategy 24, no. 4 (2005): 363-5, 
Anthony Short, The Communist Insurrection in Malaya 1948-1960 (London: Frederick Muller, 1975), 
231-53, Richard Stubbs, Hearts and Minds in Guerrilla Waifare: The Malayan Emergency 1948-1960 
(Singapore: Eastern Universities Press, 2004), 150-1. 
40 Lyndon B. Johnson, The Vantage Point: Perspectives of the Presidency, 1963-1969 (New York: Holt, 
Rinehart and Winston, 1971), 259, "U.S. ground strategy and force deployments, 1965-1968; Section 
3," in The Pentagon Papers: The Defense Department History of United States Decisionmaldng on 
Vietnam (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), 385-447, William C. Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports (New 
York: Doubleday & Company, 1976), 149-53. The MACY also intended its attritional strategy to push 
the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese towards their 'breaking point'. That is, the point at which the 
level of past losses would seem so intolerable that continued military action would seem undesirable, if 
not unthinkable. See: John E. Mueller, "The search for the 'breaking point' in Vietnam," International 
Studies Quarterly 24, no. 4 (1980). 
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this ability would weaken not only if the actor's intake of recruits fell below its loss of 
personnel, but also if its loss of personnel rose above its intake of r~cruits. However, 
from a practical perspective, the question remains: are an increase in attrition and a 
decrease in recruitment equal sources of regenerative capacity deterioration? Or, is 
one factor more important than the other in bringing about the decay of an insurgent 
actor's ability to replace its losses with new recruits? 
The prevailing response in the literature to this question is to emphasise a 
decrease in recruitment, and disregard an increase in attrition, as potential sources of 
regenerative capacity deterioration. Thompson, for instance, states that, in the 
absence of disrupting an insurgent actor's intake of recruits, the "mere killing of 
insurgents . . . is a waste of effort because their subversive organization will continue 
to spread and all casualties will be made good by new recruits."41 In a similar vein, 
Stubbs maintains that, without a concurrent 'hearts and minds' strategy, a 'coercion 
and enforcement' approach will be of little utility because "there will always be 
recruits ready to take the place of those captured, killed, or injured.'.42 Lastly, Biddle 
contends that to undercut al-Qaeda's ability to "replenish [its] depleted ranks" with 
"new recruits" requires not offensive measures, but "action to eliminate the 
wellsprings of terrorist recruitment. "43 
This favouring of a decrease in recruitment as the factor more likely to weaken 
an insurgent actor's capacity to regenerate is both intuitive and a seemingly valid 
explanation of the regenerative experiences of a number of insurgent actors. For 
instance, the MRLA gradually lost its ability to replace its casualties with new recruits 
-with the organisation shrinking from an estimated 6,000 members in 1954 to a "few 
hundred" in 1960 - primarily because the British and Malayan Administration was 
generally successful in 'separating' the insurgent actor from its sources of 
41 Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency, 116. 
42 Stubbs, Hearts and Minds, 263-4. 
43 Stephen D. Biddle, "American Grand Strategy After 9/11: An Assessment," (Carlisle: Strategic 
Studies Institute, 2005), 22. See also: R.G. Coyle, "A system description of counter insurgency 
warfare," Policy Sciences 18, no. 1 (1985): 73-5, Brian Michael Jenkins, "Countering al Qaeda: An 
Appreciation of the Situation and Suggestions for Strategy," (Santa Monica: RAND, 2002), 24. 
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recruitment. 44 In contrast, the Viet Cong, largely due to its substantial manpower 
pool45 and ability to retain "initiative on the battlefield,"46 managed to withstand the 
MACV's 'strategy of attrition' and "keep losses within his capability to replace 
them."47 
However, notwithstanding its apparent explanatory power in the above 
examples, the broader validity of the notion that a decrease in recruitment is more 
important than an increase in attrition in weakening an insurgent actor's capacity to 
regenerate is questionable. Two observations form the basis of this judgment. The 
first of these is that it appears from just a cursory examination of a number of 
insurgent actors that their regenerative capacities weakened at least equally, if not 
primarily, because of an increase in attrition. The violent Khalistani movement 
outlined above is a good example of such an insurgent actor. Another is the 
Movimiento Peronista Montonero (MPM) of Argentina. Formed during the late-
1960s, this revolutionary group grew to an estimated peak strength of 5,000 members 
in 1975.48 However, on 24 March 1976, the Argentinean military overthrew the 
civilian government and launched an unprecedented campaign against the MPM and 
its perceived supporters. As Gillespie states, the "broad sweep of [this] repressive 
drive," which saw the insurgent actor's casualties increase tenfold, 49 "helped to 
44 Robert Jackson, The Malayan Emergency: The Commonwealth's Wars 1948-1966 (London and New 
York: Routledge, 1991), 14, Short, The Communist Insurrection, 350, 505-6, Stubbs, Hearts and Minds, 
258. 
45 Hirschman, Preston, and Loi contend that, despite the horrific casualties they had suffered, the Viet 
Cong had access to "more potential military recruits every years ... than in each previous year." 
Charles Hirschman, Samuel Preston, and Vu Manh Loi, "Vietnamese casualties during the American 
War: A new estimate," Population and Development Review 21, no. 4 (1995): 809. 
46 Richard A. Hunt, "Strategies at war: Pacification and attrition in Vietnam," in Lessons from an 
Unconventional War: Reassessing U.S. Strategies for Future Conflicts, ed. Richard A. Hunt and 
Richard Shultz (New York: Pergamon Press, 1982), 28. Record notes, for instance, that the communist 
forces initiated 75-80 percent of all firefights during the Vietnam War. Jeffrey Record, The Wrong 
War: Why we Lost in Vietnam (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1998), 73-85. 
47 Douglas S. Blaufarb, The Counterinsurgency Era: U.S. Doctrine and Performance, 1950 to the 
Present (New York: Free Press, 1977), 252. 
48 Richard Gillespie, "Political violence in Argentina: Guerrillas, terrorists, and carapintadas," in 
Terrorism in Context, ed. Martha Crenshaw (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 
1995), 212. Though, as Lewis notes, "no exact membership figures were ever made public" and 
estimates range from as low as 3,000 to as high as 30,000. Paul H Lewis, Guerrillas and Generals: 
The Dirty War in Argentina (Westport: Praeger, 2002), 47-8. 
49 Approximately 300-400 Montoneros were arrested during the twenty-four months prior to the March 
1976 coup, compared to 4,500 during the twenty-four months after. See: Richard Gillespie, Soldiers of 
Peron: Argentina's Montoneros (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), 217-8, 38, Patricia Marchak, God's 
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prevent Montonero recruitment from matching losses. By the end of 1977, the 
guerrillas were putting their membership at 40 percent of the 1975-level."50 
The second observation is that there is a prominent belief in the literature that 
insurgent actors operating predominantly in urban environments have "historically 
been more susceptible to repression by an effective state" than primarily 'rural' 
insurgent actors, like the MRLA and the Viet Cong. 51 Beckett, for instance, after 
highlighting the "disastrous outcome of urban action" for such groups as the Front de 
Liberation nationale (FLN) during the 'Battle of Algiers' in 1957 (as Merom states, 
"[a]fter nine months of an intense and brutal campaign, [the French Army] virtually 
destroyed the FLN terror network in Algiers"), 52 the Aq:ao Libertadora Nacional 
(ALN) of Brazil during the 1960s, and the Ejercito Revolucionario del Pueblo (ERP) 
and the MPM of Argentina during the 1970s, concludes that "[ u ]rban insurgency has 
not proved very successful where government [have been] prepared to abandon 
restraint." 53 Likewise, Laqueur, in his recent history of terrorism, contends that 
"[ u ]rban terrorism campaigns have seldom lasted longer than three to four years. 
Once the security forces have mastered counter techniques, terrorist losses usually 
become unacceptably high." 54 If this conviction about the vulnerability of urban 
insurgent actors to security force pressure is accurate, it suggests that an increase in 
attrition may play a significant, if not leading, role in explaining the regenerative 
decay of such groups. 
The second question that the conflict studies literature raises concerns the 
issue of how governments can influence the regenerative capacities of insurgent actors. 
Specifically, if a government has decided to weaken an insurgent actor's capacity to 
regenerate, what are the best methods the government can adopt to achieve such 
Assassins: State Terrorism in Argentina in the 1970s (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 
1999), 126. 
50 Gillespie, Soldiers of Peron, 251. 
51 Steven Metz, "The future of insurgency," (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 1993), 21. 
52 Gil Merom, How Democracies Lose Small Wars: State, Society, and the Failures of France in 
Algeria, Israel in Lebanon, and the United States in Vietnam (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2003), 84. 
53 Ian F.W. Beckett, Modern Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies: Guerrillas and their Opponents 
Since 1750 (London and New York: Routledge, 2001), 151-80. 
54 Walter Laqueur, A History of Terrorism (New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers, 2002), 
86. 
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outcomes? The literature is replete with answers to this question; with scholars 
prescribing a variety of measures as ways in which governments can affect the 
recruitment or attrition levels of an insurgent actor. Foremost amongst these include 
the notions, advocated by such authors as Steinberg, Leites and Wolf, and Rosenau, 
respectively, that the most efficient means for a government to reduce an insurgent 
actor's intake of recruits is through: (1) the amelioration of the grievances that are 
motivating people to join the insurgent actor; (2) the employment of sufficient and 
astute repression; and (3) the discrediting of the ideology on which the insurgent 
actor's campaign is based. 55 With regard to the perceived best way in which a 
government can increase an insurgent actor's loss of personnel, possibly the most 
prominent suggestions include: (1) Paget's contention that "[g]ood intelligence is 
undoubtedly one of the greatest battle-winning factors in counterinsurgency 
warfare";56 and (2) Posner's argument that "civil liberties ... should be curtailed" so 
as to allow governments to deal more efficiently with the likes of al-Qaeda.57 
However, while some of these prescriptions are both instinctive and appealing, 
their empirical basis is, for the most part, limited. That is, few scholars have sought to 
test, for instance, the extent to which 'ameliorating grievances' decreases an insurgent 
actor's intake of recruits, or whether 'restricting civil liberties' does actually provoke 
an increase in an insurgent actor's loss of personnel. Of course, this is not to deny 
that scholars have examined such relationships. Cragin and Chalk, for example, have 
analysed the impact of social and economic development policies on insurgent 
recruitment in Israel, Northern Ireland, and the Philippines; 58 while Freeman has 
investigated the efficacy of emergency powers as an instrument of counterterrorism. 59 
However, these examples notwithstanding, the level of testing of the relationships 
between the prescriptions outlined above and insurgent recruitment and attrition has 
55 Nathan Leites and Charles Wolf, Rebellion and Authority: An Analytical Essay on Insurgent 
Conflicts (Chicago: Markham Publishing Company, 1970), 108-9, William Rosenau, "Waging the 'war 
of ideas'," in The McGraw-Hill Homeland Security Handbook, ed. David Kamien (New York: 
McGraw-Hill, 2006), 1132, James B. Steinberg, "Counterterrorism: A new organizing principle for 
American national security?," The Brookings Review 20, no. 3 (2002): 7. 
56 Paget, Counter-Insurgency Campaigning, 163-4. 
57 Richard A. Posner, "Security versus civil liberties," The Atlantic Monthly, December 2001, 46. 
58 Kim Cragin and Peter Chalk, Terrorism & Development: Using Social and Economic Development 
to Inhibit a Resurgence of Terrorism (Santa Monica: RAND, 2003). 
59 Michael Freeman, Freedom or Security: The Consequences for Democracies using Emergency 
Powers to Fight Terror (Westport and London: Praeger, 2003). 
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generally not been sufficient as a cumulative foundation for either academic 
understanding or the development of policy. 
RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
From the above discussion, it is clear that there a number of shortcomings in 
the conflict studies literature's understanding of the phenomenon of regenerative 
capacity deterioration. This thesis will conduct its exploration of why the 
regenerative capacities of insurgent actors weaken by seeking to address these 
shortcomings. This attempt at scholarly improvement will take the form of a two-
level examination of the regenerative experiences of three insurgent actors whose 
capacity to regenerate weakened in the past. Namely, the Front de liberation du 
Quebec (FLQ) of Canada, the Movimiento de Liberaci6n Nacional - Tupamaros 
(MLN-T) of Uruguay, and the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) of Northern 
Ireland. 
At the first level, this thesis will seek to shine greater light on the broader 
validity of the notion that a decrease in recruitment is more important than an increase 
in attrition in bringing about the deterioration of an insurgent actor's capacity to 
regenerate. It will achieve this by examining the extent to which the regenerative 
capacities of the FLQ, MLN-T, and PIRA weakened because of a decrease in 
recruitment or an increase in attrition. It is important to note that all of the insurgent 
actors that will form the basis of this investigation operated predominantly in urban 
environments. This thesis deliberately chose its cases to share this characteristic 
because it appears, from a theoretical perspective, that 'urban' insurgent actors will 
offer the sternest possible test of the broader validity of the notion in question. 
At the second level, this thesis will endeavour to strengthen the empirical 
foundations of the literature's understanding of the best ways in which a government 
can increase an insurgent actor's loss of personnel, or decrease its intake of recruits. 
It will achieve this by examining the relationships between five of the most prominent 
prescriptions in the literature (highlighted above and discussed in greater detail in the 
next chapter) and insurgent recruitment and attrition. Specifically, this thesis will test: 
(1) ifthe regenerative capacities of the FLQ, MLN-T, and PIRA weakened because of 
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a decrease in recruitment, whether this shift was the result of either 'the amelioration 
of grievances', the use of 'selective government repression', and/or 'the discrediting 
of the insurgent actor's ideology'; and (2) if the regenerative capacities of the FLQ, 
MLN-T, and PIRA weakened because of an increase in attrition, whether this shift 
was the result of either 'the improvement of the government's intelligence collection 
capabilities', and/or 'the restriction of civil liberties'. 
The importance of the proposed two-level examination is threefold. First, as 
implied above, it will strengthen the literature's general understanding of the 
dynamics of regenerative decay, as well as the relationships between the five 
identified prescriptions and insurgent recruitment and attrition. Second, it will 
provide policy-makers with a greater awareness of the likely scope of their available 
options to weaken an insurgent actor's capacity to regenerate. For instance, if the 
three cases affirm the prevailing view that a decrease in recruitment is more important 
than an increase in attrition in bringing about the deterioration of an insurgent actor's 
capacity to regenerate, then this would suggest that governments should concentrate 
their limited resources on the seemingly difficult task of influencing insurgent 
recruitment. However, if this thesis finds that a burgeoning loss of personnel can play 
a significant role in weakening the regenerative capacities of some insurgent actors, 
then this would suggest that governments may, in certain circumstances, have further, 
and possibly even better, options to weaken an insurgent actor's capacity to regenerate 
than simply trying to reduce the actor's intake ofrecruits. 
Finally, the proposed two-level examination is significant because it will 
provide policy-makers with a firmer base on which to determine how they can 
favourably influence an insurgent actor's intake of recruits and/or loss of personnel. 
For example, if this thesis uncovers that the FLQ, MLN-T, and PIRA's recruitment 
declined because their respective grievances were ameliorated, then this would 
suggest that governments should focus at least part of their counter-insurgent efforts 
on ameliorating grievances as a means of reducing an insurgent actor's intake of 
recruits. 
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RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
As the above discussion implies, this thesis has adopted a comparative 
approach in order to conduct its two-level examination. In many respects, the 
technique of comparison is the bedrock of scholarly inquiry in both the physical and 
social sciences. As Swanson states: "Thinking without comparison in unthinkable. 
And, in the absence of comparison, so is all scientific thought and scientific 
research."60 Similarly, Lieberson maintains that all social research, "in one form or 
other, is comparative research."61 However, while there is general agreement about 
the importance of comparison, there is less so concerning the question of what 
constitutes a (or the) 'comparative method'. To some scholars, the term refers to the 
comparison of a particular type of unit of analysis; generally "large macrosocial units" 
(such as different cultures and political systems).62 To others, the term refers to a 
particular logic of comparing two or more cases. According to Skocpol and Somers, 
there are three such methodological logics evident in the wider literature. Specifically, 
the logics of: parallel demonstration of theory (i.e. the use of comparison to 
demonstrate the repeated fruitfulness of a theory or hypothesis to 'make sense' of the 
available evidence); contrast of contexts (i.e. the use of comparison to highlight the 
limits of a particular theory and the power of context); and macro-causal analysis (i.e. 
the use of comparison to derive causal inferences).63 
Given this confusion surrounding the term, for the purposes of this thesis, the 
'comparative method' will refer to an approach based on the logic of macro-causal 
analysis. Specifically, the comparative method outlined by Lijphart during the mid-
1970s. According to Lijphart, the goal of the comparative method, like the "two other 
fundamental strategies of research ... the experimental and the statistical methods," is 
"scientific explanation, which consists of two basic elements: (1) the establishment of 
60 G. Swanson, Framework for Comparative Research: Structural Anthropology and Theory of Action 
~Berkley: University of California Press, 1971), 145. 
1 Stanley Lieberson, Making it Count: The Improvement of Social Research and Theory (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1985), 44. 
62 Charles C. Ragin, The Comparative Method: Moving Beyond Qualitative and Quantitative Strategies 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), 1. 
63 Theda Skocpol and Margaret Somers, "The use of comparative history in macrosocial inquiry," 
Comparative Studies in Society and History 22, no. 2 (1980): 176-87. 
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general empirical relationships among two or more variables, while (2) all other 
variables are controlled, that is, held constant."64 However, while the experimental 
and statistical methods attempt to minimise variance of the control variables through 
the use of 'control groups' and the "conceptual (mathematical) manipulation of 
empirically observed data," respectively; the comparative method seeks to produce 
the same effect through the careful selection of cases. 65 In other words, a researcher 
using Lijphart's comparative method will choose cases that are similar with respect to 
those characteristics which s/he wants to treat as constants. 
Epistemologically, Lijphart's comparative method 1s positivist; in that it 
assumes there are objective and "discernible patterns in the flux of reality," and that 
true understanding of these patterns can only come through scientific inquiry. 66 
However, this thesis, influenced by mid-range theorists like Merton and the 
Constructivist school of thought, is wary of both attempts to develop 'grand unified 
theories' and the making of "'Big-T' Truth claims" that a strict positivist approach 
entails. 67 Thus, this thesis will frame its research in terms of a 'mild positivism'. 
Specifically, while recognising the benefits of a scientific approach to investigating 
social phenomena (primarily in terms of allowing for the wider comparison and 
"orderly cumulation" of research findings), 68 this thesis also acknowledges that any 
causal inferences it derives will be "contingent and partial interpretations of a 
complex world."69 
64 Arend Lijphart, "Comparative politics and the comparative method," The American Political Science 
Review 65, no. 3 (1971): 683. 
65 Arend Lijphart, "The comparable-cases strategy in comparative research," Comparative Political 
Studies 8, no. 2 (1975): 164, Lijphart, "Comparative politics," 683-4. 
66 Andrew Murray Faure, "Some methodological problems in comparative politics," Journal of 
Theoretical Politics 6, no. 3 (1994): 307-8, Steve Smith, "Positivism and beyond," in International 
Theory: Positivism and Beyond, ed. Steve Smith, Ken Booth, and Marysia Zalewski (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996), 11-6. 
67 Robert K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure, Enlarged ed. (New York: The Free Press, 
1968), 39, Richard Price and Christian Reus-Smit, "Dangerous liaisons? Critical international theory 
and Constructivism," European Journal of International Relations 4, no. 3 (1998): 272. 
68 Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social 
Sciences (Cambridge and London: MIT Press, 2005), 68. 
69 Price and Reus-Smit, "Dangerous liaisons?," 272. 
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Cases and their Selection 
This thesis conducts its two-level examination in the context of three insurgent 
actors. The first of these is the Front de liberation du Quebec ('Quebec Liberation 
Front', or FLQ). Active from 1963 to 1972, the FLQ killed five people and 
committed 212 violent acts; the majority of which were located in the Canadian 
province of Quebec. Though, in comparison with other prominent insurgent actors 
around the world, the FLQ was not very lethal; it was, nevertheless, responsible for 
one of the most notable crises in modem Canadian history. Namely, the 'October 
Crisis' of 1970, which involved the assassination of the Deputy-Premier of Quebec, 
the deployment of troops to the streets of Montreal and Quebec City, and the 
invocation of emergency powers. The October Crisis was also notable because it 
marked the point at which the FLQ's previously robust capacity to regenerate began 
to irrevocably weaken; leading to the movement's eventual disappearance two years 
later. 
The second insurgent actor is the Movimiento de Liberaci6n Nacional -
Tupamaros ('National Liberation Movement - Tupamaros', or MLN-T). Officially 
emerging in 1965, the Tupamaros pursued a nine-year campaign against the 
Uruguayan state. Over this period, the MLN-T killed thirty-seven people and carried 
out 586 violent acts. Despite Uruguay's relative-global anonymity, the MLN-T was 
an influential insurgent actor; with its 'romantic' exploits inspiring revolutionaries as 
far away as West Germany, and its eventual downfall heartening governments 
throughout the W estem Hemisphere. The MLN-T's defeat engendered such comfort 
because, for the first seven years of its campaign, the insurgent actor seemed almost 
impervious to the Uruguayan Government's countermeasures. However, from mid-
April 1972, the Uruguayan armed forces began to strip the Tupamaros of their image 
of invulnerability. Reeling under the weight of a concerted government onslaught, the 
MLN-T gradually lost its ability to replace its casualties with new recruits, and 
ultimately disappeared from the Uruguayan scene. 
The third insurgent actor is the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA). 
From the early-1970s until April 1998, the PIRA waged a brutal 'armed struggle' in 
pursuit of its goal of a sovereign and united Ireland. During this period, the 
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Provisionals killed 1,706 people and wounded countless others. However, it is 
important to note that the entire twenty-eight years of the PIRA's campaign is not the 
focus of this thesis's investigation. Rather, this thesis will primarily concentrate on 
the first ten years of the PIRA' s existence (1970-79). This period was one of great 
significance for the PIRA. It witnessed: the initial dramatic growth of the 
organisation's membership; a succession of secret talks and cease-fires with the 
British Government; and the ascendancy of Gerry Adams and Martin McGuiness to 
the summit of the PIRA's leadership. The 1970s were also significant from this 
thesis's perspective because it was during this decade that the PIRA's capacity to 
regenerate weakened (roughly from mid-1972 to 1977); before eventually re-
stabilising. It is anticipated that this 'see-sawing' of the PIRA's regenerative capacity 
will provide additional and rich insight into the various factors that this thesis is 
investigating. 
This thesis selected the above cases because: (1) the three groups had 
experienced a prolonged and clear deterioration in their once robust capacity for 
regeneration; and (2) of all the insurgent actors that met the preceding condition, the 
FLQ, MLN-T, and PIRA exhibited the most similarities with regard to certain 
characteristics which this thesis wanted to hold 'constant'. The first of these is the 
ideological influences of the FLQ, MLN-T, and PIRA. Generally speaking, all three 
insurgent actors were motivated by a combination of nationalism (defined by Gellner 
as "a principle which holds that the political and national unit should be congruent"70) 
and socialism (loosely defined as a creed which maintains that a community's socio-
economic system should be subject to some form of social controi71). However, it is 
important to note that the three insurgent actors were motivated by nationalism and 
socialism to differing extents. At one extreme, the PIRA was primarily driven by 
70 Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), 1. 
71 'Socialism' is an incredibly difficult concept to define, largely due to the heterogeneity of socialist 
thought since the nineteenth century. As Geoghegan highlights, different strands of socialism disagree 
over such fundamental issues as "their conceptualisations of the state" and the role of private property. 
The above definition is derived from both Geoghegan's discussion, as well as from a similar summary 
written by Heywood. See: Vincent Geoghegan, "Socialism," in Political Ideologies: An Introduction, 
ed. Robert Eccleshall, et al. (New York: Routledge, 2003), 73-80, Andrew Heywood, Political 
Ideologies: An Introduction, Third ed. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 107-17. 
Introduction 22 
nationalism. Nonetheless, socialism clearly influenced Republican ideology, and the 
PIRA increasingly adopted overt socialist policies as its campaign progressed. 72 The 
FLQ, meanwhile, occupies the middle ground. Whilst the actions of its members 
were undoubtedly influenced by a nationalist desire to create an independent 
Quebecois nation-state, the FLQ was also heavily inspired (especially from the mid-
l 960s onwards) by revolutionary socialist ideals. The MLN-T, lastly, represents the 
other extreme; with the organisation clearly motivated by socialism. However, as 
Porzecanski highlights, the Tupamaros also framed their struggle in terms of 
nationalism; defining the Uruguayan 'nation' as the country's working-class, and 
seeking to make the Uruguayan political system congruent with this national unit.73 
The second characteristic is the primary theatre in which the FLQ, MLN-T, 
and PIRA waged their insurgent campaign. For all three insurgent actors, this was an 
urban setting. Specifically, Montreal and, to a lesser extent, Quebec City for the FLQ; 
Montevideo for the MLN-T; and Belfast and Derry for the PIRA. The third 
characteristic is the domestic nature of the FLQ, MLN-T, and PIRA's campaigns. 
Specifically, each of the three insurgent actors fought the vast majority of their 'armed 
struggles' within the confines of a single nation-state (Canada for the FLQ, Uruguay 
for the MLN-T, and the United Kingdom for the PIRA), and were near-solely 
confronted by the security forces of those nation-states (rather than foreign troops, 
such as the MACV during the Vietnam War). The final characteristic is the primary 
political environment in which the FLQ, MLN-T, and PIRA operated. By and large, 
all three insurgent actors emerged and waged their campaigns in the context of a 
democracy. According to the Polity IV Project (a quantitative data series about 
political regime characteristics and transitions), from 1970 to 1979, the United 
Kingdom measured an average score often out of a possible ten (signifying a 'strong 
democracy'); from 1963 to 1972, Canada also measured an average score often; and, 
from 1965 to 1970, Uruguay measured an average score of eight. 74 The only 
72 Henry Patterson, The Politics of Illusion: Republicanism and Socialism in Modern Ireland (London: 
Hutchinson Radius, 1989). 
73 Arturo C. Porzecanski, Uruguay's Tupamaros: The Urban Guerrilla (New York, Washington and 
London: Praeger Publishers, 1973), 7-8. 
74 Polity IV Project. Polity IV Annual Time-Series Dataset, Integrated Network for Societal Conflict 
Research, 2006. Accessed: 11 August 2006. Available from: 
http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/index.htm. 
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significant deviation was Uruguay from 1971to 1973, with the country receiving a 
score of 'transition' for the first two of these years, before being classified as an 
autocracy in 1973. 75 
Unfortunately (and unsurprisingly), the FLQ, MLN-T, and PIRA are not 
perfect comparative cases. Specifically, they exhibit a number of differences with 
regard to certain characteristics that, ideally, would be analogous. For instance, the 
three insurgent actors' overall size varied; ranging from the FLQ's estimated 150-170 
members, to the MLN-T's estimated 1,700-1,800 members, to the PIRA's estimated 
3,000-3,500 members. 76 Likewise, the three insurgent actors were confronted by 
security forces with different levels of power; ranging from the significant manpower 
and resources of the British Army to the relatively-small and less-technologically 
advanced Uruguayan armed forces. However, this thesis maintains that, while these 
differences will limit the strength of its research findings, they are generally not 
significant enough to prevent the comparison of the FLQ, MLN-T, and PIRA for the 
purposes of its inquiry. 
Data Collection 
This thesis collected information about its cases from primary sources and the 
secondary literature. It obtained both of these from research in Australia, as well as 
from fieldwork in Belfast, Montevideo, and Montreal. For the FLQ, this thesis 
analysed: the early FLQ 'newspaper' La Cognee ('The Hatchet'); the FLQ's 
revolutionary 'blueprint' Strategie Revolutionnaire et Role de !'Avant Garde 
('Revolutionary Strategy and the Role of the Avant Garde); the Liberation Cell's 
manifesto broadcast by Radio Canada during the 'October Crisis'; Negres blancs 
d'Amerique ('White Niggers of America') and L'Urgence de choisir ('Choose!'), 
written by Pierre Vallieres, a prominent FLQ theorist; as well as leading historical 
accounts of the FLQ, including Fournier's F.L.Q.: The Anatomy of an Underground 
Movement and Laurendeau's Les Quebecois violents ('The Violent Quebecois'). 
75 Ibid. 
76 This estimate is limited to the 1970s. 
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For the MLN-T, this thesis analysed: Tupamaro communiques; interviews 
with Tupamaros, transcribed both during and after the MLN-T's campaign; internal 
Tupamaro documents (pertaining to such issues as internal security, the organisation's 
'health', and ideology); the Uruguayan armed forces' two volume examination of 'the 
subversion', Las Fuerzas Armadas al Pueblo Oriental ('The Armed Forces of the 
Uruguayan People'); in addition to such historical accounts as Fernandez Huidobro's 
Historia de los Tupamaros, Porzecanski's Uruguay's Tupamaros, and Kohl and Litt's 
Urban Guerrilla Warfare in Latin America. This thesis was also able to access: (1) a 
detailed chronology of the conflict (including Tupamaro 'violent acts', arrests, and 
deaths), composed by David Campora, a former Tupamaro, and administered by the 
Facultad de Humanidades, Universidad de la Republica, Montevideo; and (2) Astrid 
Arraras's 1999 dissertation, Armed Struggle, Political Learning and Participation in 
Democracy, which focuses both on the MLN-T's political evolution and membership. 
For the PIRA, this thesis analysed: the Provisionals' 'newspapers', the Belfast-
based Republican News, and the Dublin-based An Phoblacht ('The Republic'); 77 
PIRA internal documents (such as the 'Staff Report' and the 'Green Book'); 
interviews with PIRA members (transcribed by such authors as English and White); 
autobiographies of prominent Provisionals (such as Gerry Adams's Before the Dawn, 
and Sean MacStiofain's Memoirs of a Revolutionary); Brigadier James M. Glover's 
famous 1978 security assessment, 'Northern Ireland- Future Terrorist Trends'; and a 
variety of historical and analytical accounts, including Bishop and Mallie's The 
Provisional IRA, Moloney's A Secret History of the IRA, Smith's Fighting for 
Ireland?, and Taylor's Provos. This thesis also accessed a variety of statistical 
datasets relating to the Northern Ireland conflict, including: Sutton's An Index of 
Deaths from the Conflict in Ireland; and the Police Service of Northern Ireland's 
tallies of annual casualties, security-related incidents, and persons charged with 
terrorist offences. 
Given the large number of French and Spanish documents listed above, it is 
important for this thesis to outline the researchers' language proficiency. Specifically, 
77 The Republican News and An Phoblacht merged in 1979. 
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the researcher is a native-English speaker with average reading skills in both French 
and Spanish. To assist his translation efforts, the researcher utilised a number of basic 
translation programmes, as well as the assistance of several fluent French and Spanish 
speakers. 
LAYOUT OF THE THESIS 
The remainder of this thesis is divided into five chapters. The subsequent of 
these, Chapter Two, will elaborate on how this thesis will conduct its two-level 
examination. Specifically, the next chapter will: (1) discuss how this thesis will 
determine the relative strength of an increase in attrition and a decrease in recruitment 
as catalysts of regenerative decay; and (2) outline the five prescriptions highlighted 
above which form the basis of this thesis's second level examination. Chapters Three, 
Four, and Five, meanwhile, are the heart of this thesis; focusing on the FLQ, MLN-T, 
and PIRA, respectively. These chapters will: (1) highlight contextual information 
relevant to the emergence and persistence of each insurgent actor; (2) detail the 
regenerative histories of the insurgent actors; and (3) analyse the impact of a 
burgeoning loss of personnel and a declining intake of recruits on the regenerative 
capacities of each insurgent actor, as well as the factors responsible for these shifts in 
attrition and recruitment. Lastly, Chapter Six will summarise this thesis's findings; 
highlighting patterns and variations, as well as drawing implications for academics, 
policy-makers, and future research. 
CHAPTER TWO 
CONCEPTS, RELATIONSHIPS, & 
MEASUREMENT 
The central purpose of this chapter is to provide greater detail about how this 
thesis will conduct its two-level examination. To this end, this chapter is divided into 
three sections. The first of these will discuss issues of measurement pertaining to the 
first level. The second and third sections, meanwhile, will elaborate on the five 
prescriptions, identified in the previous chapter, which comprise the second level. 
1 RECRUITMENT, ATTRITION, AND REGENERATIVE DECAY 
As outlined in Chapter One, this thesis's first level will investigate the extent 
to which the regenerative capacities of the FLQ, MLN-T, and PIRA weakened 
because of an increase in attrition and a decrease in recruitment. If the prevailing 
view in the conflict studies literature is correct (i.e. if a declining intake of recruits is 
more important than a burgeoning loss of personnel in effecting the corrosion of an 
insurgent actor's capacity to regenerate), then this thesis should find that a decrease in 
recruitment was a greater catalyst of regenerative capacity deterioration than an 
increase in attrition across the three cases. 
However, before this thesis can undertake this analysis, it must first outline 
how it will determine the relative strength of an increase in attrition and a decrease in 
recruitment as sources of regenerative decay. This thesis's approach is twofold. First, 
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it will seek to identify whether the deterioration of the insurgent actor's capacity to 
regenerate coincided with a declining intake of recruits and/or a burgeoning loss of 
personnel. If only one of these factors is evident, then this thesis will deem that it 
played a greater role in weakening the insurgent actor's capacity to regenerate than 
the other. However, if both factors are evident, then this thesis will determine their 
relative strength by attempting to identify: (1) whether the rates at which the actor's 
attrition increased and recruitment decreased were comparable, or was one factor 
more pronounced - more intense - than the other; and/or (2) whether the insurgent 
actor's declining intake of recruits and burgeoning loss of personnel had a similar 
impact on the actor's decision-making process, or did one factor generate greater 
concern, or trigger a larger response, than the other. 
2 A DECREASE IN RECRUITMENT 
While this thesis's first level examination is focused on the relative strength of 
an increase in attrition and a decrease in recruitment as catalysts of regenerative decay, 
the second level seeks to test the validity of five prescriptions that are prominently 
highlighted in the conflict studies literature as being the most efficient means for a 
government to either reduce an insurgent actor's intake of recruits, or increase its loss 
of personnel. This section will seek to provide greater detail about the three 
prescriptions which are linked to insurgent recruitment. Namely, the amelioration of 
grievances, the use of selective government repression, and the discrediting of the 
insurgent actor's ideology. However, before this section discusses these prescriptions, 
it will first outline the concept of a 'collective· action frame'. The reason for 
introducing this notion is twofold. First, this thesis is using the collective action 
frame concept to assist its examination of 'the amelioration of grievances' and 'the 
discrediting of the insurgent actor's ideology' prescriptions. The extent of this 
assistance will be discussed in greater detail below. Second, and more generally, the 
collective action frame concept has significant value as an analytical tool, and its use 
in reference to the FLQ, MLN-T, and PIRA will enhance this thesis's understanding 
of each insurgent actor's recruitment process. 
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2.1 THE COLLECTIVE ACTION FRAME CONCEPT 
The concept of a 'collective action frame' originates from the study of social 
movements, a sub-discipline of Sociology. According to Tarrow, social movements 
are "collective challenges by people with common purposes and solidarity in 
sustained interaction with elites, opponents, and authorities."1 There are two reasons 
why a concept borrowed from the social movement literature is applicable to the study 
of insurgent actors. The first of these is that, given Tarrow's definition, insurgent 
actors are a subtype (albeit violent and extreme) of social movements. The second 
reason is one of precedent. Specifically, a number of other scholars have utilised 
ideas and models from the social movement literature as part of their investigations of 
various insurgent actors. Della Porta's study of 'terrorist organisations' in Italy and 
West Germany and White's examination of the PIRA are prominent examples in this 
regard.2 
Goffman's seminal work on 'frame analysis' provides the intellectual 
foundations of the collective action frame concept. According to Goffman,frames are 
"schemata of interpretation" which help individuals to comprehend the world around 
them, and to render "what would otherwise be a meaningless aspect of the scene into 
something that is meaningful."3 As Benford and Snow highlight, collective action 
frames also serve this interpretive function, "but in ways that are 'intended to 
mobilize potential adherents and constituents, to garner bystander support, and to 
demobilize antagonists' ."4 Collective action frames thus play an integral role in the 
insurgent recruitment process - they are the arguments and ideas that insurgent actors 
1 Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action and Politics (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1994), 3-4. 
2 Donatella della Porta, Social Movements, Political Violence, and the State: A Comparative Analysis 
of Italy and Germany (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), Robert W. 
White, Provisional Irish Republicans: An Oral and Interpretive History (Westport and London: 
Greenwood Press, 1993). 
3 Erving Goffman, Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience (Harmondsworth: 
Penguin Books, 1974), 21. 
4 Robert D. Benford and David A. Snow, "Framing processes and social movements: An overview and 
assessment," Annual Review of Sociology, no. 26 (2000): 614, David A. Snow and Robert D. Benford, 
"Ideology, frame resonance, and participant mobilization," in International Social Movement Research: 
A Research Annual, ed. Bert Klandermans, Hanspeter Kriesi, and Sidney Tarrow (Greenwich and 
London: JAi Press, 1988), 198. 
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employ in order to convince members of the broader public about the necessity and 
legitimacy of their activities and campaigns.5 
According to the broader social movement literature, a collective action frame 
has three characteristic components. First, it offers a "diagnosis of some event or 
aspect of social life as problematic and in need of alteration."6 In the majority of 
cases, especially "across movements advocating some form of political and/or 
economic change," the identified problem is a perceived injustice. 7 For instance, 
Dartnell describes how Action Directe internationale (ADi) sought to attract recruits 
by focusing on housing issues; in particular, the apparent tendency of property owners 
to "let rot perfectly habitable older lodgings" so as to force their early demolition and 
allow the construction of new, more lucrative, developments. 8 As this example 
highlights, in addition to identifying a problem, diagnoses also typically attribute 
blame.9 Such attribution plays an important role in increasing people's receptiveness 
to an actor's collective action frame. As Gamson notes, diagnoses that link a 
perceived injustice to a vague and abstract agent (e.g. Mother Nature) "diffuse 
indignation and make [them] seem foolish."10 Conversely, diagnoses which attribute 
culpability to "clearly identifiable persons or groups" are more likely to be both 
believable and generate the necessary "hot cognition" to motivate participation in 
collective action. 11 
Second, after identifying what is wrong and who is to blame, a collective 
action frame will outline ''what needs to be done."12 Such a prognosis involves the 
articulation of both a ''proposed solution" - typically, though not exclusively, the 
reversal of the identified problem - and a "strateg[y] for carrying out the plan."13 The 
strategies which insurgent actors promote can vary; ranging from versions of 
5 Benford and Snow, "Framing processes," 514, William A. Gamson, Talking politics (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1992), 6-8, Bert Klandennans, The Social Psychology of Protest (Oxford 
and Cambridge MA.: Blackwell Publishers, 1997), 16-8. 
6 Snow and Benford, "Ideology, frame resonance," 199. 
7 Benford and Snow, "Framing processes," 615-6. 
8 Michael Y. Dartnell, Action Directe: Ultra-Left Terrorism in France, 1979-1987 (London: Frank 
Cass, 1995), 109. In the early-1980s, Action Directe split into two factions: one based in Paris (ADi), 
and the other based in Lyon (Action Directe nationale, or ADn). 
9 Benford and Snow, "Framing processes," 615. 
10 Gamson, Talking politics, 32. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Snow and Benford, "Ideology, frame resonance," 199. 
13 Benford and Snow, "Framing processes," 616. 
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Guevara's foco theory (which, in essence, emphasises the transformative power of 
violence as a means of generating 'revolutionary consciousness'); 14 to more classic 
examples of 'psychological attrition' (which advocates the gradual wearing down of 
an opponent's 'will to resist' through the application of a constant rate of offensive 
operations). However, this variance notwithstanding, the strategies of insurgent 
actors all share an essential ingredient: i.e. the use of violence as an instrument of 
change. 
The final component of a collective action frame is a "call to arms or rationale 
for engaging in ameliorative or collective action."15 In other words, after outlining 
how an actor has chosen to pursue its proposed solution, a collective action frame will 
provide justificatory arguments for why such means are right and necessary. In his 
examination of the United States nuclear disarmament movement, Benford posits that 
social movements generally frame their justificatory arguments in terms of severity, 
urgency, efficacy, and propriety. 16 However, according to Gurr and O'Boyle, 
insurgent actors tend to justify their use of violence by using at least one of two types 
of basic argument. 17 First of all, normative (or deontological) arguments seek to 
highlight the extent to which the use of violence is morally correct. The biblical 
saying 'an eye for an eye' is a simple (yet distressingly widespread) example of this 
f . "fi 18 type o JUStl icatory argument. Utilitarian (or consequentialist) arguments, 
meanwhile, seek to highlight how the use of violence is the most effective means of 
achieving stated goals. An example of a utilitarian argument is the statement by 
Amrozi bin Nurhasyim (one of the convicted perpetrators of the 2002 Bali Bombing) 
14 Ernesto (Che) Guevara, Guerrilla Warfare (Middlesex: Penguin, 1969), Jose A. Moreno, "Che 
Guevara on Guerrilla Warfare: Doctrine, Practice, and Evaluation," Comparative studies in society and 
history 12, no. 2 (1970). 
15 Snow and Benford, "Ideology, frame resonance," 199. 
16 Robert D. Benford, "You could be the hundredth monkey: Collective action frames and vocabularies 
of motive within the nuclear disarmament movement," Sociological Quarterly 34, no. 2 (1993): 196. 
17 Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), 155-6, Garrett 
O'Boyle, "Theories of justification and political violence: Examples from four groups," Terrorism and 
Political Violence 14, no. 2 (2002): 23-8. 
18 Judy M. Torrance, Public Violence in Canada, 1867-1982 (Kingston and Montreal: McGill-Queen's 
University Press, 1986), 85. 
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that "[t]here's no other way than violence to get them [Westerners] out of Indonesia. 
It's impossible to do by diplomacy."19 
Osama bin Laden's 1998 'Declaration of the World Islamic Front for Jihad 
against the Jews and the Crusaders' provides a good illustration of a contemporary 
insurgent actor's collective action frame. Bin Laden's central diagnosis is that 
'Westerners' (or, more specifically, the United States and Israel) have besieged the 
Islamic World. He seeks to prove this contention by highlighting "three inconvertible 
facts."2° First, the United States' seven-year occupation of "the land of the Two Holy 
Places, the Arabian Peninsula."21 Second, America's continued aggression against the 
Iraqi people (in the form of both economic sanctions and military action). And third, 
Washington's unrelenting support for Israel and its occupation of the al-Aqsa mosque 
in Jerusalem. In order to redress these grievances, bin Laden calls for the liberation of 
the "al-Aqsa mosque and the Holy Mosque [Mecca] from their [America and Israel's] 
grip," and the expulsion of "their armies from the lands of Islam, defeated and unable 
to threaten any Muslim." 22 Bin Laden's strategy for achieving these goals is 
relatively simple: 
With God's help, we call upon every Muslim who believes in God and wishes to be 
rewarded to comply with God's order to kill the Americans and plunder their money 
wherever and whenever they find it. We also call on the Muslim Ulema, leaders, 
youths, and soldiers to launch raids on Satan's American troops and Satan's 
supporters allying with them in order to displace their leaders so that they may learn 
a lesson.23 
To justify his call to violence, bin Laden primarily relies on a retributive justice 
normative argument. According to bin Laden, Islamic scholars throughout history 
"have unanimously agreed that Jihad (holy war) is an individual duty if an enemy 
destroys Muslim countries."24 Given that the actions of the Americans and the Jews 
19 Cited in: Catharine Mumo, "Arnrozi says bomb was to get white people out of Bali," Australian 
Associated Press, 13 June 2003. 
20 Osama bin Laden, "Fatwa against Americans, February 23, 1998," in Osama bin Laden: America's 
Enemy in his own Words, ed. Randall B. Hamud (San Diego: Nadeem Publishing, 2005), 61. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid., 62. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid. 
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clearly constitute (in bin Laden's mind, at least) a "declaration of war on God, his 
messenger (PBUH), and Muslims," every member of the Islamic faith is thus duty-
bound to repulse the enemies who are attacking their religion. 25 
2.2 THE PRESCRIPTIONS 
With the concept of a collective action frame outlined, this section will now 
tum to its discussion of the three recruitment-related prescriptions. The first of these 
to be analysed will be 'the amelioration of grievances', followed by 'selective 
government repression' and 'the discrediting of the insurgent actor's ideology'. 
The Amelioration of Grievances 
Grievances have long played an explanatory role in the study of insurgent 
violence. To some authors, such as Conteh-Morgan, Crenshaw, and Ross, grievances 
are one of the leading structural causes of 'terrorism'. 26 To others, like Johnson, 
Kitson, and O'Neil, grievances are a driving source of active and passive support for 
insurgent actors. 27 A number of scholars have sought to specify this latter relationship 
even further; identifying grievances as a causal factor of insurgent recruitment. The 
perceived importance of grievances in this regard is threefold. First, grievances are 
seen to increase a person's susceptibility to "insurgent blandishments" about the need 
for political change and 'corrective' action. 28 Gareth Evans, the former Foreign 
Minister of Australia, provides a contemporary example of this perspective when he 
states: 
25 Ibid., 61-2. 
26 Earl Conteh-Morgan, Collective Political Violence: An Introduction to the Theories and Cases of 
Violent Conflicts (London and New York: Routledge, 2004), 257, Martha Crenshaw, "The causes of 
terrorism," Comparative Politics 13, no. 4 (1981): 383, Jeffrey Ian Ross, "Structural causes of 
oppositional political terrorism: Towards a causal model," Journal of Peace Research 30, no. 3 (1993): 
325. 
27 Chalmers Johnson, "Civilian loyalties and guerrilla conflict," World Politics 14, no. 4 (1962): 657-8, 
Frank Kitson, Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency, Peacekeeping (London: Faber, 1973), 
50-1, Bard E. O'Neill, Insurgency and Terrorism: Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare (Washington, 
D.C.: Brassey's Incorporated, 1990), 77-9. 
28 D. Michael Shafer, "The unlearned lessons of counterinsurgency," Political Science Quarterly 103, 
no. 1 (1988): 62. 
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Where poverty and joblessness do become relevant is in creating a larger class of 
young men, and increasingly women, insecure to the point of hopelessness about 
their own futures, who become that much more vulnerable to recruitment - by those 
who play upon that insecurity, fire up the sense of political grievance endemic 
throughout the Arab-Islamic world, and, critically, offer a religious justification for 
jihad: making holy war.29 
33 
Second, grievances are believed to act as sources of motivation for people to join an 
insurgent actor. For instance, Stem describes-in her interview with Hassan Salameh, 
an imprisoned members of Ham.as, that while his decision to join the insurgent actor 
was partly influenced by religious factors, "[t]he most important motivation was the 
Israeli occupation; he saw Palestinians were oppressed and wanted to take action."30 
Third, grievances are seen to trigger a psychological chain-reaction that increases a 
person's propensity to engage in insurgent violence. The most notable proponent of 
this conception is Gurr, who argues that relative deprivation (in essence, the 
perceived gap between what people believe they are entitled to have and what they 
actually get) generates feelings of frustration; which, in turn, predisposes people 
towards acting aggressively. 31 It is important to note, however, that despite the 
theory's popularity, repeated empirical testing has failed to establish more than a 
weak link between relative deprivation and collective violence. 32 
Given these perceived links between grievances and insurgent participation, a 
number of authors have suggested that the key to reducing an insurgent actor's intake 
of recruits is to neutralise or ameliorate the grievances which are facilitating (if not 
driving) the actor's recruitment. This concept is not only evident in general 
discussions about insurgent violence (Atran, for example, in his article about 'suicide 
terrorism', declares that "[t]o attract potential recruits way from jihadist 
martyrdom . . . and to dry up its popular support requires addressing basic grievances 
29 Gareth Evans, "Where are we in the war on terrorism?," Australian Book Review, no. 261 (2004): 14. 
30 Jessica Stern, Terror in the Name of God: Why Religious Militants Kill (New York: HarperCollins, 
2003), 59. 
31 Gurr, Why Men Rebel, 22-37. 
32 For excellent summaries of the literature surrounding relative deprivation theory, see Steven E. 
Barkan and Lynne L. Snowden, Collective Violence (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 2001), 17-9, Stephen G. 
Brush, "Dynamics of theory change in the Social Sciences: Relative Deprivation and Collective 
Violence," The Journal of Conflict Resolution 40, no. 4 (1996). 
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before a downward spiral sets in"33); but it also forms one of the central planks of 
perhaps the most well-known strategy of counterinsurgency, the 'hearts-and-minds' 
approach. Formalised by the British and Malayan Administration during its campaign 
against the MRLA in the mid-twentieth century, 34 the hearts-and-minds approach 
contends that, through such programs as "[i]ncreasing political rights of the people, 
improving standards of living, and reducing corruption and abuse of government 
power," a government can undercut both the appeal of an insurgent actor and the 
perceived need for violent political change. 35 
Previous testing of this perceived relationship between the amelioration of 
grievances and a decrease in recruitment has been relatively infrequent, though 
generally supportive. For instance, according to Stubbs, the British and Malayan 
Administration's hearts-and-minds approach (which included the widespread use of 
developmental assistance, the introduction of elections, and the provision of greater 
security) was successful in preventing the MRLA from "rely[ing] on" rural Chinese-
Malayans "for recruits and supplies."36 Likewise, in their comparison of the rise and 
fall of Quebecois and New Left 'terrorism' in Canada and the United States, 
respectively, Ross and Gurr conclude that, in both cases, 'terrorist' recruitment and 
the use of 'terrorism' subsided because "there was movement toward resolution of the 
issues which had given rise to terrorism."37 Specifically, Ross and Gurr highlight the 
emergence of the Parti Quebecois (a separatist political party) in Canada, and the 
"end of the draft and of American involvement in the Vietnam War" in the United 
States. 38 Lastly, in their examination of the impact of social and economic 
development policies on the resurgence of 'terrorism' in Israel, Northern Ireland, and 
the Philippines, Cragin and Chalk contend that, by providing "economic alternatives," 
33 Scott Atran, "Mishandling suicide terrorism," The Washington Quarterly 27, no. 3 (2004): 67-8. 
34 For more on the origins of the hearts-and-minds approach, see: Richard Stubbs, Hearts and Minds in 
Guerrilla Warfare: The Malayan Emergency 1948-1960 (Singapore: Eastern Universities Press, 2004). 
35 Austin Long, On 'Other War': Lessons from Five Decades of RAND Counterinsurgency Research 
(Santa Monica: RAND, 2006), 21-3, Shafer, "The unlearned lessons of counterinsurgency," 62-71, 
Richard Shultz, "Breaking the will of the enemy during the Vietnam War: The operationalization of the 
cost-benefit model of counterinsurgency warfare," Journal of Peace Research 15, no. 2 (1978): 109-10. 
36 Stubbs, Hearts and Minds, 258. 
37 Jeffrey Ian Ross and Ted Robert Gurr, "Why terrorism subsides: A comparative study of Canada and 
the United States," Comparative Politics 21, no. 4 (1989): 422. 
38 Ibid. 
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social and economic development can stem "the tide of potential recruits" to insurgent 
actors.39 
In light of its professed strength in the broader literature, this thesis will 
examine the correlation between the amelioration of grievances and a decrease in 
insurgent recruitment. Specifically, this thesis will investigate, if the FLQ, MLN-T, 
and PIRA 's capacity to regenerate weakened because of a decrease in recruitment, 
whether this shift was the result of the amelioration of grievances. However, before 
this thesis can conduct this examination, it must first provide greater detail about three 
key issues. The first of these is the definition of 'grievances'. Somewhat surprisingly, 
given the widespread use of the term in both the academic and popular literatures, 
'grievances' is rarely defined. Klandermans, Roefs, and Olivier provide one of the 
few exceptions, defining grievances as "feelings of dissatisfaction with important 
aspects of life, such as housing, living standards, income, employment, health care, 
human rights, safety, and education."40 While this definition is constructive, this 
thesis maintains that it would be easier from an analytical perspective to link 
'grievances' more directly to conditions which generate feelings of dissatisfaction, 
rather than concentrate on the feelings themselves. Thus, this thesis defines 
grievances as conditions - "both actual and perceived, putative and general" - that 
generate feelings of dissatisfaction among members of a community.41 
The second issue is how this thesis will determine which grievances will form 
the basis of its investigation. This is an important undertaking, since not all 
identifiable grievances in a conflict situation between an insurgent actor and a 
government are likely to motivate or cause people to join the insurgent actor. Thus, in 
order to ensure the validity of its research findings, this thesis must develop some 
method of maximising the likelihood that the grievances it chooses to study will have 
the strongest possible relationship with the recruitment processes of the FLQ, MLN-T, 
andPIRA. 
39 Kim Cragin and Peter Chalk, Terrorism & Development: Using Social and Economic Development 
to Inhibit a Resurgence of Terrorism (Santa Monica: RAND, 2003), 34-5. 
40 Bert Klandermans, Marlene Roefs, and Rohan Olivier, "Grievance formation in a country in 
transition: South Africa, 1994-1998," Social Psychology Quarterly 64, no. 1(2001):42. 
41 Ross, "Structural casues of oppositional political terrorism," 325. 
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This thesis's solution is to focus on the grievances publicly emphasised by the 
three insurgent actors. Underlying this approach are the assumptions that: (1) as 
outlined by the collective action frame concept, insurgent actors highlight particular 
grievances as a means of attracting new recruits; and (2) since insurgent actors 
generally have compelling incentives to ensure that their intake of recruits remains 
strong (e.g. so they can offset losses, and/or expand their organisation), they are likely 
to highlight grievances which will have the greatest possible resonance with, and act 
as the greatest possible motivator for, potential recruits. This thesis will identify the 
'publicly-emphasised' grievances of the FLQ, MLN-T, and PIRA by using its 
analysis of their collective action frames. 
The third issue is how this thesis will determine if a grievance was ameliorated. 
Developing a universal 'rule' in this regard is problematic; given that there is no fixed 
'level of change' that a grievance must undergo for it to be considered as having been 
ameliorated. As a consequence, this thesis will ascertain whether the publicly-
emphasised grievances of the FLQ, MLN-T, and PIRA were ameliorated on a case-
by-case basis; appealing to the available evidence to support any conclusions that are 
made. Important factors that this thesis will take into account while reaching such 
judgments include: the extent to which a particular grievance disappeared, minimised, 
or changed in some positive manner; and whether those members of a community 
who were dissatisfied with the grievance believed it had been ameliorated. 
Selective Government Repression 
During the early-1960s, the Kennedy Administration adopted a hearts-and-
minds approach to counteract the burgeoning insurgency in South Vietnam. However, 
as the decade progressed and the Viet Cong threat continued to mount, 
disenchantment with the hearts-and-minds approach steadily grew.42 Consequently, a 
number of scholars began to develop alternative strategies of counterinsurgency. One 
42 Richard Shultz, "Coercive force and military strategy: Deterrence logic and the cost-benefit model of 
counterinsurgency warfare," The Western Political Quarterly 32, no. 4 (1979): 444-5. Though, as 
Stubbs notes, what was known as 'hearts-and-minds' in Vietnam differed greatly from the "original 
Malayan strategy. For some, winning the 'hearts-and-minds' [of the Vietnamese] simply entailed a 
massive propaganda, or psychological warfare, assault on the general population." Stubbs, Hearts and 
Minds, 3. 
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of the most prominent of these was the 'cost-benefit' model. Devised by two RAND 
scholars (Nathan Leites and Charles Wolf) during the late-1960s, the costs-benefit 
model sought to apply "systems analysis and econometric techniques" to the task of 
defeating an insurgent actor.43 
These influences are arguably most evident with regard to the model's 
prescriptions about how governments can exert control over an insurgent actor's 
recruitment. According to Leites and Wolf, a person's decision to join or not join an 
insurgent actor is less a function of 'preferences' (i.e. the person's opinions about the 
insurgent actors, its ideology, and its goals), and more a reflection of a rational 
calculation about which option Goining or not joining) is more favourable in terms of 
expected costs and benefits. 44 Thus, a government can seek to reduce an insurgent 
actor's intake of recruits by manipulating common perceptions about the costs and 
benefits associated with joining the insurgent actor, to the point where the option of 
joining the insurgent actor is widely (if not universally) seen as being less favourable 
than the option ofnotjoining.45 
Although the cost-benefit model does allow for the use of rewards (including 
the amelioration of grievances) to achieve this manipulation of common perceptions, 
it primarily emphasises the transformative power of government repression. As 
Leites and Wolf state: "Unfortunately, the contest between R [the insurgent actor] and 
A [the government] is often as much a contest in the effective management of 
coercion as a contest for the hearts and minds of the people."46 However, it is 
important to note that Leites and Wolf do not claim that a straight line exists between 
repression and a decrease in insurgent recruitment. Rather, they paint a more complex 
picture; highlighting how a government's use of repression can both deter and 
stimulate an insurgent actor's intake ofrecruits.47 However, the key question guiding 
Leites and Wolfs study was not "whether repression has a deterring or radicalising 
43 Long, On 'Other War', 25. 
44 Nathan Leites and Charles Wolf, Rebellion and Authority: An Analytical Essay on Insurgent 
Conflicts (Chicago: Markham Publishing Company, 1970), 11-4, 42-4. 
45 Ibid., 36, 76-8. 
46 Ibid., 155. 
47 See Leites and Wolfs lengthy discussion about 'inflicting damage', and the differences between "hot 
violence" and "coercion". Ibid., 90-131. 
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effect, but which effect is to be expected under what conditions."48 Thus, the authors 
outline a number of "characteristics of damaging behaviour" that they believe are 
more likely to deter, rather than provoke, insurgent recruitment.49 The first of these is 
whether a government's use of repression is perceived as being selective. According 
to Leites and Wolf (as well as Mason and Hafez and Wiktorowicz), the fear of 
repression is more likely to influence a person's decision about joining an insurgent 
actor if s/he believes that they can avoid the threatened repression by not joining the 
insurgent actor. 50 Indiscriminate repression, on the other hand, undercuts this 
perception, since aspiring recruits are at risk whether they join the insurgent actor or 
not. The other characteristics that Leites and Wolf highlight include: "the degree to 
which the severity of the sanctions . . . is understandable"; the level of protection a 
government can offer a population from the insurgent actor's use of repression; and 
the extent to which a government's use ofrepression is predictable.51 
The broader literature displays a general scepticism about the utility of using 
repression as a means of controlling an insurgent actor's intake of recruits. However, 
underlying this scepticism, it is possible to discern support for Leites and Wolfs 
notion that selective repression is likely to have a deterring effect on insurgent 
recruitment. This support manifests itself not directly, but in terms of a widespread 
belief that indiscriminate repression is a stimulant of insurgent recruitment. Nevin 
provides an example of this mindset when he contends that "violent retaliation" is a 
counterproductive method of combating terrorism, since it "adds to the overall sum of 
human misery for innocent civilians who happen to be in the way of a retaliatory 
48 This statement derives from Opp and Roehl's famous article about how the literature on political 
protest should, in light of the growing evidence that repression could both stimulate and deter 
participation in political protest, refocus its empirical inquiries. Karl-Dieter Opp and Wolfgang Roehl, 
"Repression, micromobilization, and political protest," Social Forces 69, no. 2 (1990): 523. This thesis 
maintains that the quote accurately characterises Leites and Wolfs understanding of the relationship 
between repression and insurgent participation. 
49 Leites and Wolf, Rebellion and Authority, 107. 
50 Mohammed M. Hafez and Quintan Wiktorowicz, "Violence as contention in the Egyptian Islamic 
movement," in Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach, ed. Quintan Wiktorowicz 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004), 70, Leites and Wolf, Rebellion and Authority, 108, T. 
David Mason, "Insurgency, counterinsurgency, and the rational peasant," Public Choice 86, no. 1-2 
(1996): 76. 
51 Leites and Wolf, Rebellion and Authority, 108-9. 
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attack, thereby creating potential recruits to the terrorists' cause." 52 Likewise, 
Rosendorff and Sandler state that government operations which "bomb alleged 
terrorist assets, hold suspects without charging them, assassinate suspected terrorists, 
curb civil freedoms, or impose retribution on alleged sponsors may have a downside 
by creating more grievances in reaction to heavy-handed tactics or unintended 
collateral damage" - grievances that "may promote recruitment to the terrorist 
network."53 
Previous testing of the relationship between selective government repression 
and a decrease in insurgent recruitment is both sparse and contradictory. On the one 
hand, researchers of the twelve year insurgency in El Salvador (1980-92) contend that 
the government's widespread and arbitrary use of repression against the Frente 
Farabundo Marti para la Liberaci6n Nacional (FMLN) - during which an estimated 
75,000 people were killed - boosted the insurgent actor's recruitment.54 Conversely, 
Gillespie argues that the Argentinean military's indiscriminate 'dirty war' against the 
Movimiento Peronista Montoneros (MPN) and its perceived supporters and allies - a 
campaign which was responsible for the death and 'disappearance' of approximately 
9,000 people55 - suppressed the insurgent actor's recruitment.56 
As part of the second level of its examination, this thesis will seek to shed 
greater light on the relationship between the use of selective repression and an 
insurgent actor's intake of recruits. It will achieve this by examining, if the FLQ, 
MLN-T, and PIRA 's capacity to regenerate weakened because of a decrease in 
recruitment, whether this shift was the result of selective government repression. 
According to this thesis, repression is "any action ... which raises the contender's 
52 John A. Nevin, "Retaliating against terrorists," Behavior and Social Issues 12, no. 2 (2003): 127. 
53 B. Peter Rosendorff and Todd Sandler, "Too much of a good thing? The proactive response 
dilemma," Journal of Conflict Resolution 48, no. 5 (2004): 658. 
54 William M. LeoGrande, "A splendid little war: Drawing the line in El Salvador," International 
Security 6, no. 1 (1981): 31, Elisabeth Jean Wood, Insurgent Collective Action and Civil War in El 
Salvador (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 8, 16. 
55 Report of CONADEP (National Commission on the Disappearance of Persons). Nunca Mas (Never 
Again), 1984. Accessed: 13 April 2006. Available from: http://www.nuncamas.org/index2.htm. 
56 Richard Gillespie, Soldiers of Peron: Argentina's Montoneros (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), 215-
6, 51-52. 
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cost of collective action"; 57 government repression 1s any repressive act that is 
"observable," "coercive" (in the sense that it "involves shows and/or uses of force and 
other forms of standard police and military action"), and is conducted by "state agents 
tightly connected with national political elites"; 58 and a government's use of 
repression is selective when it only targets those directly and knowingly related to an 
insurgent actor. 59 Conversely, a government's use of repression is indiscriminate 
when it "expands to include supporters, sympathizers, and ordinary citizens suspected 
of involvement" in the insurgent actor.60 
Discrediting the Insurgent Actor's Ideology 
During the Cold War, American policy-makers sought to compliment their 
assorted military, economic, and diplomatic instruments through the use of what 
others have variously called 'psychological warfare', 'public diplomacy', and 'a war 
of ideas', but what this thesis terms political warfare. 61 That is, the engagement of 
"carefully targeted sections of foreign publics," through both overt and covert 
methods of communication, in "such a manner as to support the accomplishment of 
national aims and objectives."62 Though Washington's use of political warfare during 
this period was far from perfect, it was nevertheless responsible for a number of 
foreign policy victories (e.g. helping to prevent a Communist Party victory at the 
57 Charles Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution (Reading: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 
1978), 100. 
58 Jennifer Earl, "Tanks, tear gas, and taxes: Toward a theory of movement repression," Sociological 
Theory 21, no. 1 (2003): 47-50. Here, this thesis is referring to the first of Earl's twelve types of 
repression, which are all based on Tilly's original definition. 
59 Hafez and Wiktorowicz, "Violence as contention," 68. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Problems of terminology have long plagued the study of 'political warfare'. For instance, writing in 
1958, Perusse identified eighteen different terms which were used in the literature to describe what he 
had labelled 'psychological warfare'. Roland I. Perusse, "Psychological warfare reappraised," in A 
Psychological Warfare Casebook, ed. William E. Daugherty and Morris Janowitz (Baltimore: John 
Hopkins Press, 1958), 25-6. This thesis chose 'political warfare' primarily because it was one of the 
earliest terms in use. 
62 William E. Daugherty and Morris Janowitz, A Psychological Warfare Casebook (Baltimore: John 
Hopkins Press, 1958), 2, Christopher Ross, "Public diplomacy comes of age," The Washington 
Quarterly 25, no. 2 (2002): 75. 
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1948 Italian general election)63 and, according to the likes of Richmond, significantly 
contributed to the eventual demise of the Soviet Union. 64 
Indeed, it is largely due to the perceived efficacy of American political warfare 
efforts during the Cold War that a growing band of scholars and officials have called 
on the Bush Administration to emulate its predecessors' achievements and vigorously 
engage in political warfare as part of its 'global war on terror'. According to these 
observers, the goal of such a political warfare campaign should be twofold. First, the 
United States should seek to address both its "serious image problem" and growing 
anti-Americanism around the world - particularly in Muslim countries. 65 Second, 
Washington should endeavour to discredit the jihadi ideology on which al-Qaeda and 
like-minded entities are based. 66 This latter goal is considered to be of particular 
importance; largely because there is a widespread belief that reducing the jihadist 
movement's intake of recruits requires "a campaign to undermine its ideological 
appeal."67 Ramakrishna provides one of the best examples of this contention when he 
states that: 
enduring success in the war on terror in the region [Southeast Asia] will not be 
achieved until and unless the ideological basis of the likes of JI is effectively 
undercut. In other words, only when the global jihadi capacity to regenerate by 
attracting recruits and sympathizers to its cause is severely weakened, and more 
crucially, its cause is regarded by Southeast Asian Muslim communities as 
discredited, can one begin to seriously talk about success. 68 
63 Robert T. Holt and Robert W. van de Velde, Strategic Psychological Operations and American 
Foreign Policy (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1960), 169-205, C. Edda Martinez and Edward A 
Suchman, "Letters from America and the 1948 elections in Italy," The Public Opinion Quarterly 14, no. 
1 (1950), Christopher Simpson, Science of Coercion: Communication Research and Psychological 
Warfare 1945-1960 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 48. 
64 Yale Richmond, Cultural Exchange and the Cold War: Raising the Iron Curtain (University Park: 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 2003), viii-xiv. 
65 Peter G. Peterson, "Public diplomacy and the war on terrorism," Foreign Affairs 81, no. 5 (2002): 75. 
66 Zeyno Baran, "Fighting the war of ideas," Foreign Affairs 84, no. 6 (2005): 75-8, George W. Bush, 
National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2006), 7-
10, Ariel Cohen, "Promoting freedom and democracy: Fighting the war of ideas against Islamic 
terrorism," Comparative Strategy 22, no. 3 (2003): 211-2, National Commission on Terrorist Attacks 
upon the United States, The 9111 Commission Report, Official Government ed. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 2004), 363, 75-77, Stephen Van Evera, "Assessing U.S. strategy in the 
war on terror," The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 607, no. 1 
(2005): 15-20. 
67 William Rosenau, "Waging the 'war of ideas'," in The McGraw-Hill Homeland Security Handbook, 
ed. David Kamien (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2006), 1132. 
68 Kumar Ramakrishna, "Delegitimizing global jihadi ideology in Southeast Asia," Contemporary 
Southeast Asia 27, no. 3 (2005): 345. 
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The key assumption underlying this perspective is that people are motivated to join an 
insurgent actor less because of material inducements and/or physical compulsion, and 
more because of their acceptance of the insurgent actor's worldview about what needs 
to be done and the necessity of violence. De-legitimising this worldview is thus seen 
as a necessary measure to undertake if a government wants to exert control over an 
insurgent actor's recruitment potential. 
Few scholars have sought to test directly this perceived link between 
discrediting an insurgent actor's ideology and a decrease in insurgent recruitment. 
However, broader examinations reveal indirect support for the relationship. For 
instance, Rosenau contends that al-Qaeda's recruitment potential in Kenya and 
Tanzania is weak - despite the presence of such recruitment-friendly conditions as 
endemic poverty, lawlessness, and sizeable Muslim minorities - because of the 
stagnant appeal of "radical Islam" in both countries.69 Indeed, Rosenau contends that 
"the extremist Wahabbi ideology that was spreading in Kenya during the 1980s and 
early 1990s appears to be in decline."70 
As part of the second level of its examination, this thesis will seek to provide 
greater insight into the relationship between discrediting an insurgent actor's ideology 
and a decrease in recruitment. Thus, this thesis will examine, if the FLQ, MLN-T, and 
PIRA 's capacity to regenerate weakened because of a decrease in recruitment, 
whether this shift was the result of the discrediting of the insurgent actor's ideology. 
However, before this thesis can conduct this examination, it must first discuss two key 
issues. The first of these is how this thesis will determine what constitutes the 
'ideology' of an insurgent actor. This is a difficult undertaking, since 'ideology' is, to 
paraphrase Gerring, a 'semantically promiscuous' concept.71 As Eagleton states: 
69 William Rosenau, "Al Qaida recruitment trends in Kenya and Tanzania," Studies in Conflict and 
Terrorism 28, no. 1 (2005): 4-6. 
70 Ibid.: 5. 
71 John Gerring, "Ideology: A definitional analysis," Political Research Quarterly 50, no. 4 (1997): 957. 
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the term 'ideology' has a whole range of useful meanings, not all of which are 
compatible with each other. To try to compress this wealth of meaning into a single 
comprehensive definition would thus be unhelpful even if it were possible. 72 
43 
This thesis seeks to bypass the definitional problems associated with the polysemity 
of 'ideology' by defining the term in a manner that is intended not to cover all or most 
possible meanings of 'ideology'; but rather, to be simply in accordance with how the 
term is used by those commentators who prescribe discrediting an insurgent actor's 
'ideology' as a means of reducing the actor's intake of recruits. 
Such authors tend to emphasise two aspects when discussing the ideologies of 
insurgent actors. The first of these is the goal of the insurgent actor - i.e. the desired 
end-state that the actor is striving to effect into reality. For instance, both Baran and 
Cohen in their descriptions of al-Qaeda's "ideological foundations" highlight the 
movement's objective of establishing "a modem day Caliphate" across the Muslim 
world.73 The second aspect is the method of the insurgent actor. Specifically, how 
the insurgent actor seeks to engender its goals, and, more importantly, why its chosen 
means are necessary and/or superior to other instruments of change. For example, in 
discussing al-Qaeda's ideology, Rosenau highlights its "armed doctrine," which 
contends that engaging in an unrestrained 'holy war' with America and its allies is 
both a moral obligation for Muslims (given the perceived attempts of Western 
societies to subjugate Islam) and an effective method of weakening 'apostate' regimes 
in the Muslim world (such as the monarchy of Saudi Arabia).74 
Given the general emphasis on these two factors, this thesis (inspired by 
Mullins and Seliger) defines ideology as a set of ideas by which insurgent actors 
"posit, explain, and justify" their goals and methods for "organized social action."75 
This thesis will identify the ideologies of the FLQ, MLN-T, and PIRA by using its 
analysis of their collective action frames - focusing particularly on the prognoses and 
justificatory arguments of the three insurgent actors. 
72 Terry Eagleton, Ideology: An Introduction (London: Verso, 1991), 1. 
73 Baran, "Fighting the war of ideas," 68-9, Cohen, "Promoting freedom and democracy," 209. 
74 Rosenau, "Waging the 'war of ideas'," 1134-6. 
75 Willard A. Mullins, "On the concept of ideology in political science," The American Political 
Science Review 66, no. 2 (1972): 510, Martin Seliger, Ideology and Politics (London: George Allen & 
Unwin, 1976), 14. 
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The second issue is how this thesis will determine if an insurgent actor's 
ideology was discredited. There are few obvious or 'standard' measures in this regard. 
This thesis's approach is to focus on popular perceptions about the believability of the 
insurgent actor's ideology. Specifically, this thesis will deem that the FLQ, MLN-T, 
and PIRA's ideologies were discredited if the number of people who approved of the 
goals and methods which comprised their respective ideologies either noticeably or 
completely declined. The analysis of data sources like opinion polls, ethnographies, 
and historical observations will be used to ascertain whether such shifts in popular 
perceptions occurred. 
3 AN INCREASE IN ATTRITION 
This section will focus on two prescriptions that are prominently highlighted 
in the conflict studies literature as being the most efficient means for a government to 
increase an insurgent actor's loss of personnel. Namely, the improvement of the 
government's intelligence collection capabilities, and the restriction of civil liberties. 
The Improvement of the Government's Intelligence Collection Capabilities 
Although there are numerous (and fervent) debates in the counter-insurgency/ 
terrorism literature about the efficacy of various anti-insurgent measures, there does 
appear to be a consensus about the "supreme importance" of enhancing a 
government's intelligence capabilities as a means of counteracting insurgent threats.76 
To some authors, for instance, a better "ability to obtain, analyze, and act on 
information" is crucial, since it allows governments to impede insurgent attacks and, 
in turn, "control the psychological dimension of the conflict."77 To others, however, 
the significance of improving a government's intelligence capabilities primarily lies 
with its likely effect on insurgent attrition. Specifically, the better a government's 
ability to collect, analyse, and disseminate information about an insurgent actor, the 
76 Boaz Ganor, The Counter-Terrorism Puzzle: A Guide for Decision Makers (New Brunswick and 
London: Transaction Publishers, 2005), 47. 
77 Steven Metz, "Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq," The Washington Quarterly 27, no. 1 
(2003): 33. 
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more damage the government will likely be able to inflict on the insurgent actor. 
Paget alludes to this relationship when he states: "Good intelligence is undoubtedly 
one of the greatest battle-winning factors in counterinsurgency warfare."78 Thompson, 
on the other hand, is more explicit: 
Good intelligence leads to more frequent and more rapid contacts. More contacts 
lead to more kills. These in turn lead to greater confidence in the population, 
resulting in better intelligence and still more contacts and kills. That, General, is 
why you should first worry about intelligence. 79 
Underlying this perceived relationship between a government's intelligence 
capabilities and insurgent attrition is the assumption that the major factor preventing a 
government from inflicting greater damage on an insurgent actor is its inability to 
identify and locate members of the insurgent actor. Kitson famously articulated this 
belief in his seminal work on counterinsurgency, Low Intensity Operations: "If it is 
accepted that the problem of defeating the enemy consists very largely of finding hum, 
it is easy to recognize the paramount importance of good information."80 Byman 
echoes a similar sentiment when he declares: "Intelligence is the sine qua non of 
counterterrorism ... if it [the state] can locate the terrorists, it can usually arrest or kill 
them."81 McCormick, meanwhile, frames the issue in terms of the asymmetry of a 
government's power. Specifically, "[t]he state ... begins the game with a much 
greater ability to attack what it sees but a limited ability to see what it wishes to 
attack." 82 The primary reason why a government finds it difficult to 'see' an 
insurgent actor is because the latter, aware of its vulnerabilities in the face of the 
government's force advantage, deliberately seeks to obscure its presence. It achieves 
this by: avoiding frontal assaults and static clashes, preferring instead to rely on hit-
and-run tactics; foregoing uniforms and other distinguishing features of 'traditional' 
78 Julian Paget, Counter-Insurgency Campaigning (London: Faber and Faber Limited, 1967), 163-4. 
79 Robert Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency: Experiences from Malaya and Vietnam 
(London: Chatto & Windus, 1966), 89. 
80 Kitson, Low Intensity Operations, 95. 
81 Daniel Byman, "Measuring the war on terrorism: A first appraisal," Current History 102, no. 668 
(2003): 413. 
82 Gordon H. McCormick, "Terrorist decision-making," Annual Review of Political Science 6 (2003): 
484. 
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armies; and operating in environments (such as jungles, mountains, or cities) which 
provide numerous opportunities for concealment. 83 
Previous testing of this notion that enhancing a government's intelligence 
capabilities will lead to an increase in an insurgent actor's loss of personnel has been 
generally supportive. Short, for instance, in his study of the 'Emergency', states that 
the "most important reason" why the British and Malayan security forces were able to 
inflict an increasing rate of casualties on the MRLA from 1950 to 1952, and then 
continue to inflict a significant rate of casualties over the next four years, "was 
intelligence. Higher grade information was being received from the public; it was 
being more efficiently collated; and was therefore used more profitably."84 Likewise, 
such authors as Alexander and Keiger, Home, and Martin argue that the French Army 
in Algeria was able to capture and kill an increasing number of Front de libeartion 
nationale (FLN) members from 1956 to 195 8 because of a series of improvements in 
its intelligence capabilities. 85 These included: the undertaking of a thorough census of 
the Algerian population and the issuing of identity cards to all residents; the 
establishment of a vast network of Muslim-Algerian informants; and the integration 
of French units amongst Muslim-Algerian communities. 
As part of the second level of its examination, this thesis will seek to subject 
the relationship between enhancing a government's intelligence capabilities and an 
increase in insurgent attrition to further empirical scrutiny. However, a 'government's 
intelligence capabilities' is an expansive - and thus potentially unruly - topic of 
inquiry. Accordingly, this thesis will limit its examination to only one component of 
a 'government's intelligence capabilities'. Specifically, a government's ability to 
collect information about an insurgent actor. This thesis has chosen to focus on this 
83 Roger Trinquier, Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency, trans. Daniel Lee (London 
and Dunmow: Pall Mall Press, 1964), 26. 
84 Anthony Short, The Communist Insurrection in Malaya 1948-1960 (London: Frederick Muller, 
1975), 359-60. 
85 Martin S. Alexander and J.F.V. Keiger, "France and the Algerian War: Strategy, Operations, and 
Diplomacy," Journal of Strategic Studies 25, no. 2 (2002): 6-7, Alistair Horne, A Savage War of Peace: 
Algeria 1954-1962 (London: Macmillan, 1977), 198, 219-20, Gilles Martin, "War in Algeria: The 
French experience," Military Review 85, no. 4 (2005): 55-6. 
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component rather than others (such as a government's ability to analyse or 
disseminate intelligence) because it is the collection of intelligence that most scholars 
emphasise when they discuss how governments should improve their intelligence 
capabilities. Thus, this thesis will examine, if the FLQ, MLN-T, and PIRA 's capacity 
to regenerate weakened because of an increase in attrition, whether this shift was the 
result of an improvement in the government's ability to collect intelligence about the 
insurgent actor. 
The Restriction of Civil Liberties 
Over the last five years, liberal-democratic governments around the world 
have reacted to the attacks of 11 September 2001 (and later the bombings of Bali, 
Madrid, and London) by introducing a range of 'anti-terrorism' laws. Many of these 
have attracted considerable controversy; primarily due to their curtailment of civil 
liberties. For instance, since 2002, the Australian Government has: ( 1) provided the 
country's Attorney-General with the power, largely free of judicial review, to outlaw 
specific organisations on the basis that s/he believes they pose a threat to national 
security;86 (2) authorised the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) to 
detain people for up to seven days for questioning, even if they are not suspected of, 
or charged with, any crime;87 and (3) introduced 'preventative detention' and 'control' 
orders that allow the Australian Federal Police (AFP) to detain or severely restrict the 
freedom of individuals who are suspected of possible involvement in a future 
'terrorist' offence. 88 Commentators such as Grattan, Harris, and Michaelsen have 
respectively described these measures as: "unnecessary" with "obvious dangers";89 
"dangerous and disingenuous'';90 and "ill-conceived" and a "clear overreaction."91 
86 Security Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Act 2002, (5 July), s. 102.1. 
87 Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Act 2003, (22 
July), s. 34HC. 
88 Anti-Terrorism Act (No. 2) 2005, (14 December), s. 104-5. 
89 Michelle Grattan, "Wrong tools to fight terrorism," The Sydney Morning Herald, 10 May 2002, 13. 
90 Richard Harris, "Anti-democratic provisions fall on the wrong side of the law," The Sydney Morning 
Herald, 22 November 2005, 17. 
91 Christopher Michaelsen, "Antiterrorism legislation in Australia: A proportionate response to the 
terrorist threat?," Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 28, no. 4 (2005): 334. 
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In the face of such criticism, liberal-democratic governments have employed a 
variety of arguments to justify their 'anti-terrorism' laws. These range from: 
highlighting the 'exceptional' nature of the jihadist threat (necessitating, of course, 
"exceptional measures" to counteract it);92 to comparing the fight against Salafabist 
violence to a 'war' (thus requiring 'wartime' sacrifices in individual freedoms). 93 
However, perhaps the most common argument liberal-democratic governments have 
used to justify their 'anti-terrorism' laws is "that they cannot be effective against the 
threat [of terrorism] unless they sacrifice some of their democratic substance."94 Or, 
to phrase this differently, that a negative relationship exists between the extent of a 
country's civil liberties and the efficacy of its government's counterterrorism response. 
The Prime Minister of Australia implicitly provides an example of this argument 
where he states that the Anti-Terrorist Act (No. 2) 2005 (which introduced 
'preventative detention' and 'control' orders, and gave the APP greater powers of stop, 
search, and arrest) is necessary because it enables the Australian Government "to 
better deter, prevent, detect and prosecute acts of terrorism."95 
The key assumption underlying this perceived relationship between restricting 
civil liberties and increasing the efficacy of a government's counterterrorism 
capability is that "the very mechanisms that protect the individual from state power ... 
also hamper the state's ability to respond to the [terrorist] threat."96 This assumption 
is evident in the Bush Administration's defence of the National Security Agency's 
(NSA) domestic surveillance program, which involves the NSA monitoring certain 
telephone calls of American citizens without obtaining the necessary warrants under 
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (PISA). According to the American 
President and his top officials, it is necessary for the NSA to circumvent the PISA 
92 Marisol Touraine and Yann Galut, cited in: Didier Hassoux, "La securite prend des libertes," 
Liberation, 5 October 2001, 18. 
93 Alan Travis, "Anti-terror critics just don't get it, says Reid," The Guardian, 10 August 2006, 6. 
94 Anastassia Tsoukala, "Democracy in the light of security: British and French political discourses on 
domestic counter-terrorism policies," Political Studies 54, no. 3 (2006): 608. See also: Richard A. 
Posner, "Security versus civil liberties," The Atlantic Monthly, December 2001, 46-7, Jessica 
Wolfendale, "Terrorism, security, and the threat of counterterrorism," Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 
29, no. 7 (2006): 753-4. 
95 John Howard. Counter-Terrorism Laws Strengthened, Office of the Prime Minister of Australia, 
2005. Accessed: 28 October 2006. Available from: 
http://www.pm.gov.au/N ews/media _releases/media_ Release 15 51.html. 
96 Laura K. Donohue, "Security and freedom on the fulcrum," Terrorism and Political Violence 17, no. 
1-2 (2005): 70. 
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process because its requirements for legal oversight are too cumbersome ("FISA 
involves marshalling arguments, PISA involves looping paperwork around") and 
prevent the American Government from effectively engaging an agile adversary like 
al-Qaeda. 97 
Although most scholars tend to exhibit scepticism about the purported benefits 
to governmental efficiency derived from restricting civil liberties, only a few have 
sought to subject this relationship to empirical scrutiny. One of these is Hewitt, who 
analysed the efficacy of emergency powers as a means of reducing terrorism in 
Cyprus, Italy, Spain, the United Kingdom, and Uruguay. He concluded that, in all 
cases, there was no "recognizable pattern whereby violence declines following the 
introduction of emergency powers. Sometimes violence declines, sometimes it 
increases, but most times the legislation has no discernible impact."98 Adopting an 
approach similar to that of Hewitt, Freeman investigated the consequences for four 
democratic states (Canada, Peru, the United Kingdom, and Uruguay) "of using 
emergency powers to fight terrorism."99 Freeman's conclusions, however, differed to 
those of Hewitt. Specifically, Freeman argued that emergency powers can be 
effective (in terms of reducing the number and lethality of terrorist attacks), but their 
effectiveness is dependent on both the "size of the active terrorist group in relation to 
its level of support, and the speed with which the security forces capture suspected 
terrorists." 100 Specifically, Freeman contends that "[e]mergency powers are most 
effective when the state moves quickly against a small terrorist group that has weak 
support."101 
97 George W. Bush. Press Conference of the President, The White House, 19 December 2005. 
Accessed: 28 October 2006. Available from: 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/12/20051219-2.html, Press Briefing by Attorney 
General Alberto Gonzales and General Michael Hayden, Principal Deputy Director for National 
Intelligence, The White House, 19 December 2005. Accessed: 28 October 2006. Available from: 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/12/20051219-1.html. 
98 Christopher Hewitt, The Effectiveness of Anti-Terrorist Policies (Lanham: University Press of 
America, 1984), 66-7. 
99 Michael Freeman, Freedom or Security: The Consequences for Democracies using Emergency 
Powers to Fight Terror (Westport and London: Praeger, 2003), 5. 
JOO Ibid., 12-3, 186. 
IOI Ibid., 186. 
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As part of the second level of its examination, this thesis will seek to provide 
further insight into the relationship between the extent of a country's civil liberties 
and the efficacy of its government's counterterrorism response. This thesis will 
attempt to achieve this by analysing what effect restricting civil liberties has on an 
insurgent actor's loss of personnel. After all, it stands to reason that, if a relationship 
does exist between restricting civil liberties and enhancing governmental efficiency, 
then those governments which do restrict civil liberties should experience an 
improvement in their ability to arrest and/or kill members of an insurgent actor; 
increasing, in turn, the insurgent actor's loss of personnel. Thus, this thesis will 
investigate, if the FLQ, MLN-T, and PIRA 's capacity to regenerate weakened because 
of an increase in attrition, whether this shift was the result of restrictions in civil 
liberties. 
Before this thesis can undertake this investigation, it must first delineate what 
constitutes a 'restriction in civil liberties'. According to this thesis, a restriction in 
civil liberties is the enactment and enforcement of legislation, specifically designed to 
combat an insurgent actor, which limits existing freedoms (such as freedom of 
assembly, habeas corpus, and freedom from arbitrary search and arrest). In the FLQ 
case, the primary restrictions in civil liberties were: the War Measures Act; the Public 
Order Regulations, and the Public Order (Temporary Measures) Act. In the MLN-T 
case, the primary restrictions in civil liberties were: the Uruguayan Government's 
repeated invocation of the Medidas Prontas de Seguridad ('Prompt Security 
Measures', or MPS) during the late-1960s and early-1970s; the declaration of an 
'estado de guerra internai' ('state of internal war') in April 1972; and the Ley de 
Seguridad de! Estado y el Orden Interno ('Law of the Security of the State and 
Internal Order') 1972. In the PIRA case, the primary restrictions in civil liberties 
were: the reintroduction of internment (under the Civil Authorities (Special Powers) 
Act (Northern Ireland) 1922) in August 1971; the Northern Ireland (Emergency 
Provisions) Act 1973; and the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 
1974. 
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4 CONCLUSION 
Now that this thesis has expounded the five prescriptions which form the basis 
of the second level of its examination, it shall turn its focus to conducting its two-level 
examination in the context of its three chosen insurgent actors. The first of these to be 
placed under the spotlight will be the Front de liberation du Quebec, followed by the 
Movimiento de Liberaci6n Nacional - Tupamaros, and, in turn, the Provisional Irish 
Republican Anny. 
CHAPTER THREE 
FRONT DE LIBERATION DU QUEBEC 
In every corner of Quebec, let those who have been contemptuously called 
'lousy French' and 'alcoholics' begin to fight back against the violators of 
liberty and justice; let them put all those professional crooks and hold-up men 
out of business: the bankers, businessmen, judges, and political wheeler-dealers. 
We are Quebec workers and we will carry through to the end ... Our victory is 
inevitable. An awakened people cannot long be kept in misery and contempt. 
- The 'Liberation Cell' manifesto, October 1970 
The Front de liberation du Quebec (FLQ) is often overshadowed in the 
conflict studies literature by other more murderous and audacious insurgent actors, 
such as the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) and the Liberation Tigers of 
Tamil Eelam (LTTE). However, from a regenerative perspective, the FLQ is both an 
intriguing and noteworthy case. From its inception in 1963 to 1970, the FLQ enjoyed 
a robust capacity for regeneration. As Gellner states, the movement was able "to 
renew itself, to grow new heads, like Hydra, whenever any were chopped off."1 Yet, 
following the 'October Crisis' of 1970, the FLQ gradually lost its ability to replace its 
arrested, deserted, and killed members with new recruits. The consequences were 
disastrous for the movement. An insurgent actor that, in mid-1970, seemed to be 
gaining both in strength and purpose; had instead, by the end of 1972, disappeared 
from Quebec's political landscape. 
1 John Gellner, Bayonets in the Streets: Urban Guerrilla at Home and Abroad (Don Mills: Collier-
Macmillan, 1974), 83. 
Front de liberation du Quebec 53 
The overarching goal of this chapter is to shed greater light on why this 
deterioration in the FLQ's capacity to regenerate occurred. To facilitate this task, this 
chapter is divided into six sections. The first three of these are contextual in nature, 
outlining: (1) the rise of Quebec nationalism during the mid-twentieth century; (2) 
characteristics of the FLQ itself (such as its operational history and collective action 
frame); and (3) very briefly, the security forces which were responsible for 
counteracting the FLQ threat. The fourth and fifth sections, meanwhile, will focus on 
the FLQ's capacity to regenerate; describing the movement's regenerative experience 
before and after October 1970, as well as analysing the relative strength of an increase 
in attrition and a decrease in recruitment as catalysts of regenerative decay, and the 
dynamics of these factors. Finally, the sixth section will provide a summary of the 
chapter and its key findings. 
1 THE RISE OF QUEBEC NATIONALISM 
The 1950s and 1960s was a period of remarkable and often dramatic change in 
Quebec's history. One of the most significant transformations of this era- especially 
in relation to understanding the dynamics of the FLQ's recruitment - was the rise of 
Quebec nationalism. In many respects, the emergence of this new strain of French-
Canadian nationalism represented a realignment of the historic Canadien nationalist 
impulse with the 'realities' of modem Quebec life. Arguably the most public and 
conscious driver of this realignment was a growing band of young nationalists who 
were dissatisfied with the strictures of the traditional nationalist discourse. Though 
the first strain of Canadien nationalism was relatively liberal in character;2 for most of 
2 Jean-C. Bonenfant and Jean-C. Falardeau, "Cultural and Political Implications of French-Canadian 
Nationalism," in French-Canadian Nationalism: An Anthology, ed. Ramsay Cook (Toronto: Macmillan 
of Canada, 1969), 20-1, Fernand Ouellet, Lower Canada 1791-1840: Social Change and Nationalism, 
trans. Patricia Claxton (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1980), 87-91, 323-4. Not surprisingly, the 
origins of French-Canadian nationalism are contested. For instance, Griffin contends that a national 
consciousness emerged amongst the French-Canadians in the wake of the British Conquest of New 
France in 1759. Anne Griffin, Quebec: The challenge of independence (Rutherford, Madison, Teaneck: 
Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1984), 19-30. Ouellet, however, maintains that such concepts as 
'nation', 'nationalism', and 'French-Canadian' only entered the French-Canadian lexicon during the 
first decades of the eighteenth century. Thus, "[t]o date our nationalism back to the French regime, or 
even to the latter half of the eighteenth century, would be to ascribe to the men of the period a scale of 
values which they were not yet aware." Femand Ouellet, "The historical background of separatism in 
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the nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, the Catholic clergy (strict adherents of 
papal orthodoxy) exerted a significant influence over nationalist thought. This 
clerical or ultramontane nationalism was based on three central components. These 
were, l'agriculturisme (a linking of rural life with French-Canadian identity and the 
survival of the nation);3 le messianisme (the belief that the French-Canadian people 
had a religious mission to fulfil on the North American continent - a mission which 
required both clerical leadership and a strong Catholic Church);4 and l'anti-etatisme 
(an inherent distrust of the state and an associated preference for autonomous, French-
Canadian institutions).5 
However, to the dissenting young nationalists, these 'myths' (as Brunet so 
famously described them) were not only increasingly irrelevant in the postwar era, but 
also potentially damaging to the French-Canadian nation's chances of survival.6 For 
instance, authors such as Andre Laurendeau and Jean-Marc Leger observed that: (1) 
given the incredible rate of urbanisation and industrialisation that had occurred in 
Quebec since the end of the Second World War, there was "no longer a rural and 
agricultural French Canada, but primarily an urban/industrial French Canada"; 7 and (2) 
traditional French-Canadian nationalism, with its glorification of rural life, prevented 
the existing nationalist elite from engaging with the burgeoning ranks of urban, 
industrial workers and preventing their 'denationalisation'.8 What was needed, these 
nationalists argued, was a new nationalist doctrine: one which would be urban and 
Quebec," in French-Canadian nationalism: An Anthology, ed. Ramsay Cook (Toronto: Macmillan of 
Canada, 1969), 50. 
3 Richard Ares provided an excellent example of l'agriculturisme when he stated in 1943 that: "By 
tradition, vocation as well as necessity, we are a people of peasants. Everything that takes us away 
from the land diminishes and weakens us as a people and encourages cross-breeding, duplicity and 
treason." Cited in: Femand Dumont and Guy Rocher, "An Introduction to a Sociology of French 
Canada," in French-Canadian Society, ed. Marcel Rioux and Yves Martin (Toronto: McClelland and 
Stewart, 1964), 183. 
4 Hubert Guindon, Quebec Society: Tradition, Modernity, and Nationhood, ed. Roberta Hamilton and 
John L. McMullan (Toronto, Buffalo, and London: University of Toronto Press, 1988), 51, Susan 
Mann Trofimenkoff, The Dream of Nation: A Social and Intellectual History of Quebec (Toronto: 
Gage Publishing Limited, 1983), 119. 
5 Ralph Heintzman, "The Political Culture of Quebec, 1840-1960," Canadian Journal of Political 
Science I Revue canadienne de science politique 16, no. 1 (1983): 5-6, Kenneth McRoberts, Quebec: 
Social Change and Political Crisis, Third ed. (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1988), 85. 
6 Michel Brunet, "Trois Dominantes de la Pensee Canadienne-Fran9aise: l'Agriculturisme, l'Anti-
etatisme et le Messianisme," in La Presence Anglaise et Les Canadiens (Montreal: Beauchemin, 1964). 
7 Cited in: Michael D. Behiels, Prelude to Quebec's Quiet Revolution: Liberalism versus Neo-
nationalism 1945-1960 (Kingston and Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1985), 48. 
8 Ibid., 43-4. 
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secular in nature, as well as embrace the state as an instrument of advancing the 
interests of the French-Canadian people. It was these central tenets which would later 
form the ideological base of Quebec nationalism. 
However, the most important 'reality' reflected in Quebec nationalism was not 
its progressive character; but rather, its demarcation of the nation's borders. 
Notwithstanding its long history in the French-Canadian political consciousness, for 
most of the nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, French-Canadian nationalism 
lacked an accurate conception of where the spatial boundaries of the nation lay. This 
confusion was primarily the result of an astonishing (and equally traumatic) wave of 
French-Canadian emigration that occurred from the 1830s to the 1930s. In all, an 
estimated 900,000 Canadiens emigrated from the Saint-Lawrence River area (the 
historic centre of French settlement) over this period; 9 driven by a ballooning 
population (doubling nearly every twenty-five years during the nineteenth century),10 
a lack of available land along the Saint-Lawrence River,11 and the lure of economic 
opportunity. 12 These emigres established a remarkably broad presence across North 
America; primarily settling in Ontario, northern New Brunswick, New England, and 
the American Midwest. The problem, of course, with such a broad presence was that 
it obscured the precise borders of the French-Canadian nation. As Belanger states: 
"Clearly, one could not create a nation-state any more, except in imagination."13 
However, as the twentieth century progressed and the surge of French-
Canadian emigres abated, a distinct trend emerged amongst North America's 
Francophones. Specifically, the further a "community of French origin" was from 
9 Roderic Beaujot and Kevin McQuillan, Growth and Dualism: The Demographic Development of 
Canadian Society (Toronto: Gage Publishing, 1982), 15-6, 89, Yolande Lavoie, L' Emigration des 
Quebecois aux Etats-Unis de 1840 a 1930 (Montreal: Presses de l'Universite de Montreal, 1972), 68. 
1° For example, in 1760, the French-Canadian population was estimated to be comprised of 57,000 
people. By 1880, this figure had jumped to 1,080,000. Jacques Henripin, Tendances et Facteurs de la 
Fecondite au Canada (Ottawa: Bureau Federal de la Statistique, 1968), 5. 
11 Jacques Henripin, "From Acceptance of Nature to Control: The Demography of the French 
Canadians since the Seventeenth Century," The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science 
23, no. 1 (1957): 13. 
12 R. K. Vedder and L. E. Gallaway, "Settlement Patterns of Canadian Emigrants to the United States, 
1850-1960," The Canadian Journal of Economics 3, no. 3 (1970): 486. 
13 Claude Belanger. Ultramontane Nationalism: 1840-1960, Marianolpolis College, 2000. Accessed: 06 
April 2006. Available from: http://www2.marianopolis.edu/quebechistory/events/natpart3 .htm. 
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Quebec, the higher its rate of assimilation with its English-speaking neighbours. 14 
Indeed, as Table 1 illustrates, the proportion of Canadians living outside Quebec with 
French ethnic origin whose 'mother tongue' was English doubled between 1931 and 
1961. In other words, the French-Canadian presence in North America was gradually 
contracting, becoming increasingly limited to (and identified with) the solidly French-
speaking province of Quebec. 15 Quebec nationalism mirrored this demographic trend 
by redefining the boundaries of the French-Canadian nation to those of Quebec. Thus, 
le nation Canadien Fran9ais became le nation Quebecois. 
Province or territory 1931 1941 1951 1961 
Canada 4.7 5.8 7.9 9.9 
Newfoundland 78.0 85.2 
Princes Edward Island 22.6 29.0 46.3 55.1 
Nova Scotia 32.0 39.6 49.1 56.9 
New Brunswick 5.0 6.5 9.0 12.1 
Quebec 0.6 1.0 1.3 1.6 
Ontario 22.1 25.0 31.2 37.7 
Manitoba 12.1 14.5 22.4 30.3 
Saskatchewan 18.9 23.4 32.6 43.2 
Alberta 25.5 29.7 39.4 49.7 
British Colombia 50.4 53.6 56.8 64.7 
Yukon and N.W.T. 46.6 
Table 1: Population of French Ethnic Origin whose Mother Tongue is 
English, Canada and Provinces, 1931-1961 {Percentage) 16 
Though there were many differences between the newly-emerged Quebec 
nationalism and its French-Canadian predecessors, it did share their preoccupation 
with the survival of the French-Canadian nation in a hostile, Anglophone environment. 
However, unlike traditional nationalists, who sought to ensure the continued existence 
of the nation by protecting and upholding minority rights across Canada; 17 the Quebec 
nationalists believed that the best way to secure the nation was by protecting and 
14 Report of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism. Book One: The Official 
Languages, (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1967), 32. 
15 William D. Coleman, The Independence Movement in Quebec 1945-1980 (Toronto, Buffalo, London: 
University of Toronto Press, 1984), 219, Rudy Fenwick, "Social change and ethnic nationalism: An 
historical analysis of the separatist movement in Quebec," Comparative Studies in Society and History 
23, no. 2 (1981): 204, Kenneth McRoberts, "The sources of neo-nationalism in Quebec," in Quebec 
since 1945: Selected readings, ed. Michael D. Behiels (Toronto, ON.: Copp Clark Pitman Limited, 
1987), 81. 
16 Reproduced from: Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism. Book One, 33. 
17 Fenwick, "Social change and ethnic nationalism," 201-2. 
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upholding the rights of the majority in Quebec. To this end, the Quebec nationalists 
sought (and still seek) the transformation of Quebec's relationship with the Federal 
Government, so as to ensure that the political structures governing Quebec most 
suitably met and reflected the will of the Quebecois. 
One of the earliest and most prominent group of nationalists who attempted to 
achieve this goal was the provincial administration of Jean Lesage. Holding office 
from 1960 to 1966 (a period later known as la revolution tranquille, or 'the Quiet 
Revolution'), Lesage's government enacted a host of nationalist-inspired and often 
dramatic reforms. These included: the creation in 1961 of a Departement de relations 
provinciales-federales ('Department of Federal-Provincial Relations') which "began 
scrutinising every aspect of relations with Ottawa"; 18 the expansion of the provincial 
bureaucracy (the number of public employees increased from 36,766 in 1960 to 
56,258 in 1965); 19 and the 1963 nationalisation of the province's vanous 
hydroelectricity municipalities (forming Hydro Quebec). This last measure was the 
central issue of the 1962 general election; during which Lesage famously campaigned 
under the slogan "Maztres chez nous" ('Masters in our own house'). However, 
despite such rhetoric and the obvious strains that arose between Quebec and Ottawa 
during its tenure, the Lesage Administration was, ultimately, autonomist in character. 
That is, while Lesage and (most of) his ministers agitated for greater provincial 
control of government services, they nonetheless accepted Quebec's status within 
Confederation. 
The same could not be said, however, of such Quebecois figures as Michel 
Chaput, Pierre Bourgault, and Rene Levesque. To these nationalists, the solution to 
Quebec's problems lay not in merely readjusting the province's role within 
Confederation; but rather, in removing Quebec from Canada altogether. This 
separatist perspective was generally based on two lines of reasoning. First, the history 
of Canada since the Conquest had demonstrated that, while English-Canadians had 
earnestly tried to accommodate their French-speaking brethren, when the interests of 
both groups clashed, the 'English' would simply "rely on their numerical majority to 
18 Trofimenkoff, The Dream, 308. 
19 McRoberts, Quebec, 136. 
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achieve their goal."20 Second, the provincial government lacked the authority (and 
was unlikely to be granted the authority) to implement the measures - such as 
controlling immigration flows - that were needed in order to secure the future of the 
nation. Thus, only a sovereign Quebec, free of the institutionalised domination of 
Confederation and able to utilise the full gamut of policy options available to a nation-
state, could both secure and safeguard the needs of Francophone Quebec. 
Initially, public support for this separatist perspective of Quebec nationalism 
was low. For example, Hamilton and Pinard note that, in 1962, only 8 percent of 
male Francophones living in Quebec were in favour of the province becoming 
independent.21 However, as the 1960s progressed, popular support for separatism 
rose. As Figure 1 illustrates, the percentage of male Francophones living in Quebec 
who were in favour of independence grew by an average of one point each year 
between 1962 and 1973.22 The emergence of numerous political organisations 
advocating Quebec's independence reflected this increase in support. The first of 
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Figure 1: Male Francophones in Favour of Quebec Becoming Independent, 
Quebec, 1962-1973 (Percentage) 23 * Indicates Average Percentage 
2° Fenwick, "Social change and ethnic nationalism," 203. 
21 Richard Hamilton and Maurice Pinard, "The Quebec Independence Movement," in National 
Separatism, ed. Colin H. Williams (Vancouver and London: University of British Columbia Press, 
1982), 211. 
22 Ibid., 209. 
23 Ibid., 211. 
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these to surface was Alliance laurentienne in 1957; followed by the Action socialiste 
pour l 'independance du Quebec (ASIQ) and Rassemblement pour l 'independance 
nationale (RIN) in 1960, the Parti republican du Quebec (PRQ) in 1962; the 
Ralliement national (RN) in 1966; and, most famously, the Parti Quebecois in 1968.24 
It was from this milieu of separatist politics that the FLQ emerged. 
2 THEFLQ 
During the night of 7 and 8 March 1963, four youths, after spray-painting the 
letters 'FLQ' on a nearby wall, threw an incendiary device (glass bottles surrounded 
by a mesh net) at the Royal Montreal Regiment Armoury in Montreal. Given that the 
perpetrators had used kerosene as their accelerant - a substance which only ignites at 
very high temperatures - the apparatus smashed harmlessly. Nonetheless, the FLQ's 
campaign for an independent Quebec had begun. Over the next ten years, the 
movement would be responsible for an additional 212 violent acts.25 The majority of 
these (144) were bombings (both attempted and actual); followed by thefts and 
robberies (forty-eight), arson attacks (seventeen), kidnappings (two), and one assault. 
Although the FLQ generally ascribed to Jenkins' characterisation (i.e. they wanted "a 
lot of people watching, not a lot of people dead"), 26 FLQ violence did claim the lives 
24 For more information on these parties, see: James William Hagy, "Quebec separatists: The first 
twelve years," Queen's Quarterly 76, no. 2 (1969), John Saywell, The Rise of the Parti Quebecois 
1967-1976 (Toronto and Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 1977). 
25 This figure was derived from Kellett et al. 's database of terrorism incidents in Canada. Anthony 
Kellett et al., "Terrorism in Canada 1960-1989," (Ottawa: Ministry of the Solicitor General of Canada, 
1991), 226-85, 310-29. In total, Kellett et al. list 186 acts of nationalist-separatist 'terrorism' and fifty-
seven nationalist thefts and robberies from 1963 to 1972 (a total of 243 nationalist-separatist violent 
acts). This thesis obtained the smaller figure of 212 by only including those instances of violence that 
could be directly linked to the FLQ (and thus ignoring seemingly isolated and relatively-minor acts of 
nationalist-separatist violence). This thesis deemed such a linkage to exist if: ( 1) Kellett et al. 
attributed responsibility of the act to the FLQ; or (2) Fournier, Laurendeau, or Morf assigned the FLQ 
as the perpetrator of the act. Louis Fournier, F.L.Q.: The Anatomy of an Underground Movement, trans. 
Edward Baxter (Toronto: NC Press Limited, 1984), Marc Laurendeau, Les Quebecois violents: La 
violence politique 1962-1972, Augmented and updated ed. (Montreal: Bon~al, 1990), Gustave Morf, 
Terror In Quebec: Case studies of the FLQ (Toronto and Vancouver: Clarke, Irwin & Company 
Limited, 1970). 
26 Brian Jenkins, "Will terrorists go nuclear?," ORBIS 29, no. 3 (1985): 511. 
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of five civilians (as well as two FLQ members).27 The most common targets ofFLQ 
violence were: institutions associated with the Federal Government (such as Canada 
Post, Canadian National Railways, and the military); symbols of 'Anglo-Saxon' 
domination (in particular, the predominately Anglophone suburb of Westmont in 
Montreal); and businesses involved in protracted labour disputes. This latter target 
type was a reflection of the growing influence of Marxist/Leninist thought amongst 
some felquistes (the colloquial term for a member of the FLQ) from the mid-l 960s 
onwards. 
The key to understanding and conceptualising the FLQ is to realise that, in the 
words of Charters, "there never was a single organization called the FLQ."28 Rather, 
the FLQ was a movement; a series of autonomous networks that shared a com.1Ilon 
ideal of begetting le Quebec libre through the application of violence. Cross-
membership between these networks was minimal; though family and friends of 
captured felquistes would frequently appear in later networks. 29 Likewise, central 
leadership was virtually non-existent. While certainfelquistes - Pierre Vallieres and 
Charles Gagnon in particular - were able to exert a significant intellectual influence 
over sections of the movement, to describe them as "leaders of the FLQ ... overstates 
their contribution."3° For the most part, the FLQ's networks emerged, fought, and 
declined independently from each other. As a consequence, there was little continuity 
of experience and approach, with each network's strategic and operational decision-
making being largely a function of each network's membership. 
Primarily due to the diffuse and secretive nature of the movement, the exact 
number and composition of the FLQ's networks has yet to be determined.· 31 
Nevertheless, this thesis, drawing on the three main historical accounts of the FLQ (i.e. 
Fournier, Laurendeau, and Mort), as well as a host of more limited surveys (such as 
27 The civilians killed were: Wilfrid O'Neil (April 1963), Leslie Mc Williams (August 1964), Therese 
Morin (May 1966), Jeanne-D'Arc Saint-Germain (June 1970), and Pierre Laporte (October 1970). The 
FLQ members killed were: Jean Corbo (July 1966) and Pierre-Louis Bourret (September 1971). 
28 David A. Charters, "The amateur revolutionaries: A reassessment of the FLQ," Terrorism and 
Political Violence 9, no. 1 (1997): 138. · 
29 Ronald D. Crelinsten, "The internal dynamics of the FLQ during the October Crisis of 1970," in 
Inside Terrorist Organizations, ed. David C. Rapoport (London and Portland: Frank Cass, 2001), 59. 
3° Charters, "The amateur revolutionaries," 138. 
31 Wayne G. Reilly, "The management of political violence in Quebec and Northern Ireland: A 
comparison," Terrorism and Political Violence 6, no. 1 (1994): 50. 
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Crelinsten and de Vault and Johnson), has identified sixteen networks; comprised of 
an estimated 150-170 members.32 It is important to note that these approximations 
likely undervalue the actual number of FLQ networks and members; given that the 
Canadian authorities never identified all the perpetrators of a series of FLQ-claimed 
bombings (seventeen, plus ten attempted) from May to July 1970.33 
Of course, the FLQ's estimated 150-170 members were not spread evenly 
amongst the movement's sixteen networks. As Table 2 illustrates, some networks 
(such as the RQ and Levesque Networks) had between two and fourfelquistes; while 
the membership of others (like the First, Vallieres-Gagnon, and Lanctot-Rose 
Networks) extended to over twenty activists. Similarly, the FLQ's networks varied 
greatly in terms of productivity and the extent of the threat that they posed. At one 
extreme, the Geoffrey Network - the most prolific of the FLQ's networks - was 
responsible for forty-four violent acts between March 1968 and March 1969 
(including the infamous bombing of the Montreal Stock Exchange on 13 February 
1969). At the other end of the spectrum, the Canadian authorities were able to disrupt 
the Macaza Commando Unit before it could launch 'offensive operations'. 
2.1 COLLECTIVE ACTION FRAME 
Diagnosis 
Notwithstanding its organisational complexity, the FLQ had a relatively 
consistent collective action frame. Its diagnosis, while drawing on a range of societal 
ills, centred on a single meta-narrative. Specifically, that Quebec was une colonie. 
Ruling this colony were the 'Anglo-Saxons' (i.e. English-Canadians and Americans) 
who, through their routine and seemingly-innate discrimination and exploitation, were 
not only degrading the lives of the majority Quebecois, but also threatening the 
Francophone nation's very existence. Aiding and abetting the Anglo-Saxons in their 
32 Crelinsten, "The internal dynamics.", Carole de Vault and William Johnson, The Informer: 
Confessions of an Ex-Terrorist (Toronto: Fleet Books, 1982), Fournier, F.L.Q, Laurendeau, Les 
Quebecois violents, Morf, Terror In Quebec. 
33 Fournier suggests that some members of the UQAM Network, specifically Pierre-Louis Bourret, 
were responsible for some of these bombings. Fournier, F.L.Q., 192. 
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No. of No. of No.of Name Start End Members Acts Fatalities {Al!l!rox.} {Al!l!rox.} 
First Network 02/63 06/63 21-25 28 1 
Resistance du Quebec (RQ) 07/63 10/63 3 6 
Armee de liberation du Quebec 08/63 04/64 8-9 10 (ALQ) 
La Cognee Network 08/63 04/67 6-? 10 
Saint-Madeleine Network 04/64 05/64 3-5 1 
Partisans de l'independance du 05/64 05/64 3 1 Quebec {PIQ) Network 
Armee revolutionnaire du 06/64 09/64 13 1 1 Quebec (ARQ) 
Macaza Commando Unit ?/65 07/65 7 
Vallieres-Gagnon Network 12/65 09/66 13-22 9 1 
Geoffrey Network 03/68 03/69 10-11 44 
Dubreuil Network 05/68 05/72 2-6 10 
Fundraising Network 11/69 03/70 7-8 8 
Lanctot-Rose Network 12/69 12/70 30-35 2 1 
Saint-Henri Network 12/69 05/72 2-? ? 
Universite du Quebec a 05/70 06/72 21-26 17 Montreal (UQAM) Network 
Levesque Network 12/70 10/72 2-4 16 
FLQ (Unidentified Network) 50 1 
Table 2: FLQ Networks, Duration, Membership Composition, 
Acts Committed, and Fatalities, 1963-197234 
34 Data for this table is collated from: Crelinsten, "The internal dynamics.", de Vault and Johnson, The 
Informer, Fournier, F.L.Q, Kellett et al., "Terrorism in Canada 1960-1989.", Laurendeau, Les 
Quebecois violents, Morf, Terror In Quebec. 
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nefarious schemes were a "French-Canadian ruling class," which was "absolutely 
incapable of opposing" the system on which its privileges lay. 35 
As the FLQ's First Network announced in April 1963, the Quebecois' status 
as a colonised people was evident ''politiquement, socialement, economiquement."36 
Politically, because the provincial government lacked the "vital political levers" (such 
as full control over the economy) that were necessary for the Quebecois' survival.37 
Furthermore, the Anglo-Saxons constantly relied on their numerical, financial, and 
constitutional dominance "to maintain and accentuate the inferiority of the 
Quebecois."38 For instance, La Cognee (an FLQ-published journal) highlighted in 
October 1963 the attempts by Actor's Equity (an American trade union) to claim 
jurisdiction over the recently-opened Place des Arts in Montreal. As La Cognee 
fumed: "The American artists want to dictate to the Quebecois artists what they must 
do ... Once again, the legitimate aspirations of our people are betrayed, once again the 
coloniser reveals his contempt and will for exploitation."39 
Socially, the colonisation of the Quebecois was apparent by two phenomena. 
First, the disdain in which the Anglo-Saxons held Canada's French-speakers (the 
''white niggers of America");40 manifested in both employment discrimination, and 
the general abuse ("Speak White!") to which Francophones were subjected.41 Second, 
the colonial language's gradual conquest of Quebec. "We are 80% of the population 
and yet the English language dominates in most areas. Little by little French is 
relegated to the status of folklore whereas English becomes the working language."42 
Many felquistes expressed extreme anxiety over this last issue. For example, in its 
first edition, La Cognee berated Montreal's Catholic school board (la Commission des 
Ecoles Catholiques de Montreal, or CECM) for introducing a new program that 
required French-speaking students to learn English for fifteen minutes per day. 
35 Pierre Vallieres, White Niggers of America: The Precocious Autobiography of a Quebec 'Terrorist', 
trans. Joan Pinkham (New York and London: Monthly Review Press, 1971 ), 202. 
36 FLQ, "Messa~e du FLQ a la Nation," in La Veritable Histoire du F.L.Q., ed. Claude Savoie 
(Montreal: Les Editions du Jour, 1963), 43. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid. 
39 FLQ, "Le Quebec est une Colonie," La Cognee, no. 1 (1963): 3. 
40 Vallieres, White Niggers of America. 
41 FLQ, "Message du FLQ a la Nation," 44. 
42 Ibid. 
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According to the journal's editors, the "direct consequence" of this measure would be 
the "accelerated Anglicisation of our population" and that the CECM was guilty of 
"betray[ing] their nation and its past" and "shamefully colloborat[ing] with the 
colonizer."43 The Liberation Cell of the Lanctot-Rose network expressed similar 
concern about the assimilatory pressures of Bill 63 (a provincial language bill, 
introduced in 1969, which upheld the right of parents to school their children in either 
English of French) in its manifesto of October 1970.44 
However, the exploitation and slavery of the Quebecois was most evident (and 
ruinous) in the realm of economics. As the FLQ's First Network stated in 1963: 
"Only one sentence is sufficient to prove it: more than 80% of our economy is 
controlled by foreign interests. We provide the labour, they collect the profits."45 
Subsequent FLQ networks would gradually begin to frame Quebec's economic 
colonisation in terms of Marxist/Leninist arguments. Writing in 1968, Vallieres 
argued that, for the past 350 years, Quebec had been "subject to the interests of the 
dominant classes of the imperialist countries: first France, then England, and today the 
United States." 46 As a consequence, "its economy has always been directed, 
controlled, and organized by factors other than the needs of its population."47 This 
was manifested by Quebec's historic dependence on the export of "raw or semi-
finished" materials (e.g. fur, lumber, asbestos, and electricity) and foreign capital.48 
According to Vallieres, the greatest injustice of the colonial economic system 
under which the Quebecois lived was its inherent inequality. Specifically, the system 
allowed a minority (i.e. American imperialists and their allied English- and French-
Canadian bourgeoisie) to exploit and direct the energies of the majority (i.e. "the 
workers, the farmers, the petty white-collar workers, the students, the unemployed, 
43 FLQ, "Le Quebec est une Colonie," 4. 
44 FLQ. Manifesto of the Front de liberation du Quebec, Marianopolis College, 1970. Accessed: 20 
November 2005. Available from: 
http://www2.marianopolis.edu/ quebechistory/ docs/ october/manifest.htm. 
45 FLQ, "Message du FLQ a la Nation," 43. 
46 Vallieres, White Niggers of America, 232. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid., 232-3. 
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and those on welfare - that is, at least 90 percent of the population") for their own 
benefit. 49 As Vallieres states, the 
masses ... are being unjustly deprived of the ownership of their means of production, 
as well as of the wealth produced, culture, etc., and that they are being maintained in 
slavery in the name of democracy, the democracy of free enterprise and the 
exploitation of man by man. 50 
The Liberation Cell exuded a similar Marxist tint, castigating "the patronizing 'big 
bosses' and their henchmen who have made Quebec their hunting preserve for 'cheap 
labour' and unscrupulous exploitation"; the "hypocrite ... Bourassa [Liberal Premier 
from May 1970 to November 1976] who relies in Brinks armoured trucks,51 the living 
symbol of the foreign occupation of Quebec, to keep the poor natives of Quebec in the 
fear of misery and unemployment in which they are accustomed to living"; and the 
Federal Government, whose "policy of heavy importation" ruined Quebec's 
indigenous producers "for the benefit of a clutch of damned money-makers in their 
Cadillacs. "52 
Prognosis 
The FLQ's solution to Quebec's colonisation and associated problems was, 
not surprisingly, the independence of Quebec. The earlier networks largely portrayed 
this objective as a simple transfer of power; that is, wresting control of the 'vital 
political levers' away from the Anglo-Saxons. 53 However, to latter networks, 
corresponding with their Marxist/Leninist interpretation of Quebec's ills, such 
'political' independence was, by itself, inadequate. As Vallieres states: 
49 Ibid., 218-9, 58. 
50 Ibid., 223. 
51 This is a reference to the 'l'Affaire Brinks'. On 29 April 1970, two days before Quebec's general 
election, the Royal Trust (a trust company with its head office in Montreal) very publicly moved a large 
quantity of its securities (stocks, bonds, etc.) to its office in Toronto using nine Brinks armoured trncks. 
The Parti Quebecois suspected that the transfer had been staged at the behest of Bourassa's Liberal 
party to raise public anxiety about the possibly consequences of a Parti Quebecois victory (a dominant 
Liberal campaign theme). 
52 FLQ. Manifesto of the Front de liberation du Quebec. 
53 Crelinsten, "The internal dynamics," 60. 
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OK. Let's tell Ottawa to go to hell. And then? What's going to change? ... The 
iron of the North Shore, the asbestos of Asbestos, the mines of Abitibi, our forests 
and hydraulic resources, our conunerce, finance, and industry - and the political 
machines: will not all that still be the exclusive property of the Americans?54 
66 
'True' independence, from this perspective, required not only political separation, but 
also the abolition of the system which was directly responsible for the pervasive 
inequality of Quebec's society - namely, capitalism. In its place, the revolutionary-
minded felquistes envisaged "the construction of an egalitarian society, just and free, 
based on the collective practice of self-management at all levels (economic, 
administrative, academic, cultural)."55 
The FLQ's various networks sought to achieve this goal of independence 
(however they conceived it) by relying on the transformative powers of the 'armed 
struggle'. For example, the First Network announced that its "principal mission" in 
bringing about the "POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC INDEPENDENCE OF 
QUEBEC" was "to COMPLETELY DESTROY, through SYSTEMATIC 
SABOTAGE" a host of Anglo-Saxon, colonial targets. 56 Similarly, La Cognee 
promoted both the necessity of creating "un mouvement insurrectionnel," as well as 
using all possible means, ''whether they are violent or not," to achieve the 
revolution.57 Finally, Vallieres called on his supporters to reject the "illusory promise 
of victory without combat ... Even if violence is a phenomenon detestable in itself, it 
is nonetheless true that for exploited and colonized people like ourselves, freedom 
grows out of the barrel of a gun."58 
However, while the FLQ advocated the primacy of violence as an instrument 
of change, it did not provide any real conception of how the use of violence would 
actually engender the independence of Quebec. The closest any of the FLQ's 
networks came to establishing a connection between coercive force and Quebec's 
freedom was in the 1966 document, Revolutionary Strategy and the Role of the Avant-
Garde. This nine-page strategic analysis maintained that Quebec's war for national 
54 Vallieres, White Niggers of America, 235. 
55 FLQ, Strategie Revolutionnaire et Role de !'Avant Garde (Paris: 1970), 1. 
56 FLQ, "Revolution par le Peuple pour le Peuple," in La Veritable Histoire du F.L.Q., ed. Claude 
Savoie (Montreal: Les Editions du Jour, 1963), 27. 
57 FLQ, "La Non-violence et la Guerre de Liberation," La Cognee, no. 13 (1964): 9, FLQ, "Pourquoi un 
Parti Revolutionnaire Clandestin?," La Cognee, no. 7 (1964): 6. 
58 Vallieres, White Niggers of America, 269. 
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liberation would be both long in duration and comprise of three stages. That is, the 
"radicalisation of social agitation" (primarily a political stage; the objective of which 
was to use various means - including violence - to raise class consciousness); the 
"organisation of the masses"; and unlimited "popular insurrection" (utilising both 
political and military means). 59 However, even this document was, in the words of 
Charters, 
more of an idealistic call to action than a genuine strategy. It made good propaganda, 
excited revolutionary intellectuals, and worried the authorities - who apparently took 
it more seriously than it deserved - but in practical terms, it was too vague to serve 
as a blueprint for revolutionary warfare.60 
This seeming lack of strategic depth within the FLQ is most likely a reflection of what 
Charters describes elsewhere as the 'revolutionary amateurishness' of the FLQ's 
membership; who, by and large, were motivated less by an understanding or even 
knowledge of revolutionary theory, and more by a rudimentary "impulse to action."61 
Justificatory Arguments 
Nonetheless, despite not providing much detail about how it expected the use 
of violence to achieve its goals; the FLQ did go to considerable length to justify its 
armed struggle. Consistent with Gurr and O'Boyle, the FLQ framed its justificatory 
arguments both in moral and utilitarian terms. With regard to the former, the FLQ 
proffered two lines of reasoning. The first and minor of these was based on the twin 
assumptions that: (1) "defensive wars and wars of liberation" (in contrast with 
"imperialist wars") are "morally acceptable" (if not ''worthy of praise"); and (2) the 
war to liberate Quebec was one of these. 62 As La Cognee states: "one can thus 
conclude that our war is moral."63 
59 FLQ, Strategie Revolutionnaire, 1-4. 
60 David A. Charters, "The October Crisis: Implications for Canada's Internal Security," in Terror, ed. 
Brian MacDonald (Toronto: The Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 1986), 59. 
61 Charters, "The amateur revolutionaries," 139-4 7. 
62 FLQ, "La Non-violence et la Guerre de Liberation," 7. 
63 Ibid. 
Front de liberation du Quebec 68 
However, the FLQ's principal moral argument was that the movement's 
armed struggle was justified because violence is the natural and uncontrollable 
consequence of oppression and exploitation. Responsibility for the movement's 
actions thus lay not with the FLQ, but with the oppressors and exploiters. This 
reasoning is evident in the communique which the First Network released in the wake 
of its bombing of an army recruiting centre on 20 April 1963; an otherwise uneventful 
attack, except that it unintentionally killed the centre's night watchman, Wilfrid 
O'Neil. After dismissively claiming that "a revolution does not occur alas, without 
the spilling of blood"; 64 the First Network stated: "For the death of O'Neil, the 
culprits are not the Patriots. They are all the collaborators, the wretched exploiters 
who compel the Quebecois Patriots to take up arms for the freedom of the nation."65 
Other networks were also quick to embrace this moral rationalisation. For example, 
La Cognee announced in May 1964 that "We did not choose clandestinity and 
violence: they were imposed upon us." 66 Likewise, Vallieres argued that since 
revolutionary violence "is the product of the very contradictions of the colonial, 
capitalist system, it can disappear only with the system itself."67 
Seemingly at odds with this moral calculation was the FLQ's central utilitarian 
justificatory argument. In essence, this line of reasoning implied that the Quebecois 
did have a choice in the means which they could employ to beget Quebec's 
independence. However, because the alternative means - limited to pacifism and 
electoralism - were ineffective, the armed struggle was the most effective by default. 
The FLQ's rejection of pacifism centred on two arguments. First, that it had proved 
fruitless in the past. As La Cognee proclaimed: "Two centuries of pacifism did not 
liberate our fatherland from Anglo-Saxon colonialism ... to persevere with pacifism 
would be treasonous or insane."68 Second, that a campaign of non-violence would 
delay the realisation of Quebec's liberation and, in doing so, impose unneeded 
suffering on the proletariat.69 
64 FLQ, "Communique," in La Veritable Histoire du F.L.Q., ed. Claude Savoie (Montreal: Les Editions 
du Jour, 1963), 59. 
65 Ibid. 
66 FLQ, "Nous Continuons," La Cognee, no. 12 (1964): 1. 
67 Vallieres, White Niggers of America, 260. 
68 FLQ, "Nous Continuons," 1. 
69 Vallieres, White Niggers of America, 202. 
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The arguments on which the FLQ based its dismissal of electoralism were of 
varying validity. For instance, La Cognee rebuffed the suggestion of prominent 
independantistes that "constitutional freedoms and democratic guarantees" made it 
possible for separatists ''to seize power by the electoral way," by claiming that there 
was no "national parliament" (the Federal Parliament being rejected as a foreign 
government; the Quebec Parliament as not having control over all the nation's 
territory) in which the FLQ could "govern in the name of all the nation."70 In a latter 
issue, La Cognee asserted that since elections are held only once every four years, the 
electoral path would likely "defer independence for a century or two.'.n However, the 
FLQ's strongest argument against electoralism was that it was a process inherently 
corrupted by money. As the Liberation Cell announced in October 1970: 
what we call democracy in Quebec is nothing but the democracy of the rich ... the 
British parliamentary system is finished and the Front de liberation du Quebec will 
never allow itself to be fooled by the pseudo-elections that the Anglo-Saxon 
capitalists toss to the people of Quebec every four years. 72 
This contention was based on the observation that to obtain power via the electoral 
process, a party required a substantial political machine. Unfortunately, maintaining 
this machine was expensive; potentially costing the party "millions of dollars."73 In 
order to meet this cost, the party would have to become increasingly reliant on - if not 
subservient to - those ''who exploit our people," the "local and foreign capitalists."74 
Given this subservience, no party would be able to pursue polices - such as 
independence - that deviated greatly from the interests of its 'owners'. Thus, as 
Vallieres states: "We were (and still are) convinced that on the ground of electoralism, 
the battle is always lost for the wage-earners, that is, for the vast majority of the 
nation.''75 
7° FLQ, "Pourquoi un Parti Revolutionnaire Clandestin?," 4. 
71 FLQ, "La Non-violence et la Guerre de Liberation," 7. 
72 FLQ. Manifesto of the Front de liberation du Quebec. 
73 Vallieres, White Niggers of America, 212. 
74 FLQ, "Pourquoi un Parti Revolutionnaire Clandestin?," 5, Vallieres, White Niggers of America, 212. 
75 Vallieres, White Niggers of America, 211-2. 
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2.2 RECRUITMENT PROCESS 
Not surprisingly, given its diffuse nature, the FLQ lacked a permanent and 
centralised recruitment network. Rather, each of the movement's networks had its 
own (in most cases ad hoc) recruitment network. The scope of these was generally 
limited. That is, a direct relationship tie tended to connect new recruits with current-
members or (with regard to those who founded new networks) other potential-
members. In some cases, familial bonds would form the basis of this interpersonal 
connection. For example, Fran9ois Lanctot, and Jacques and Louise Cossette-Trudel 
joined the Lanctot-Rose Network through their relationship (as brother, brother-in-law, 
and sister, respectively) with Jacques Lanctot. However, in a large number of cases, 
the direct relationship tie that facilitated recruitment into the FLQ was developed in 
the context of the various 'radical' separatist groups which were prevalent in 
Quebecois politics. Generally speaking, these groups sought to achieve le Quebec 
libre through the use of various 'paralegal' instruments, such as demonstrations, 
boycotts, and social agitation. 76 They thus attracted those independantistes who were 
already disillusioned with the 'limits' of conventional political action (i.e. those most 
susceptible to accepting the FLQ's collective action frame) and were important 
meeting grounds for a host of futurefelquistes. For instance, the founders of the First 
Network - Georges Schoeters, Raymond Villeneuve, and Gabriel Hudon - met each 
other while they were members of Reseau de resistance (RR), a 'radical' group 
established in November 1962;77 a large proportion of the Vallieres-Gagnon Network 
knew each other from their membership in the Mouvement de liberation populaire 
(MLP); 78 and Francis Simard met Paul Rose (both members of the Lanctot-Rose 
Network) during their mutual affiliation with the Rassemblement pour l 'independance 
nationale (RIN).79 
76 Charters, "The amateur revolutionaries," 151. 
77 Gellner, Bayonets in the Streets, 62-3. 
78 Vallieres, White Niggers of America, 211-3. 
79 Francis Simard, Talking it out: The October Crisis from Inside, trans. David Homel (Toronto: 
Guernica, 1987), 117-9. 
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3 THE CANADIAN GOVERNMENT AND ITS SECURITY FORCES 
Since 1867, Canada has maintained a federal system of parliamentary 
government. While the Federal Government, based in Ottawa, is accountable for such 
matters as the "raising of Money by any Mode or System of Taxation," foreign 
relations, and "Militia, Military and Naval Service, and Defence"; the Provincial 
Governments (of which there were twelve in the mid-twentieth century) are amenable 
for concerns like public health, the "Administration of Justice" and the "Imposition of 
Punishment by Fine, Penalty, or Imprisonment."80 Given this distribution of powers, 
the Government of Quebec had primary responsibility for counteracting the FLQ 
threat. However, due to concerns within the Federal Government about the rise of 
separatist sentiment in Quebec, and that a number of felquiste targets (e.g. military 
armouries and diplomatic personnel) fell under the purview of Ottawa's liability, 
successive Federal Administrations (specifically, those of Lester Pearson and Pierre 
Trudeau) sought to play a significant role in anti-FLQ efforts. 81 
The Federal and Quebec Governments deployed four major security forces 
against the FLQ. The first three of these were police forces; specifically, the Royal 
Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), the Surete du Quebec, and Montreal's municipal 
police. The difference between these agencies was largely one of jurisdiction. 
Whereas the RCMP was Canada's federal police force,82 Montreal's municipal police 
were tasked with maintaining law and order within the confines of Greater Montreal. 
The Surete du Quebec, meanwhile, was responsible for policing: in provincial areas 
not covered by Quebec's various municipal police forces; and with regard to certain 
provincial laws, such as those regulating gambling, racketeering and political 
violence.83 Though statistics for the 1960s and early-1970s are unavailable, in 1975, 
8° Constitution Act, 1867, Department of Justice, Canada, 13 April 2006. Available from: 
http://lois.justice.gc.ca/en/const/c 1867 _ e.html. 
81 Peter Janke, Terrorism and Democracy: Some Contemporary Cases (Houndsmill, Basingstoke, 
Hampshire, and London: Macmillan, 1992), 46-7. 
82 Though the RCMP is responsible for federal policing matters, it also contracts out its services to 
various provinces and municipalities. 
83 William Kelly and Nora Kelly, Policing in Canada (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1976), 51. 
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the RCMP had a strength of approximately 6,500 officers, the Surete du Quebec 4,049, 
and Montreal's municipal police 5,735.84 
The fourth security force was the Canadian Army. Its campaign against the 
FLQ was a relatively limited one; both temporally (the Federal Government only 
deployed the army against the FLQ from 15 October 1970 to 4 January 1971) and 
operationally (it was largely restricted to guarding Federal and other important 
buildings in Montreal, Quebec City and Ottawa). Nevertheless, the Canadian Army's 
deployment did have a significant impact on the Quebecois political psyche (an issue 
that will be discussed in greater detail below). In 1970, the Canadian Army 
comprised 37,300 regular soldiers;85 though only 12,500 of these were deployed in the 
campaign against the FLQ.86 
4 THE FLQ'S REGENERATIVE EXPERIENCE 
From its inception in February 1963 to October 1970, the FLQ enjoyed a 
strong regenerative capacity. The movement's rate of attrition over this period was 
both high and constant. As Table 3 illustrates, the primary source of this incessant 
loss of personnel was security force pressure. In all, the RCMP, the Surete du Quebec 
and Montreal's municipal police arrested ninety felquistes; as well as compelling a 
further five to flee into exile. Though far from perfect, the security force's response 
to the FLQ benefited from three factors: (1) institutionalised cooperation between the 
RCMP, Surete du Quebec and Montreal's municipal police in the form of the 
Combined Anti-Terrorist Squad (CATS), a multi-agency taskforce created in 1964; (2) 
high-level concern within the Federal Government about the FLQ (a reflection of 
Ottawa's intrinsic sensitivity towards the rise of separatist sentiment in Quebec); and 
(3) the general ineptitude of some felquistes. This ineptitude, unfortunately, was 
evident on 14 July 1966, when Jean Corbo, a sixteen year old member of the 
Vallieres-Gagnon Network, was killed by a premature explosion. In addition to 
deaths and arrests, the FLQ also suffered from an indeterminate number of desertions 
84 Ibid., 31, 54. 
85 International Institute for Strategic Studies, Military Balance (London: The Institute for Strategic 
Studies, 1969-1970), 20. 
86 Dan G. Loomis, Not Much Glory: Quelling the FLQ (Toronto: Deneau, 1984), 144. 
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prior to October 1970. For instance, Fournier contends that, by 1967, "almost all" of 
the La Cognee Network's members had abandoned the armed struggle and joined "the 
'legal' independence movement."87 
Year No. of No. of No. of FLQ Networks Formed FLQ Networks Declined Arrests Exiles Deaths 
First, La Cognee 
1963 23 1 Networks and the ALQ First and RQ Networks 
and RQ 
PIQ, Saint-Madeleine PIQ, Saint-Madeleine 1964 28 Networks and the ARQ Networks and the ALQ 
and ARQ 
Vallieres-Gagnon Network 
1965 10 and the Macaza Macaza Commando Unit 
Commando Unit 
1966 13 1 Vallieres-Gagnon Network 
1967 La Cognee Network 
1968 Geoffrey and Dubreuil Networks 
Fundraising, Lanctot-
1969 3 4 Rose, Saint-Henri Geoffrey Network 
Networks 
1970t 13 UQAM Network Fundraising Network 
Table 3: FLQ, Number of Arrests, Exiles, and Deaths, Networks 
Formed and Declined, per year, 1963-0ctober 197088 
t Prior to October only 
However, the FLQ was able to withstand the significant and persistent 
attritional pressure of the 1960s because new recruits kept coming forward; either to 
join existing networks or, with the assistance of like-minded acquaintances, form new 
networks. For instance, on 29 May 1963, the security forces, acting on information 
provided by an informer, launched a series of raids on suspected FLQ residences 
around Quebec. This operation was a considerable success, with the police arresting 
nineteen felquistes and effectively crippling the First Network's ability to conduct 
further attacks. However, within thee months, between fifteen and twenty new 
felquistes had stepped forward; creating the Armee de liberation du Quebec (ALQ), 
the Resistance du Quebec (RQ) and the La Cognee Network. This pattern of 
regeneration would be replicated time and time again over the next six years. The 
only real aberration was the eighteen month gap between the demise of the Vallieres-
87 Fournier, F.L.Q., 98. 
88 Data for this table is collated from: Crelinsten, "The internal dynamics.", de Vault and Johnson, The 
Informer, Fournier, F.L.Q, Kellett et al., "Terrorism in Canada 1960-1989.", Laurendeau, Les 
Quebecois violents, Morf, Terror In Quebec. 
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Gagnon Network in September 1966 and the rise of the Geoffrey and Dubreuil 
Networks in early-to-mid 1968; a significant pause in the FLQ's regenerative impulse. 
Nevertheless, by October 1970, even though the movement had lost approximately 
100 members over the previous seven years, there were four FLQ networks in 
existence, with an estimated combined membership of forty-to-fifty felquistes - the 
largest number ofjelquistes to be operational at anyone time. 
4.1 THE OCTOBER CRISIS 
The beginning of the end for the FLQ was the October Crisis of 1970. This 
ultimately-defining event began on the 5th of October, when the 'Liberation Cell' 
(seven members of the Lanctot-Rose Network, led by Jacques Lanctot) kidnapped 
James Cross, the British Trade Commissioner to Montreal. In return for his freedom, 
the Liberation Cell demanded (amongst other things): the cessation of all police 
activities designed to find the kidnappers; a "voluntary tax of $500,000 in gold 
bullion"; and the release of twenty-three imprisoned felquistes and their guaranteed 
free passage to either Algeria or Cuba.89 Three days later, the Federal Government 
acquiesced to the Liberation Cell's "minimum demand for continued dialogue" and 
authorised Radio-Canada to broadcast the group's manifesto. 90 Within forty-eight 
hours, on the evening of the 10th of October, four other members of the Lanctot-Rose 
Network (operating independently of Lanctot's group, and calling themselves the 
'Chenier Cell') 91 sought to bolster the Liberation Cell's negotiating position by 
abducting Pierre Laporte, Deputy Premier and Minister for Employment and 
Immigration of Quebec. 
This second kidnapping had a "profound psychological impact on the 
provincial and federal govemments";92 not only because of the victim's high-profile 
89 FLQ. Demands of the FLQ, Marianopolis College, 6 October 1970. Accessed: 13 April 2006. 
Available from: http://www2.marianopolis.edu/quebechistory/docs/october/demands.htm. 
9° Crelinsten, "The internal dynamics," 62. 
91 Due to a split within the Lanctot-Rose Network in September 1970 over strategic issues, the 
Liberation and Chenier Cells maintained distinct decision-making processes before and during the 
October Crisis. Nevertheless, each cell was in intermittent contact with the other, and generally relied 
on the same body of 'supporter-:felquistes' for assistance. 
92 Janke, Terrorism and Democracy, 51. 
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and close relationships with many inside the corridors of power (including the Prime 
Minister, Pierre Trudeau), but also because it suggested (erroneously, in hindsight) 
that the FLQ was larger and more capable than had been previously assumed. 
However, of greater concern to the authorities was the apparent outpouring of 
Quebecois sympathy for the Liberation Cell's manifesto and, to a lesser extent, the 
FLQ itself. 93 Evidence (at least from the Federal and Quebec Governments' 
viewpoint) of this sympathy included: (1) favourable editorials in such Francophone 
newspapers as Quebec-Presse, which on the 11th of October rebuked condemnations 
of the FLQ's actions and declared "that the struggle for the liberation of Quebec is a 
basic requirement"; 94 (2) the publication on the 14th of October of a statement by 
sixteen prominent Quebecois journalists, politicians, and trade unionists, calling on 
Trudeau to negotiate with the FLQ, while also "virulently attacking Ottawa's hard-
line";95 (3) a demonstration on the 15th of October by approximately 3,000 students at 
the Universite de Montreal (UdeM) in support of the Liberation Cell's manifesto and 
the release of the imprisoned felquistes; 96 and (4) most disturbingly from Ottawa's 
perspective, a notable absence of Quebecois outrage over the kidnappings. 97 
By the 15th of October, the Federal and Quebec Governments had reached the 
conclusion that an "apprehended insurrection" existed in the province of Quebec.98 
The essence of this concept (which has seen attracted considerable controversy)99 was 
not that an insurrection was actually ongoing, or necessarily even planned; but rather, 
given the seeming strength of the FLQ and its growing support, that an insurrection 
"was a possible outcome" if conditions in Quebec were left unchecked. 100 Thus, the 
93 Stephane Leman-Langlois and Jean-Paul Brodeur, "Terrorism Old and New: Counterterrorism in 
Canada," Police Practice and Research 6, no. 2 (2005): 130. 
94 Raphael Cohen-Almagor, "The terrorists' best ally: The Quebec media coverage of the FLQ crisis in 
October 1970," Canadian Journal of Communication 25, no. 2 (2000): 264-5. 
95 Crelinsten, "The internal dynamics," 63. 
96 Michael Freeman, Freedom or Security: The Consequences for Democracies using Emergency 
Powers to Fight Terror (Westport and London: Praeger, 2003), 127. 
97 Ronald D. Crelinsten, "Power and meaning: Terrorism as a struggle over access to the 
communication structure," in Contemporary Research on Terrorism, ed. Paul Wilkinson and Alasdair 
M. Stewart (Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press, 1987), 432. 
98 War Measures Act, 16 October 1970. Accessed: 30 April 2006. Available from: 
http://www2.marianopolis.edu/quebechistory/docs/october/wm-act.htm. 
99 George Bain, "The making of a crisis," in Power Corrupted: The October Crisis and the Repression 
of Quebec, ed. Abraham Rotstein (Toronto: New Press, 1971), 11, Denis Smith, Bleeding Hearts ... 
Bleeding Country: Canada and the Quebec Crisis (Edmonton: Hurtig, 1971), 46-50. 
10° Charters, "The amateur revolutionaries," 159. 
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Federal and Quebec Governments decided to abandon their traditional 'criminal 
justice' approach to combating the FLQ, 101 and instead launch a vigorous campaign 
aimed at incapacitating the violent separatist movement and "shock[ing] the Quebec 
public out of its confusion into support for established authority."102 
The first step in this campaign was the deployment of Canadian Army troops 
(ultimately numbering 12,500) to Quebec City and Montreal on the 15th of October; 
tasked with aiding the local police forces and protecting public buildings. Next, in the 
early hours of the 16th of October, Trudeau invoked the War Measures Act 1970 
(WMA). This emergency statute (which had only been invoked twice before in 
Canada's history- both in wartime) provided the Federal Government with extensive 
powers; covering such areas as censorship, exclusion and deportation, control of 
Canada's territorial waters, transportation, exportation and importation, and the 
appropriation of property. 103 Under this "umbrella of powers," the Federal 
Government also passed the Public Order Regulations 1970.104 This decree enacted a 
series of measures specific to the government's anti-FLQ campaign. Specifically, the 
Public Order Regulations 1970 declared that the FLQ was "an unlawful association"; 
introduced penalties for membership of, and support for, the FLQ; permitted police 
officers to conduct searches and seize property without warrant; and, most 
controversially, allowed suspects to be detained for twenty-one days without charge 
and ninety days without trial. 105 Using these last powers, the various police agencies 
operating in Quebec detained without charge 238 suspected FLQ members and 
101 Prior to October 1970, the Canadian anti-FLQ campaign was a near-perfect representation of the 
criminal justice approach to countering non-state violence. That is, the government gave 
"responsibility for bearing the 'brunt' of the confrontation" to the police (as opposed to the Canadian 
Armed Forces); and the police conducted their operations and brought charges against suspected 
felquistes within the established legal framework. Peter Chalk, West European Terrorism and 
Counter-Terrorism: The Evolving Dynamic (Basingstoke and London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1996), 97, 
Ronald D. Crelinsten and Alex P. Schmid, "Western responses to terrorism: A twenty-five year balance 
sheet," Terrorism and Political Violence 4, no. 4 (1992): 307-9. 
102 Smith, Bleeding Hearts, 34. See also: Jean-Frans;ois Duchaine, "Rapport sur les evenements 
d'Octobre 1970," (Quebec: Direction generale des publications gouvemementales, 1981 ), 116-7. 
103 War Measures Act. 
104 Freeman, Freedom or Security, 122. 
105 Public Order Regulations, 16 October 1970. Accessed: 30 April 2006. Available from: 
http://www2.marianopolis.edu/ quebechistory/ docs/ october/regsoct.htm. 
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sympathisers within hours of the WMA's invocation, and a further 230 people during 
the remainder of the year. 106 
The October Crisis reached its nadir, however, on the night of the 17th of 
October, when Pierre Laporte (under still uncertain circumstances) was killed. 107 
After police found his body in the trunk of a car the next day, a wave of revulsion 
swept over Canada. However, despite this public outrage and the security force's 
extensive new powers, it was not until the 6th of November that the police scored their 
first breakthrough in relation to the kidnappings; arresting Bernard Lortie of the 
Chenier Cell. The security force's next success was the capture of Jacques and Louise 
Cossette-Trudel of the Liberation Cell on the 3rd of December. However, the 
Cossette-Trudels' time in detention was brief, as the authorities negotiated safe 
passage to Cuba for them and three other members of the Liberation Cell in exchange 
for Cross's release. 108 These five felquistes remained in exile (both in Cuba and in 
France) until the late-1970s, when, after obtaining permission from the ruling Parti 
Quebecois, they slowly returned home; receiving (relatively) short prison sentences 
for their actions during the October Crisis. Meanwhile, on 27 December 1970, the 
last three members of the Chenier Cell were eventually detained. A week later, the 
troops in Quebec City and Montreal returned to their barracks and on 30 April 1971 
the Public Order Act, which had succeeded and mirrored the WMA, was withdrawn, 
"returning Canada to a state of normalcy."109 
106 Freeman, Freedom or Security, 123, Ron Haggart and Aubery E. Golden, Rumours of War (Toronto: 
New Press, 1971), 171. 
107 According to Simard (one of Laporte's kidnappers), on the day before he died, Laporte· had 
managed to untie his bonds and, while still blindfolded, throw himself against a window (with a pillow 
for protection) in a bid to escape. Simard, Talking it out, 47-8. Unfortunately, Laporte's attempt at 
freedom not only failed, but he also cut himself badly in the process. According to Crelinsten, the 
Chenier cell refused to take him to hospital for treatment and, on the 1 ?1h of October, "Laporte was 
killed ... and the circumstances surrounding his death remain unclear to this day." Crelinsten, "The 
internal dynamics," 64. 
108 It is important to note that two members of the Liberation cell - Nigel Hamer and an anonymous 
woman who has never been identified - left the hideout were Cross was being held in late October, 
1970. Consequently, they both managed to avoid police detection. Indeed, it was not until 1980 that 
the police arrested Nigel Hamer for his role in the October Crisis. 
109 Freeman, Freedom or Security, 121. 
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4.2 THE WEAKENING OF THE FLQ'S REGENERATIVE CAPACITY 
In the wake of the October Crisis, the FLQ's capacity to regenerate began to 
irrevocably weaken. This deterioration was the result of less a change in the 
movement's rate of attrition (which remained both high and constant), and more the 
gradual decline in the movement's recruitment. In other words, unlike the FLQ's 
prior-experience, new recruits were not coming forward to replace the movement's 
often-devastating loss of personnel. This dynamic was increasingly evident from 
November 1970 to the end of 1971. During this period, the police arrested twenty-
eight felquistes and forced five others into exile; effectively dismantling the Lanctot-
Rose Network and seriously degrading the operational capability of the UQAM 
Network. The FLQ also suffered one death (Pierre-Louis Bourret on 24 September 
1971 ), and an indefinite number of desertions; with key felquistes such as Robert 
Comeau, Nigel Hamer, and Gilles Cossette gradually disassociating themselves from 
the UQAM Network and joining other, non-violent separatist organisations, like the 
Front d 'action politique (FRAP). However, over these same fourteen months, only 
an estimated dozen new recruits emerged. Four of these established the Levesque 
Network in December 1970, while the remaining eight joined the UQAM Network.110 
As 1972 progressed, the divergence between the FLQ's rates of attrition and 
recruitment expanded even further. For instance, on the 25th of May, the police 
detained the seeming last two active members of the Saint-Henri Network. A month 
later, the UQAM Network was subdued after four of its felquistes were arrested. 
Finally, in August and September, following its robbery of a credit union in Montreal 
(the last recorded act of FLQ violence), the police arrested the four members of the 
Levesque Network. In earlier times, the FLQ would have responded to these losses 
110 It is important to note that the status of these eight new UQAM recruits is contested. This is 
primarily due to their connection with Carole de Vault, who was both a member of the UQAM 
Network and a police informer. Because of this last fact, some observers have accused de Vault of 
being an "agent provocateur," guilty of creating a ''phony FLQ." Fournier, F.L.Q., 277. However, de 
Vault vehemently denies these charges, portraying herself as both a pawn and witness of events. de 
Vault and Johnson, The Informer. Nevertheless, whatever role de Vault may have played, it does 
appear that the eight new UQAM recruits listed above were unaware of de Vault's connection with the 
police (indeed, many were arrested for crimes they committed in the name of the FLQ), and joined the 
movement because they wanted to engender Quebec's independence through the armed struggle. It is 
for these reasons that this thesis identifies the eight new UQAM recruits as members of the FLQ. 
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with an influx (possibly belated) of new recruits; launching the struggle for Quebec's 
independence anew. However, with the demise of the Saint-Henri, UQAM and 
Levesque Networks, no new recruits emerged. As a result, both the FLQ and its 
campaign of violence came to an end. The FLQ's name would be associated with a 
number of future violent incidents. In particular, a bomb threat during the 1976 
Olympic Games in Montreal, and two firebomb attacks in 1986 and 1989. However, 
as Kellett states, "the police assessed these incidents as the work of a few crackpots, 
and discounted the possibility of a resurgent FLQ."111 
5 ANALYSIS 
From the above account of the FLQ's regenerative experience, it appears that a 
decrease in recruitment played a greater role than an increase in attrition in weakening 
the movement's capacity to regenerate. Underlying this judgment is the observation 
that the deterioration of the FLQ's regenerative capacity coincided with a notable 
reduction in the number of aspiring-felquistes willing to join an existing, of form a 
new, network; but not with a discernible increase in the number of felquistes who 
were arrested or killed, or who deserted. This is not to deny that the FLQ's losses 
following the October Crisis were both considerable and relentless. However, while 
the FLQ's loss of personnel during this period was certainly debilitating, it was no 
more debilitating than before the kidnappings of Cross and Laporte. 
In light of the above findings, the remainder of this chapter will thus focus on 
exploring whether the FLQ's decrease in recruitment from October 1970 onwards was 
the result of 'the amelioration of grievances', 'selective government repression', 
and/or 'the discrediting of the insurgent actor's ideology'. 
111 Anthony Kellett, "Terrorism in Canada, 1960-1992," in Violence in Canada: Sociopolitical 
Perspectives, ed. Jeffrey Ian Ross (Don Mills: Oxford University Press, 1995), 291. 
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5.1 A DECREASE IN RECRUITMENT 
The Amelioration of Grievances 
There is little support for the notion that the FLQ 's intake of recruits declined 
because of the amelioration of grievances. Rather, by the early-1970s, the grievances 
which lay at the heart of the movement's collective action frame had only been 
slightly alleviated (if at all). As aforementioned, the FLQ framed its diagnosis in 
terms of Quebec's alleged political, economic and social colonisation. Arguably the 
most improvement had been made with regard to the former. Beginning with the 
election of Jean Lesage in 1960, Quebec's governing class had become increasingly 
assertive in demarcating the province's autonomy. Though Ottawa rejected some of 
the Quebec Government's demands (particularly those that touched on the sensitive 
issue of Quebec's international status), it acquiesced to many. For instance, by the 
early-1960s, the Lesage Administration had formalised the doctrine of 'opting-out'. 
That is, the notion that Quebec should be able to receive full federal funding ''without 
condition of sponsorship."112 Successive administrations were also able to convince 
Ottawa that, "[i]n order to organize Quebec's social and economic life in conformity 
with its own spirit," the Quebec Government should control the administration of 
federal programs in the province. 113 
However, the Federal Government's response to the October Crisis 
overshadowed these political achievements. By deploying troops and invoking 
emergency powers, the Trudeau Administration essentially confirmed one of the FLQ 
and broader separatist movement's central complaints against the Federal-Provincial 
relationship. Specifically, while Ottawa may have seemed eager to accommodate 
Francophone Quebec, when its vital interests were at stake, it would not hesitate to 
use every aspect of its power to "subordinate Quebec to its will."114 The impact of the 
October Crisis on separatist and general Quebecois sentiment was thus dramatic. As 
Charters states, "the enduring image of the October Crisis is not the body of Pierre 
112 McRoberts, Quebec, 140. 
113 Trofimenkoff, The Dream, 309. 
114 McRoberts, Quebec, 201. 
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Laporte, the victim of an FLQ assassination; it is the troops on the streets of Montreal, 
the symbol of federal repression." 115 Indeed, Premier Jacques Parizeau made 
reference to the WMA and the detention of hundreds of suspected felquistes as late as 
the 1995 referendum campaign on Quebec's independence; a clear sign of the lasting 
resentment that the Federal Government's actions during October 1970 generated. 116 
Likewise, the gnevances which underscored the FLQ's indictment of 
Quebec's economic colonisation had only been marginally ameliorated by the time 
the movement's recruitment had evaporated. Beginning in the early-1960s, 
successive Federal and Quebec Governments introduced numerous measures to 
improve the economic lot of Quebec's Francophones. For instance, Loomis describes 
how Lester Pearson, Prime Minister from 1963 to 1968, created such initiatives as the 
Canada Development Corporation and the Economic Council of Canada with the twin 
objectives of winning the "hearts and minds" of Canada's French-speaking peoples 
and combating the FLQ's exploitation of "the so-called contradiction of 'economic 
colonisation'." 117 Trudeau continued Pearson's general strategy; establishing the 
Department of Regional Economic Expansion (DREE) in 1969. Under this new 
agency, the Federal Government provided incentives for "private companies willing 
to set up new enterprises in designated areas - mainly in eastern Quebec and the 
Maritimes"; as well as allocating approximately $80 million for economic 
development m Quebec and New Brunswick over 1970 and 1971. 118 Quebec's 
various Provincial Governments, meanwhile, had been attempting to address the 
Anglo-Saxon domination of the local economy. For example, in June 1962, the 
Lesage administration created the Societe generate de financement (SGF). The goal 
of this government-controlled financial institution was to encourage and support the 
development of Francophone enterprises in Quebec. Three years later, the Provincial 
Government also established the Caisse de depots et de placements du Quebec (CDP). 
Charged with administering the province's pension funds, the CDP was envisaged as 
us Charters, "The amateur revolutionaries," 163. 
u6 Rheal Seguin, "Parizeau broadens scope of referendum struggle," The Globe and Mail, 27 
September 1995, 4. 
117 Loomis, Not Much Glory, 48-52. 
us Ibid., 61, Walter Stewart, Shrug: Trudeau in Power (Toronto: New Press, 1971), 23. 
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an indigenous "source of capital that could be used to advance Quebec's economic 
development." 119 
However, while it is true that the above programs did eventually bring long-
term benefits to the Quebecois; during the first half of the 1970s (the period when the 
FLQ's recruitment declined), their impact was minimal. For instance, the 1961 
census revealed that Quebec's Francophones earned 65.5 percent of the average 
income of the province's Anglophones. 120 Ten years later, this figure had only 
increased to 71.9 percent. 121 Furthermore, Anglo-Saxon firms continued to dominate 
Quebec's economy. From 1961 to 1974, the percentage of the province's 
manufacturing labour force employed by Francophone-owned firms increased by less 
than seven percentage points (from 21.8 to 28.4 percent). 122 Likewise, the number of 
Francophone-owned firms in Quebec's largest 100 companies remained at twenty 
over this same period. 123 As McRoberts states, "if the Quiet Revolution goal of 
maitres chez nous is understood to mean Francophone ownership of the Quebec 
economy, then clearly it had not been realized by the mid-1970s."124 
However, of all the grievances identified by the FLQ, the least improvement 
had been made with regard to those which buttressed the movement's accusation of 
Quebec's social colonisation. Indeed, la question linguistique - i.e. the perceived 
vulnerability of the French language in Quebec - arguably increased in intensity from 
the late-1960s to the mid- l 970s. L 'Affaire Saint-Leonards triggered this escalation.125 
119 Coleman, The Independence Movement, 103. 
120 On average, Quebec's Anglophones earned $5,918 per year, compared to $3,880 for the province's 
Francophones. Report of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism. Book Three: The 
Work World, (Ottawa: Queen's Press, 1967), 21. 
121 In 1971, Quebec's Anglophones earned an average income of $8,551 per year, while Quebec's 
Francophones earned an average income of $6, 150 per year. Fram;ois Vaillancourt, Differences in 
Earnings by Language Groups in Quebec, 1970: An Economic Analysis (Quebec: International Center 
for Research on Bilingualism, 1980), 43. 
122 Andre Raynauld, "The Quebec economy: A general assessment," in Quebec Society and Politics: 
Views from the Inside, ed. Dale C. Thomson (Toronto, ON.: McClelland and Stewart Ltd., 1973), 150-1, 
Fran9ois Vaillancourt, "La situation demographique et socio-econornique des francophones de Quebec: 
Une revue," Canadian Public Policy-Analyse de politiques 4 (1979): 547. 
123 McRoberts, Quebec, 176. 
124 Ibid. 
125 Levine provides an excellent in-depth examination of the Saint-Leonard affair. Marc V. Levine, 
The Reconquest of Montreal: Language Policy and Social Change in a Bilingual City (Philadelphia: 
Temple University Press, 1990), 67-86. 
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In November 1967, the Catholic school board of Saint-Leonards (a growmg 
municipality eight kilometres north of Montreal) voted to eliminate the district's 
bilingual schools. An acrimonious debate ensued. On one side, the district's Italian 
community (the largest source of the bilingual school's enrolees) ardently demanded 
the right to freely choose the 'language of instruction' for their children. Facing them 
were a growing band of Francophones, concerned that Saint-Leonards' bilingual 
schools were not assimilating Allophones 126 into French-speaking society; but instead, 
contributing to the growing 'Anglicisation' of the province. Not surprisingly, given 
the scope and importance of the issues at stake, the debate surrounding the Saint-
Leonards affair soon spread to Greater Montreal. The city was a "linguistic 
tinderbox," as 'unilingualists' (i.e. Francophones who argued that French should be 
the sole language of instruction in Quebec's public schools) formed advocacy groups 
such as the Mouvement pour li'integration scolaire (MIS), while the province's 
Allophones and Anglophones agitated for official bilingualism; with both sides 
calling on the government of Jean-Jacques Bertrand for action. 127 
Bertrand's (reluctant) solution was Bill 63, 'An Act to Promote the French 
Language in Quebec'. On the one hand, this bill did seek to placate Quebec's 
increasingly-anxious Francophones; mandating the teaching of French in all of the 
province's English-speaking schools, and including measures to encourage new 
immigrants to learn French over English. 128 However, on the contested issue of 
'language of instruction', Bill 63 ultimately sided with those in favour of 'free choice'; 
stating explicitly that schooling "shall be given in the English language to any child 
for whom his parents or the persons acting in their stead so request at his 
enrolment." 129 The reaction of Quebec's Francophones was "unprecedentedly 
intense."130 Nationalists decried Bill 63 as "a 'linguistic Munich', an ignominious 
surrender on the part of the Bertrand government, a powerful encouragement to the 
126 Allophone is a Canadian term for a person whose native tongue is neither English nor French. 
127 Levine, The Reconquest of Montreal, 72. 
128 Linda Cardinal, "The limits of bilingualism in Canada," Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 10, no. 1 
(2004): 82. 
129 Assemblee nationale du Quebec, "An Act to Promote the French Language in Quebec," in Lois du 
Quebec (Quebec City: Publications du Quebec, 1969), 62. 
130 Levine, The Reconquest of Montreal, 80. 
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anglicization of Quebeckers."131 Tens of thousands of demonstrators descended upon 
Montreal and Quebec City, urging the bill's repeal. 
Even with the eventual ratification of Bill 63 on 27 November 1969, the 
passion generated by it did not abate. Bertrand's government was the first to 
experience this fervour, resoundingly losing the 1970 general election.132 In March 
1971, the various unilingualist groups sought to take their struggle to the next level; 
creating a common front (the Mouvement Quebec fran<;ais) to agitate for the "repeal 
of Bill 63 and ... legislation declaring French as Quebec's sole official language."133 
It was not until 1974 (two years after the last FLQ act, and nearly three years after the 
movement's recruitment had dissipated), when the Liberal administration of Robert 
Bourassa introduced a new language bill (Loi 22), that Francophone anger over la 
question linguistique began to fade. 
Selective Government Repression 
The link between selective government repression and the FLQ's decreasing 
recruitment is convoluted. On the one hand, there is some evidence that the FLQ's 
recruitment did decline because of the Federal and Quebec Government's use of 
repression. The primary evidence in this regard is that the FLQ's intake of recruits 
waned concurrently with the intensification of the authorities' anti-FLQ campaign. 
As aforementioned, prior to October 1970, the Federal and Quebec Governments 
largely pursued the FLQ through the criminal justice system. That is, they issued 
warrants, laid charges within the established legal framework, and primarily focused 
their operations on those directly linked to felquiste violence. However, in the wake 
of the Cross and Laporte kidnappings, Quebec witnessed not only the weakening of 
the FLQ's ability to attract new recruits, but also the use of government repression on 
131 Richard Jones, "Politics and the reinforcement of the French language in Canada and Quebec, 1960-
1986," in Quebec Since 1945: Selected Readings, ed. Michael D. Behiels (Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman 
Limited, 1987), 230. 
132 Though the Union Nationale's defeat in April 1970 was due to numerous reasons, the cleavage 
struck by Bill 63 between the party's moderate and ultra-nationalist wings played an important role. 
For more information, see: Herbert F. Quinn, The Union Nationale: Quebec Nationalism from 
Duplessis to Levesque, Second enlarged ed. (Toronto, Buffalo and London: University of Toronto Press, 
1979), 255-7. 
133 Levine, The Reconquest of Montreal, 93. 
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a scale unknown since the Conscription Riots of the First World War. 134 Specifically, 
beginning on 15 October 1970, the Federal and Quebec Governments: deployed 
thousands of troops to Quebec's major metropolitan centres; invoked emergency 
powers which placed Quebec "under what amounted to a state of marital law"; 135 and 
detained without charge hundreds of suspected FLQ members and sympathisers. 
Even after the Trudeau Administration withdrew the Canadian Army and revoked the 
Public Order Act in early-1971, the security forces continued to mount substantial and 
high-profile raids on suspected FLQ hideouts. The most notable of these occurred on 
the symbolically-important first anniversary of Cross's kidnapping, when sixty police 
officers "carried out a large-scale roundup in Montreal and arrested four FLQ 
members."136 
Another source of evidence that a relationship exists between the Federal and 
Quebec Governments' use of repression and the FLQ's declining recruitment is 
scholars who suggest that the authorities' vigorous countermeasures during and after 
the October Crisis were likely to have deterred potential recruits from joining the FLQ. 
Ross and Gurr, for instance, state that the "waves of arrests of FLQ members from 
1970 to 1972 undoubtedly had a deterrent effect on many would-be supporters."137 
Likewise, Charters contends that 
a case can be made that deployment of the [Canadian] army, while perhaps 
unnecessary in respect of the existing threat (although the government may not have 
known that at the time), served as a deterrent to potential violent activity that might 
have arisen spontaneously had nothing been done. 138 
However, while it is possible to draw a tentative link between the authorities' 
post-October 1970 repression and the FLQ's declining recruitment, it is much more 
difficult to describe the Federal and Quebec Governments' use of repression during 
this period as having been selective. Indeed, in the wake of the October Crisis, people 
134 Judy M. Torrance, Public Violence in Canada, 1867-1982 (Kingston and Montreal: McGill-Queen's 
University Press, 1986), 22-3. 
135 Reg Whitaker, "Keeping up with the neighbours? Canadian responses to 9/11 in historical and 
comparative context," Osgoode Hall Law Journal 41, no. 2 & 3 (2003): 249. 
136 Jeffrey Ian Ross, "The rise and fall of Quebecois separatist terrorism: A qualitative application of 
factors from two models," Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 18 (1995): 292. 
137 Jeffrey Ian Ross and Ted Robert Gurr, "Why terrorism subsides: A comparative study of Canada 
and the United States," Comparative Politics 21, no. 4 (1989): 413. 
138 Charters, "The October Crisis," 67. 
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directly and knowingly connected with the FLQ formed only a minority of those 
targeted by the authorities as part of their anti-FLQ campaign. For example, between 
16 October and 31 December 1970, the security forces operating in Quebec detained 
468 people under the War Measures Act. Of these, only thirty-three were ever 
charged with 'terrorism'-related offences;139 while the vast majority (over 90 percent) 
"were not associated with the FLQ, nor did they have anything to do with the 
kidnappings."140 
After the Federal Government revoked its emergency powers in earlyl-971, 
the security forces did become more discriminating in who they arrested in relation to 
the FLQ. However, the RCMP's 'disruptive' or 'countering activities' tempered this 
renewed selectiveness. During the late-1970s, the RCMP grew increasingly frustrated 
that it was only reacting to, rather than "forestalling," acts of separatist violence. 141 
To redress this perceived deficiency, the RCMP sought to 'get ahead of the curve' by 
engaging in a four-year campaign of disruption. 142 Specifically, the RCMP decided to 
employ repression (both overtly and covertly) against individuals and groups (such as 
the Mouvement pour la defense des prisonniers politiques, the Parti communiste du 
Quebec, and En Lutte) that it believed were likely to conduct separatist violence in the 
future, though who were not necessarily associated with the FLQ. Examples of the 
RCMP's repression during this period include: the destruction of private property (the 
RCMP famously burnt down a barn in rural Quebec on 8 May 1971 to prevent a 
radical group from meeting there);143 burglary and theft (e.g. in October 1972, the 
RCMP broke into the headquarters of the Mouvement pour la defense des prisonniers 
politiques, stealing and destroying "half a tonne" of documentation); 144 and physical 
and psychological harassment.145 
139 Freeman, Freedom or Security, 123. 
140 Haggart and Golden, Rumours of War, 71-6, Malcolm Levin and Christine Sylvester, Crisis in 
Quebec (Toronto: Ontario Institute for Studies in Education, 1973), 25. 
141 Commission of Inquiry Concerning Certain Activities of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, 
"Freedom and Security under the Law," (Ottawa: Canadian Government Publishing Centre, 1981), 269. 
142 Steve Hewitt, "Reforming the Canadian security state: The Royal Canadian Mounted Police 
Security Service and the 'Key Sectors' program," Intelligence and National Security 17, no. 4 (2002): 
178-9. 
143 Fournier, F.L.Q., 323. 
144 Ibid., 328-9. 
145 Commission of Inquiry Concerning Certain Activities of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, 
"Freedom and Security," 270. 
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Discrediting the Insurgent Actor's Ideology 
There is conflicting support for the notion that the FLQ's recruitment declined 
because its ideology was discredited. On the one hand, it appears that the FLQ's 
recruitment problems did not coincide with a contraction of public approval for the 
movement's goals (i.e. the independence of Quebec and the adoption of a socialist 
socio-economic system). This is evident from two sources. The first of these is 
Hamilton and Pinard's collation of polls tracking Quebecois opinion about the option 
of independence between 1962 and 1980 (see Figure 2). This data suggests that 
public support for le Quebec libre trended upwards following October 1970. The 
second source is the observation that Quebec's major trade unions - namely the 
Federation des travailleurs du Quebec (FTQ) and the Confederation des syndicats 
nationaux (CSN) - as well as the Parti Quebecois (one of the province's largest 
political parties) adopted increasingly socialistic postures from 1971 onwards. 146 For 
example, in November 1971, the president of the FTQ, Louis Laberge, "called for a 
socialist Quebec and a united front to oppose the capitalist system"; 147 while, in the 
same month, the Parti Quebecois released a manifesto which advocated the need for 
"social revolution" and a "pro-labour bias."148 This seeming 'radicalisation' of the 
union movement and the ever-increasingly popular Parti Quebecois suggests that 
public support for the adoption of a socialist socio-economic system was likely to 
have remained at least steady in the wake of the October Crisis. 
146 Leon Dion and Micheline de Seve, "Quebec: Interest groups and the search for an alternative 
political system," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 413 (1974): 
140-1, Graham Fraser, PQ: Rene Levesque & the Parti Quebecois in Power (Toronto: Macmillan of 
Canada, 1984), 57-8. 
147 Saywell, The Rise of the Parti Quebecois, 58. 
148 Fournier, F.L.Q., 312. 
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However, it does appear that the FLQ's recruitment problems following the 
October Crisis did coincide with a contraction in public approval for the movement's 
strategy of violence. This is evident from two sources. The first of these is general 
observations in the secondary literature. Ross, for instance, claims that Laporte's 
murder represented "a watershed in the political history of the FLQ. It helped swing 
public opinion away from the FLQ and toward more conventional forms of political 
participation."15° Charters echoes a similar sentiment, noting the contrasting fortunes 
of both the FLQ ("when the FLQ murdered Laporte, popular support evaporated 
almost overnight") and the democratic separatist movement ("a steady trend toward") 
after October 1970.151 The second source is the growing number of felquistes who 
came to reject the FLQ's modus operandi, while continuing to embrace its goals, from 
1971 onwards. The most notable of these 'renouncers' was Pierre Vallieres, who 
announced in December 1971 that he had quit the FLQ and intended to pursue 
revolutionary separatism through the auspices of the Parti Quebecois. 152 Similarly, 
Jacques and Louise Cossette-Trudel (of Liberation Cell fame) declared in a 1972 
149 Hamilton and Pinard, "The Quebec Independence Movement," 211. 
150 Ross, "The rise and fall," 293. 
151 Charters, "The amateur revolutionaries," 153, Charters, "The October Crisis," 61. 
152 Vallieres announced his decision in a number of newspaper articles, which were later published as: 
Pierre Vallieres, Choose!, trans. Penelope Williams (Toronto, ON.: New Press, 1972). 
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letter from Cuba that "armed agitation must stop. FLQ terrorism is a two-edged 
sword which has begun to cut the heads off the Quebecois themselves."153 
Two beliefs appear to have driven this contraction in public approval for the 
FLQ's strategy of violence. The first of these was, in contrast with the FLQ's blithe 
dismissal of electoralism, that the existence of the Parti Quebecois precluded the need 
for independantistes t<;> seek their goals through the use of violence. 154 Founded in 
October 1968 as the result of a merger between two separatist political parties (the 
Mouvement souverainete-association and the Ralliement national), the Parti 
Quebecois strove for both Quebec's independence and various social-democratic 
reforms. 155 The Parti Quebecois was also strictly constitutionalist, attempting to 
achieve its goals solely through the legal, democratic system. According to Vallieres 
in his January 1972 tome, L 'Urgence de choisir ('Choose!'), the Parti Quebecois was 
likely to prove an effective instrument for begetting le Quebec libre because: (1) 
Quebec had an accessible electoral system that the masses could use "effectively''; 156 
and (2) the Parti Quebecois, unlike earlier separatist political parties, had not only an 
accomplished and respected leader (Rene Levesque, a minister during the Lesage 
Administration), but also a potentially successful strategy for achieving the goal of 
independence.157 Buttressing Vallieres' argument was the Parti Quebecois' gains in 
the 1970 provincial election; attracting 23.1 percent of the vote (the second highest 
tally, after the victorious Parti liberal du Quebec). Although it is true that the Parti 
Quebecois' meagre return of seven seats (out of a possible 108) from this electoral 
haul was a source of contention in nationalist circles; the party's "real 
accomplishments" (the 1970 election was, after all, the Parti Quebecois' first), 15~ the 
continued perceived legitimacy of Quebec's electoral system, 159 and the seeming 
153 Cited in: Fournier, F.L.Q., 329. 
154 Ross and Gurr, "Why terrorism subsides," 414. 
155 Saywell, The Rise of the Parti Quebecois. 
156 Vallieres, Choose!, 93. 
157 Ibid., 94. 
158 Ross and Gurr, "Why terrorism subsides," 414. 
159 Janke, Terrorism and Democracy, 70. 
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upswing of political momentum in the Parti Quebecois' favour, 160 meant that, to 
many, the "democratic road to independence ... seemed a possibility."161 
The second belief was that, again in contrast with the FLQ's justificatory 
arguments, the use of violence was an inefficient means of engendering Quebec's 
independence. There were two aspects of this perception of violence's inefficiency. 
First, the "hostile public reaction" to Laporte's murder showed independantistes that 
Quebecois support for political violence was shallow.162 In Vallieres' opinion, this 
meant that a violent revolutionary movement would unlikely be able to transform 
itself into an "authentic people's army'' and, in turn, achieve anything more than 
peripheral and ultimately pointless aggression. 163 The second aspect was that 
violence was increasingly seen more as a means of "inviting ... harsh reprisals" on the 
Quebec independence movement, rather than an means of begetting change. 164 
Vallieres provided arguably the most paranoid version of this line of reasoning. To 
the former felquiste, the "major lesson" of the October Crisis was that Ottawa realised 
its "main threat" was not the FLQ, ''but the focalising political practice of the Parti 
Quebecois, the union centrals and the citizens' committees."165 Consequently, it was 
in the interests of the Federal Government ''to provoke the opportunity that will allow 
it to intervene against the independentist and progressive forces of Quebec before the 
Parti Quebecois can acquire the legitimacy of a democratically-elected 
government." 166 Vallieres maintained that, given the constraints imposed on the 
· authorities by Canada's democratic system, liberal ideals, and free press, only 
separatist violence would provide the Federal Government with its desired pretext for 
crushing the PQ and the province's other legal separatist organs. In other words, 
Vallieres framed violence not as an effective instrument of change, but as a likely 
instrument of the separatist movement's destruction. 
160 Charters, "The amateur revolutionaries," 153. 
161 Torrance, Public violence, 39. 
162 Dion and de Seve, "Quebec," 141, Reilly, "The management of political violence," 56. 
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6 CONCLUSION 
The central focus of this chapter has been to illuminate why the FLQ' s 
previously-robust capacity for regeneration began to weaken irrevocably following 
the October Crisis of 1970. It sought to achieve this by first providing a detailed 
analysis of the FLQ, and the political and strategic environment in which' the 
movement arose and pursued its 'armed struggle'. Second, this chapter examined the 
FLQ's regenerative experience from the movement's inception in 1963 to its eventual 
demise in 1972. It is clear from this investigation that a decrease in recruitment 
played a greater role than an increase in attrition in weakening the FLQ's regenerative 
capacity. This finding is in accordance with the prevailing view in the literature that a 
decrease in recruitment is more important than an increase in attrition in bringing 
about the deterioration of an insurgent actor's capacity to regenerate. 
Finally, this chapter examined whether the post-October 1970 decrease in the 
FLQ's intake of recruits was the result of 'the amelioration of grievances', the use of 
'selective government repression', and/or 'the discrediting of the insurgent actor's 
ideology'. Regarding the first, this chapter found that the FLQ's recruitment declined 
even though the grievances which formed the basis of its collective action frame 
remained more or less unchanged. This suggests that ameliorating grievances is not a 
necessary condition for reducing an insurgent actor's intake of recruits. 
With regard to 'selective government repression', this chapter observed that, 
while it is possible the Federal and Quebec Governments' repression following the 
Cross and Laporte Kidnappings deterred aspiring-felquistes from joining the FLQ, the 
authorities' use of repression during this period was not selective. These results 
suggest that: (1) as Leites and Wolf contend, a negative and conditional relationship 
may exist between government repression and insurgent recruitment; yet (2) 
selectiveness is not necessarily an indicator of whether a government's use of 
repression will have a deterrent effect. 
Last of all, in reference to 'discrediting the insurgent actor's ideology', this 
chapter found that, while public approval of the felquistes' goal of an independent, 
socialist Quebec remained steady during the early-1970s, the FLQ's declining 
recruitment did appear to coincide with a contraction in public support for the 
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movement's strategy of violence. These findings both support and detract from the 
literature's enthusiasm for discrediting an insurgent actor's ideology as a means of 
reducing the actor's recruitment. On the one hand, the FLQ case suggests that a link 
does exist between public approval for an insurgent actor's ideology and the strength 
of the actor's intake of recruits. However, given that the Canadian authorities were 
directly and deliberately responsible for only one of the three factors which appear to 
have discredited the FLQ's ideology, the FLQ case also raises questions about the 
extent to which governments can influence public perceptions of an insurgent actor's 
ideology. 
CHAPTER FOUR 
MOVIMIENTO DE LIBERACION NACIONAL -
TUPAMAROS 
jHabra patria para todos a para nadie! ('There will be a fatherland for all or 
for nobody!') 
- Popular Tupamaro slogan 
The Movimiento de Liberaci6n Nacional - Tupamaros (MLN-T) provides 
researchers with one of the most interesting regenerative histories of any insurgent 
actor. During its formative years (1965-66), the MLN-T learnt, through the 
experience of a near-defeat, the importance of possessing a strong regenerative 
capacity. Over the years that followed, the Tupamaros were able not only to develop 
such a capacity, but also to expand their membership. Consequently, the MLN-T's 
'armed struggle' intensified. Indeed, by 1971, observers were suggesting that the 
MLN-T was on the verge oflaunching an "armed takeover" of the Uruguayan state.1 
However, 1972 did not witness the formation of a Tupamaro Government. Rather, in 
the face of a concerted and unrestrained assault by the Uruguayan armed forces, the 
MLN-T's ability to replace its losses with new recruits weakened considerably. 
Unable to reverse this trend, the MLN-T eventually disappeared from the Uruguayan 
scene. 
This chapter will seek to uncover why the MLN-T' s previously-strong 
capacity for regeneration weakened. To facilitate this undertaking, this chapter is 
1 "The Tupamaros may do it," The Economist, 15 May 1971, 16. 
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divided into six sections. The first three of these are contextual in nature, discussing: 
(1) the flow-on effects of the Cuban Revolution, and Uruguay's socio-economic 
problems of the mid-twentieth century; (2) characteristics of the MLN-T itself (such 
as the organisation's structure and recruitment process); and (3) the Uruguayan 
Government's security forces. The fourth and fifth sections, meanwhile, will focus on 
the MLN-T's capacity to regenerate; detailing the organisation's three different 
regenerative phases, as well as analysing the relative strength of an increase in 
attrition and a decrease in recruitment as catalysts of regenerative decay, and the 
dynamics of these factors. Finally, the sixth section will provide a summary of the 
chapter and its key findings. 
1 CUBA AND CRISIS: THE FOUNDATIONS OF AN INSURGENCY 
During the 1950s and 1960s, Uruguay witnessed two developments that 
facilitated the rise of the MLN-T. The first of these was external; specifically, the 
Cuban Revolution. On 1 January 1959, after suffering a series of military setbacks, 
Fulgencio Batista, the President of Cuba, fled to the Dominican Republic; handing 
effective control of the country to the guerrilla forces of the Movimiento 26 de Julio 
(M-26). As Debray observes, these events "descended like a clap of thunder" on 
traditional Latin American politics;2 generating "shockwaves that resonated across the 
hemisphere."3 These 'shockwaves', however, were not derived from the goals and 
motivations of the M-26. After all, the concepts of revolution and socialism had long 
been ensconced in the Latin American political consciousness. Rather, the 
significance of the Cuban Revolution lay in how it "redefined revolutionary 
possibilities."4 As Wickham-Crowley states, prior to 1959, a Leninist conception 
dominated the "cultural repertoire" of revolutionary action in Latin America. 5 This 
rejected the option of internal reform; maintaining that capitalist systems could only 
be overthrown through the use of force. However, it also stipulated that violence 
2 Regis Debray, Strategy for Revolution, ed. Robin Blackburn (London: J. Cape, 1970), 93. 
3 Matt D. Childs, "An historical critique of the emergence and evolution of Ernesto Che Cuevara's Foco 
Theory," Journal of Latin American Studies 27, no. 3 (1995): 596. 
4 Timothy P. Wickham-Crowley, Guerrillas and Revolution in Latin America: A Comparative Study of 
Insurgents and Regimes Since 1956 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 32. 
5 Ibid. 
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could impede the revolutionary process if it was employed before the necessary 
'objective conditions' were in place. Thus, from the Leninist perspective, the task of 
the revolutionary was largely preparatory; that is, establishing an organisation and 
class-consciousness to take advantage of the 'objective conditions' once they 
transpired. 
The Cuban Revolution, however, introduced a new 'mode of action' - or, in 
the words of a former Tupamaro, a "new path to national liberation."6 This was 
initially fragmentary (derived from the speeches of Fidel Castro and Ernesto 'Che' 
Guevara), but was eventually codified by Che as a theory of revolutionary warfare. 
Known as Jaco theory, its dual essence was that: (1) "the countryside is the basic area 
of armed fighting"; and (2) committed revolutionaries did not have to wait for the 
'objective conditions' to exist before launching a revolution; but rather, that 
insurrectionary violence would create them.7 As a number of authors have noted, Jaco 
theory was a deliberate simplification (if not outright distortion) of the Cuban 
experience; the result of internal politicking and a desire to generalise the M-26's 
strategy for wider adoption.8 Nevertheless,Joco theory did have tremendous appeal to 
aspiring revolutionaries across Latin America. It offered them a model that not only 
was drawn from their hemisphere (and was thus seemingly more applicable to the 
vagaries of their political life); but also forsook the arduous and time-consuming tasks 
of preparation, emphasising instead the transformative power (and more-glamorous 
undertaking) of revolutionary action. More importantly, Jaco theory had seemingly 
succeeded in the shadow of America's economic and military power. As Wickham-
Crowley states: 
The thought processes of future guerrillas were probably remarkably neat: if Cuba 
can carry out a socialist revolution under the very nose, and against the resistance, of 
yanqui imperialism, then why not here as well, where the U.S. presence is so much 
less pervasive?9 
6 Eleuterio Fernandez Huidobro, cited in: Carlos Nunez, "Eleuterio Fernandez Huidobro," NACLA 
Report on the Americas 20, no. 5 (1986): 47. 
7 Ernesto (Che) Guevara, Guerrilla Warfare (Middlesex: Penguin, 1969), 13. See also: Jose A. Moreno, 
"Che Guevara on Guerrilla Warfare: Doctrine, Practice, and Evaluation," Comparative studies in 
society and history 12, no. 2 (1970): 115-6. 
8 Childs, "An historical critique," 594-5, Maurice Halperin, "Return to Havana: Portrait of a Loyalist," 
Cuban Studies 23 (1993): 188, Wickham-Crowley, Guerrillas and Revolution, 32-3. 
9 Wickham-Crowley, Guerrillas and Revolution, 32. 
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It was the result of this instinctive appeal that the foquista approach came to 
dominate the cultural repertoire of revolutionary action in Latin America. This was 
evident from the early-1960s onwards, when Latin America witnessed an explosion of 
insurgent actors which were convinced that the use of force would 'jumpstart' the 
revolutionary process in their countries. Prominent amongst these were: the Frente 
Sandinista de Liberaci6n Nacional (FSLN) of Nicaragua (est. 1961), which, as Nolan 
notes, maintained a strict adherence to foco theory during the 1960s; 10 the Fuerzas 
Armadas de Liberaci6n Nacional (FALN) of Venezuela (est. 1962); the Fuerzas 
Armadas Revolucionarias (FAR) of Guatemala (est. 1962); and the Ejercito de 
Liberaci6n Nacional (ELN) of Colombia (est. 1964). It was during this 'rush to 
revolution' that the founders of the MLN-T, similarly inspired by the exploits of the 
Cuban Revolution, began moving towards their own embrace of revolutionary action. 
The second development that came to pass during the 1950s and 1960s was a 
prolonged crisis in Uruguay's politico-economic system. Since the country's 
independence in August 1828, two parties have dominated Uruguayan politics: the 
Partido Colorado, with its power base in the capital, Montevideo; and the Partido 
Nacional-Blanco, the traditional representative of the landholding elite. 11 For most of 
the nineteenth century, the Blancos and Colorados were, in the words of Taylor, 
"pseudo-parties." 12 That is, they were more "the personal gangs of momentarily 
dominant caudillos rather than conscious articulators of genuine interests"; 13 willing 
to use every means possible (including a frequent and disturbing recourse to violence) 
to achieve political supremacy. However, from the 1870s onwards, both parties 
10 David Nolan, "From FOCO to insurrection: Sandinista strategies of revolution," Air University 
Review, July-August 1986. 
11 This domination came to an end on 31 October 2004, when a coalition of leftist parties (Encuentro 
Progresista - Frente Amplio - Nueva Mayoria) triumphed in the country's presidential elections. 
Remarkably, the largest faction of this coalition (the Movimiento de Participaci6n Popular, or MPP) 
consisted of former MLN-T members turned politicians. See: Larry Rohter, "Uruguay's left makes 
history by winning presidential ballot," The New York Times, 1 November 2004, 11, "Vazquez should 
win by a whisker but turnout will be decisive.," Latin American Brazil & Southern Cone Report, 26 
October 2004, 12. 
12 Phillip B. Taylor, "Interests and institutional dysfunction in Uruguay," The American Political 
Science Review 57, no. 1 (1963): 63. 
13 Ibid. 
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gradually sought to moderate and institutionalise their rivalry. The guiding principle 
behind this process was that minority party participation should be guaranteed in the 
administration of government (known in Uruguay as coparticipaci6n ). 14 By the early-
twentieth century, aided by President Jose Batlle y Ord6fiez's crushing of an 
attempted Blanco uprising in 1904, inter-party violence was largely eliminated.15 
It was due in part to this factor, as well as a series of labour, education, and 
social security reforms implemented by Batlle in the 1910s,16 that Uruguay was able 
to embark upon an extended period of national growth and prosperity. Indeed, as the 
twentieth century progressed, scholars came to laud Uruguay as the 'Switzerland of 
South America'. In many respects, this academic esteem was warranted. After all, by 
the 1950s, Uruguay's citizenry enjoyed near-universal literacy; 17 the trappings of a 
modem welfare state; 18 and one of the highest per capita incomes and standards of 
living of any Latin American country. 19 Furthermore, Uruguay's democratic record 
for the previous fifty years had been arguably the continent's best. As Kohl and Litt 
state, "[t]here were honest and regular elections, a free press, civil liberties, few coups, 
and minimal military interference and civil violence."20 
However, a slump in world meat and wool prices during the mid-1950s dealt a 
blow to Uruguay's helvetic reputation. Despite the country's seemingly 'modem' 
character, the Uruguayan economy was essentially dependent on "two tyrants ... 
14 The exact meaning of coparticipaci6n has varied during the history of its usage. For an etymological 
and in-depth analysis of coparticipation, see: Goran G. Lindahl, Uruguay's New Path: A Study in 
Politics during the First Colegiado, 1919-33 (Stockholm: Library and Institute of Ibero-American 
Studies, 1962), 191-7, Martin Weinstein, Uruguay: The Politics of Failure (Westport and London: 
Greenwood Press, 1975), 50-84. 
15 David Rock and Fernando Lopez-Alves, "State-building and political systems in nineteenth-century 
Argentina and Uruguay," Past and Present, no. 167 (2000): 201. 
16 Percy Alvin Martin, "The career of Jose Batlle y Ordonez," The Hispanic American Historical 
Review 10, no. 4 (1930): 425-6. 
17 Herman E. Daly, "The Uruguayan economy: Its basic nature and current problems," Journal of Jnter-
American Studies 7, no. 3 (1965): 318. 
18 For an examination of the development and evolution of Uruguay's welfare system, see: George 
Pendle, Uruguay, Third ed. (London, New York and Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1963), 27-47. 
19 In 1956, Uruguay's per capita income was the highest in South America. "The measurement of Latin 
American real income in US dollars," Economic Bulletin for Latin America 7, no. 2 (1968). According 
to Finch, Uruguay was likely to have "held this position throughout the first half of this [i.e. the 
twentieth] century." M.H.J. Finch, A Political Economy of Uruguay since 1870 (London and 
Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1981), 220. 
20 James Kohl and John Litt, Urban Guerrilla Warfare in Latin America (Cambridge and London: The 
MIT Press, 1974), 174. 
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Their names are Cattle and Sheep."21 This dependency was related not so much to the 
size of the livestock sector (which was responsible for less than 20 percent of the 
nation's GDP and employment), but to the fact that meat, wool, and hides accounted 
for over 80 percent of the total value of Uruguay's exports. 22 As Daly thus states, 
"[t]he Uruguayan economy [was] like an inverted pyramid- it rest[ed] on its smallest 
sector and [was] held in balance by the flow of international trade."23 
During the decade following the end of the Second World War, strong 
international demand for livestock products helped Uruguay maintain its poise. 
Indeed, the country's GDP expanded by an annual average of 4.8 percent over this 
period.24 However, when the end of the Korean War triggered a collapse in world 
commodity prices, the Uruguayan economy was unable to perform its balancing act 
any longer. Over the next five years, the country saw its export earnings virtually 
halve; dropping from an annual average of $US243.5 million between 1950 and 1954, 
to $US159.9 million between 1955 and 1959.25 As the value of the country's exports 
shrank, Uruguay's industrial sector, which was heavily reliant on the international 
exchange earned by agricultural exports for the importation of necessary machinery 
and equipment, also began to struggle. Moreover, as the cash inflows of primacy 
producers contracted, so did their supply of raw materials to, and demand for the 
products produced by, Uruguayan industry. The government, meanwhile, already 
carrying a "heavy burden of social welfare programs, public enterprises, and partially 
parasitical public employees,"26 had neither the capital nor the room for manoeuvre to 
stimulate the local economy. 
As a consequence of all these factors, Uruguay's economy expansion first 
decelerated and then stagnated; with the country's GDP growing by an annual average 
21 Russell H. Fitzgibbon, "Uruguay's agricultural problems," Economic Geography 29, no. 3 (1953): 
251. 
22 Russell H. Brannon, The Agricultural Development of Uruguay: Problems of Government Policy 
(New York, Washington, and London: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1968), 68, Finch, A Political 
Economy, 129. 
23 Daly, "The Uruguayan economy," 325. 
24 Finch, A Political Economy, 223. 
25 Brannon, The Agricultural Development, 57. 
26 Phillip B. Taylor, "Government and politics of Uruguay," Tulane Studies in Political Science 7 
(1960): 129. 
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of only 0.4 percent between 1955 and 1965. 27 Though Uruguay's low rate of 
population growth (approximately 1.3 percent) tempered the impact of this stagnation 
on per capita income, the effect was, nevertheless, still severe.28 For instance, while 
Uruguay's per capita income grew by an annual average of 3 .4 percent between 1945 
and 1955, it declined by 1.1 percent between 1955 and 1965.29 Further manifestations 
of Uruguay's stagnant economy included a doubling of the ranks of the nation's 
unemployed; 30 and a dramatic increase in inflation. Indeed, Uruguay's Consumer 
Price Index (CPI) grew by an annual average of 23.4 percent between 1956 and 1960; 
30.7 percent between 1961 and 1965; and an astonishing 66.1 percent between 1966 
and 1970.31 
As Uruguay's economic conditions worsened, popular dissatisfaction rose. 
One of the earliest manifestations of this growing discontent was the electorate's 
rejection of the incumbent Colorado executive in 1958; handing control of the 
government to the Blancos for the first time in ninety-three years. However, as the 
country's economic crisis continued, the public's anger soon began to express itself in 
the form of public militancy. 32 In particular, strikes and work stoppages by 
Uruguay's various labour unions became "an everyday fact of life in Montevideo."33 
According to Weinstein, throughout the 1950s, an estimated 1,200,000 total man-days 
of labour were lost each year as a result of strikes. In 1963, this figure had sky-
rocketed to 2,500,000.34 Political protests were also common, with Lyndon Johnson's 
visit on 11 April 1967 especially provoking "violent demonstrations."35 
27 Finch, A Political Economy, 226. According to Brannon, Uruguay's GDP grew by an annual 
average of 0.0 percent between 1955 and 1964. Brannon, The Agricultural Development, 49. 
28 Daly, "The Uruguayan economy," 318. 
29 Finch, A Political Economy, 223. According to Brannon, Uruguay's per capita income declined by 
an annual average of 1.4 percent between 1955 and 1964. Brannon, The Agricultural Development, 49. 
3° Finch, A Political Economy, 227, Kohl and Litt, Urban Guerrilla Warfare, 176. 
31 Finch, A Political Economy, 229, World Bank Group. World Development Indicators, 2005. 
Accessed: 10 December 2005. Available from: http://devdata.worldbank.org/dataonline/. 
32 Fernando Lopez-Alves, "Political Crises, Strategic Choices, and Terrorism: The Rise and Fall of the 
Uruguayan Tupamaros," Terrorism and Political Violence 1, no. 2 (1989): 211. 
33 Howard Handelman, "Labor-industrial conflict and the collapse of Uruguayan democracy," Journal 
of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 23, no. 4 (1981 ): 376, Weinstein, Uruguay: Failure, 120. 
34 Weinstein, Uruguay: Failure, 119. 
35 Alain Labrousse, The Tupamaros: urban guerrilla in Uruguay, trans. Dinah Livingstone 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1973), 61. 
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The government's response to Uruguay's worsening economic and political 
conditions was generally ineffectual. Though the Blanco-led administration 
introduced numerous measures aimed at addressing the country's waning economic 
fortunes (e.g. the Ley de Reforma Monetaria y Cambiaria of 1959); it was unable (and 
seemingly unwilling) to tackle Uruguay's debilitating structural deficiencies (such as 
the crippling cost of the government's various social programs and the ingrained 
politicisation of the bureaucracy).36 Likewise, the government's response to societal 
and labour unrest was typically heavy-handed. For example, in February 1963, and in 
April, September and October 1965, the Blanco-led administration reacted to 
prolonged strikes by invoking emergency powers. 37 These were used to disperse 
bothersome strikers and, in some cases, arrest union leaders. Police also frequently 
clashed with and "repressed" protestors angry with the government's hostile posture 
towards revolutionary Cuba between 1961and1964.38 
2 THEMLN-T 
It was during this political turmoil of the early-1960s that a number of groups 
on the Uruguayan left began to gradually embrace unconventional and illegal means 
of political participation. Though the circumstances of each group were unique, the 
primary reason for this shift was a general and growing disillusionment with the 
traditional avenues of political change. The experience of Raul Sendic, arguably the 
most famous Tupamaros, provides a good example of this evolution. Beginning in 
the late-1950s, Sendic and some colleagues from Montevideo embarked upon an 
attempt to unionise the sugar workers of northwest Uruguay. These activists were 
motivated not only by a desire to improve the lot of the caiieros (traditionally one of 
the most impoverished sectors of Uruguayan society), but also a belief that unionising 
the sugar workers would help them shape the national political agenda. As Lopez-
· 
36 Alexander T. Edelmann, "The rise and demise of Uruguay's second plural executive," The Journal of 
Politics 31, no. 1 (1969): 130-9, Taylor, "Interests and institutional," 66-7, Weinstein, Uruguay: 
Failure, 114-7. 
37 Documentaci6n y Archivo de Lucha Armada DC, "Cronologia Basica 1954-1973," (Montevideo: 
Facultad de Humanidades, la Universidad de la Republica, 2006). 
38 Astrid Arraras, "Armed Struggle, Political Learning and Participation in Democracy: The Case of the 
Tupamaros" (PhD, Princeton University, 1999), 53-4. 
Movimiento de Liberaci6n Nacional - Tupamaros 101 
Alves describes, Sendic and his associates had faith both in the "power of public 
opinion" and the instrumentality of parliamentary politics.39 They thus believed that, 
by using conventional labour tactics, they could raise public awareness of the plight of 
rural workers; and this, in tum, would undermine the legitimacy of Uruguay's 
political and socioeconomic system. 
In 1961, Sendic and his compatriots were successful in unionising sugar beet 
workers in the department of Paysandu, and cane-cutters in the department of Artigas; 
forming the Union Remolacheros del Este (URDE) and Union de Trabajadores 
Azucareros de Artigas (UT AA), respectively. However, these unions found it 
difficult to secure major reforms, or even to force the sugar companies to abide by 
previously negotiated agreements. 4° Consequently, the leadership of the UT AA 
decided to press their demands at the heart of Uruguayan political life. In June 1962, 
hundreds of caneworkers and their families marched 600 kilometres from Artigas to 
Montevideo. Although these demonstrators were well-received by certain sectors of 
the political community, they were, in the main, ignored by the legislative and 
executive branches. According to Porzecanski, this seeming disregard was the tipping 
point for Sendic and his colleagues; as they concluded "if the political system was not 
capable of even listening to its constituents, then it was surely time to abandon it.'.41 
Over the next twelve months, they thus decided to pursue their revolutionary goals 
through increasingly violent means. 
Sendic's Group was not the only one which chose the path of the armed 
struggle at this time. Others included: the Movimiento de Ayuda al Campesino 
(MAC), comprised of disaffected members of the Movimiento Revolucionario 
Oriental (a radical left-wing party); several members of the Paritdo Socialista, who 
had become "disappointed with their party's electoral performance in 1962"; the 
Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (MIR); and the Federaci6n Anarquista del 
Uruguay (FAU).42 These various groups were in frequent contact with each other. In 
39 Lopez-Alves, "Political Crises," 213. 
4° Carlos Nunez, The Tupamaros: Urban Guerrillas of Uruguay (New York: Times Change Press, 
1970). 
41 Arturo C. Porzecanski, Uruguay's Tupamaros: The Urban Guerrilla (New York, Washington and 
London: Praeger Publishers, 1973), 5. 
42 Arraras, "Armed Struggle", 57-63. 
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mid-1963, they decided to form a loose federation called the Coordinator. This 
arrangement allowed them to combine their operational and intelligence capabilities, 
while also maintaining complete independence over their actions. 43 During the 
subsequent twelve months, member-groups of the Coordinator conducted a number 
of 'revolutionary' actions, such as stealing explosives from a quarry in the 
Department of Maldonado on 19 April 1964, and firebombing several American 
businesses and two U.S. embassy cars in Montevideo on 9 September 1964. However, 
in late-1964, some member-groups (primarily the FAU) split from the Coordinator 
over ideological differences.44 The remaining four groups - the MAC, the Socialists, 
Sendic's Group, and the MIR - decided to continue their association by forming a 
single, unified organisation. They called this new grouping the Movimiento de 
Liberaci6n Nacional-Tupamaros.45 
From 1965 to 1973, the Tupamaros were responsible for a total of 586 violent 
acts.46 This figure includes: 258 robberies and thefts; 135 armed attacks; eighty-one 
bombings; fifty-five firebombings; sixteen kidnappings (plus a further eight attempted 
kidnappings); and nine assassinations (plus an additional three attempted 
assassinations). The MLN-T also conducted twenty-one 'coercive broadcasts'. That 
is, the temporary occupation of either a public place (such as a theatre) or a radio 
station in order to transmit Tupamaro propaganda. Targets of MLN violence 
generally included: perceived corrupt and exploitative businesses; members of the 
Uruguayan police force; and foreign embassies and their staff. 
Despite Uruguay's size, the MLN-T was able to capture significant 
international attention during its eight-year campaign; influencing revolutionaries not 
43 Eleuterio Fernandez Huidobro, Historia de los Tupamaros (Montevideo: Ediciones de la Banda 
Oriental, 1987), 74-5. 
44 Arraras, "Armed Struggle", 67. 
45 The name 'Tupamaros' is a derivative ofTupac Ama.rU, the leader of an indigenous uprising against 
the Spaniards in colonial Peru in 1780. After defeating Tupac Amani's forces, the Spanish used the 
term 'Tupamaros' to label "all members of rebellious groups" that subsequently emerged in Latin 
America to challenge colonial authority. Indeed, the forces of Jose G. Artigas - the hero of Uruguay's 
independence - were called Tupamaros during their battles with the Spanish in the 1820s. By calling 
themselves the Tupamaros, the MLN-T was thus attempting to tap into his well of historic and cultural 
meaning. See: Porzecanski, Uruguay's Tupamaros, ix. 
46 This figure is derived from: Documentaci6n y Archivo de Lucha Armada DC, "Cronologia Basica 
1954-1973." 
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only in neighbouring Brazil and Argentina, but also as far away as Quebec and West 
Germany. 47 The primary reason for this was the group's reputation as 'romantic 
revolutionaries'. 48 As Kohl and Litt state, "Their actions were characterised by 
flawless planning and execution, and, perhaps most important, by style"49 - what 
Connolly and Druehl refer to as the organisation's "human touch."5° For example, 
during a bank robbery in May 1968, a Tupamaro administered first aid to an elderly 
bystander who had "suffered a nervous shock."51 On another occasion in February 
1969, after learning that the $300,000 they had recently stolen from the San Rafael 
Casino included tips for the casino operators, the Tupamaros "returned a portion of 
the confiscated money earmarked for the workers."52 
The MLN-T's 'romantic' approach to revolutionary warfare was also evident 
(to some extent) in the deaths attributable to the organisation. Of the thirty-seven 
people that died as a result of Tupamaro violence, only four were non-combatants (i.e. 
Carlos Burgueno, Juan A. Betancour, Professor Armando Acosta y Lara, and Julio 
Morat6). 53 Furthermore, Burgueno's death was unintentional (he was killed in 
crossfire between the police and the Tupamaros in October 1969), and Acosta y Lara 
was a recently-retired Undersecretary for the Interior (and thus had played a leading 
role in the Government's anti-Tupamaro efforts). Nevertheless, notwithstanding this 
apparent discrimination, the MLN-T clearly did not shy away from the use of lethal 
force. Over the course of their campaign, the Tupamaros killed twenty-one police 
officers, eleven members of the Fuerzas Armadas (the Uruguayan Armed Forces, or 
FFAA), and one American embassy official (Dan Mitrione) who had been advising 
47 Fournier describes how the Tupamaros had "an impact" on the "ranks of the FLQ." Louis Fournier, 
F.L.Q.: The Anatomy of an Underground Movement, trans. Edward Baxter (Toronto: NC Press Limited, 
1984), 71-2. Similarly, during the late-1960s and early-1970s, a small group of West Berlin radicals 
established the 'Tupamaros-West Berlin'. This grouping soon evolved into the Bewegung 2. Juni. 
Jeremy Varon, Bringing the War Home: The Weather Underground, the Red Army Faction, and 
Revolutionary Violence in the Sixties and Seventies (Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University of 
California Press, 2003), 207-8. 
48 Marysa Gerassi, "Uruguay's Urban Guerrillas," New Left Review, no. 62 (1970): 28. 
49 Kohl and Litt, Urban Guerrilla Warfare, 173. 
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the Uruguayan police on counterinsurgency tactics and interrogation methods. s4 
Arguably the most bloodthirsty of the MLN-T's attacks occurred on 18 May 1972, 
when a Tupamaro cell, in an attempt to assassinate the Commander-in-Chief of the 
FF AA, Oscar Gravina, brutally killed four of his guards. 
Organisationally, the MLN-T was structured to ensure a hierarchical flow of 
information, while also maintaining the security principle of compartmentalisation (i.e. 
restricting access to information in order to reduce the likelihood of its discovery by 
adversaries). The basic building block of this structure was the cell. Comprised of 
between two and six members, each cell specialised in either "commando-type 
operations or service-type work," and upheld strict confidentiality amongst its 
membership.ss Cells were coordinated and supervised by an Executive Committee; 
the organisation's "primary decision-making organ."s6 To assist this coordination 
process, the Executive Committee grouped the MLN-T's various cells into columns, 
based on either geographic or, in the case of Montevideo's numerous cells, functional 
requirements. These columns were not decision-making units, but purely 
administrative entities that sought to take advantage of such tactical benefits as 
economies of scale.s7 Nevertheless, each column was intended to have a regenerative 
function. That is, they "had to be able to continue operating even when the rest of the 
organization had been dismantled";s8 thus ensuring even if "only one column survives, 
the possibility exists of regenerating the whole movement."s9 In theory, the MLN-T 
had one further organisational level, the National Convention. Consisting of 
representatives from each of the organisation's cells, the National Convention was 
originally intended to appoint the Executive Committee, and to "deal with broad 
ideological issues, such as strategies to be pursued or attitudes to be taken." 60 
However, given the security risk involved to the MLN-T in having a large number of 
54 For an exhaustive account of Mitrione's workings with the Uruguayan police and his background, 
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58 Arraras, "Armed Struggle", 91. 
59 Kohl and Litt, Urban Guerrilla Warfare, 189. 
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its members concentrated in one place at one time, the National Convention met on 
only two occasions: in January 1966 and March 1968.61 
Unfortunately, as is the case with most (if not all) insurgent actors, there is a 
dearth of direct information about the MLN-T's membership. Nevertheless, the 
industriousness of two scholars has, to some extent, counteracted this deficiency. The 
first of these academics is Arturo Porzecanski. In the immediate aftermath of the 
MLN-T's demise, Porzecanski compiled "all information released to the press by 
Uruguay's police and armed forces concerning both guerrillas captured and later 
convicted and guerrillas killed in action" between 12 December 1966 and 22 June 
1972.62 After discarding "what appeared to be contested or very incomplete entries," 
Porzecanski obtained a list of 648 Tupamaros. 63 
The second scholar who has shed light on the MLN-T's membership is Astrid 
Arraras. In her examination of the Tupamaros' journey from violent revolutionaries 
to respectable members of Uruguay's democratic process, and with the benefit of 
greater access to primary source material, Arraras sought to expand upon and improve 
Porzecanski' s compilation. Adopting a similar methodology to Porzecanski, Arraras 
collated "names and personal information of members and sympathizers of the MLN-
T from the police and Armed Forces communiques published in the newspaper, El 
Dia, from December 12, 1966 to December 31, 1972."64 After revising her list with 
the assistance of former Tupamaros, 65 Arraras estimated that "a total of 1,549 
members (including the founders) or sympathizers of the MLN-T were arrested and 
prosecuted during 1966-1972. "66 
Of course, this figure is not an exact measure of the MLN-T's total 
membership. As Arraras concedes, her approximation excludes those Tupamaros 
whose arrest and prosecution were not publicised, or who managed to avoid arrest and 
prosecution altogether (primarily by fleeing overseas). 67 Furthermore, the figure of 
1,549 does not include those Tupamaros who were arrested and prosecuted during 
61 Documentaci6n y Archivo de Lucha Armada DC, "Cronologia Basica 1954-1973." 
62 Porzecanski, Uruguay's Tupamaros, 28. 
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1973, or the forty-seven members of the MLN-T who were killed between 1965 and 
1973.68 Once these factors are taken into consideration, it is likely that the MLN-T's 
total strength lay approximately between 1, 700 and 1,800 members and sympathisers. 
This estimation will be used in the following investigation. 
2.1 COLLECTIVE ACTION FRAME 
Diagnosis 
Not surprisingly, the focus of a significant portion of the MLN-T' s diagnosis 
was Uruguay's deteriorating economic situation. For example, the Tupamaros drew 
attention to: the country's ballooning inflation;69 the "plight of rural wage workers";70 
the reduction of "pensioners and old people to beggary";71 and the "daily deaths" of 
children in hospital (due not to the incurability of their afflictions, but to simple 
"malnourishment").72 The MLN-T also highlighted inequalities in Uruguayan society. 
For instance, the organisation's Proclama de Paysandu of 1971 contrasted the 
wretched conditions of the cantegriles (where the "cold comes through the walls and 
the guriserio [the children] have to sleep embracing the dogs to keep warm"), with the 
fortunes of the rich (who had "comfortable homes, top physicians, vacations houses in 
the resorts; for them there is never any meat shortage"). 73 
From the Tupamaro perspective, the primarily culprit of Uruguay's soc10-
economic problems was capitalism. As Porzecanski states, the MLN-T attributed "the 
failure of the agricultural and industrial sectors to grow and expand . . . to inherent 
contradictions and malfunctions of Uruguay's primitive capitalist system." 74 
68 Documentaci6n y Archivo de Lucha Armada DC, "Cronologia Basica 1954-1973." 
69 MLN-T, "Analisis del MLN sobre la situaci6n nacional y continental," in Los Tupamaros, ed. Omar 
Costa (Mexico: Ediciones Era, 1972), 240. 
70 MLN-T, "Interview with Urbano," in Urban Guerrilla Warfare in Latin America, ed. James Kohl 
and James Litt (Cambridge and London: The MIT Press, 1974), 275. 
71 MLN-T, "The Tupamaro manifesto," in The Tupamaros: Urban Guerrillas in Uruguay, ed. Alain 
Labrousse (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1973), 160. 
72 MLN-T, "Los Tupamaros ejecutores de la justicia popular," in Los Tupamaros, ed. Omar Costa 
(Mexico: Ediciones Era, 1972), 120-1. 
73 MLN-T, "Proclamation of Paysandu," in Urban Guerrilla Warfare in Latin America, ed. James Kohl 
and James Litt (Cambridge and London: The MIT Press, 1974), 297-8. 
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Likewise, the organisation portrayed inflation as a "redistributive mechanism of the 
social product in favour of the capitalist."75 The MLN-T also attributed blame for 
Uruguay's economic decline to the country's bourgeoisie. According to the 
Tupamaros, through the "rampant" corruption of officials and the infiltration of vital 
government positions, 76 the "rich" (i.e. "the owners of the ranches, the cattle, the 
factories, the banks") had "taken over" Uruguay. 77 They thus acted as a brake on the 
government's ability to reverse the system's exploitation of the poor majority. As the 
Tupamaros stated in 1971, "they [the rich] are in the government, occupying 
ministries, administering what is theirs so that everything continues as it is, the rich 
rich and the poor poor."78 
The Tupamaros provided many examples of what they saw as the 
government's defence of the 'established order'. These included: the firing of 
"hundreds of workers"; 79 continued interference in educational matters and the 
suppression of the student movement; 80 the introduction of a wage freeze (which 
resulted in a "drop of income of the poorest, while the interests of those who are 
responsible for the crisis remain untouched"); 81 the banning of strikes and the 
repression of protesters;82 the closing down of newspapers; and the imprisonment of 
people "without proof of guilt" and the infliction of "[t]ortue and beatings ... with 
complicity of the Judiciary."83 The Tupamaros also highlighted the government's 
inability (and seeming unwillingness) to punish the crimes of the powerful. After a 
series of financial scandals involving prominent members of Uruguay's elite (the 
perpetrators of which remained largely untouched), the MLN-T parodied the 
government's approach to justice: 
75 MLN-T, "Arnilisis del MLN," 240. 
76 Ibid., 237, MLN-T, "Facts the public should know," in The Tupamaros, ed. Maria Esther Gilio 
(London: Secker & Warburg, 1972), 118. 
77 MLN-T, "Proclamation of Paysandu," 298, MLN-T, "The Tupamaro manifesto," 159. 
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79 MLN-T, "Interview with Urbano," 275. 
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A plantation owner can engage in troop contraband at will in behalf of the Brazilian 
meat packers. Leave the population without meat, leave the country without foreign 
exchange. This ranch owner can become minister at any moment. Or president. But 
for a man of the people who steals a sheep in Vichadero [a small, rural town] to feed 
his children who are dying of starvation, the price is three years in jail. 84 
108 
The MLN-T's diagnosis also consisted of a condemnation of what it saw as 
Uruguay's subservience to foreign powers. Although this complaint encompassed 
Uruguay's historically-interventionist neighbours, Brazil and Argentina, it was 
primarily aimed at what the Tupamaros regarded as the region's leading imperialist 
power, the United States. For instance, the MLN-T declared in 1969 that "[t]here has 
never been such shameless direct intervention by the United States embassy. Through 
the International Monetary Fund and through national organizations, the government 
of the United States dictates its policies to our worthless government and it obeys."85 
Similarly, in 1968, the Tupamaros lambasted "the stranglehold of North American 
capital on our country, and the increasing interference of neighbouring dictators."86 
Prognosis 
The MLN-T's solution to Uruguay's many problems was twofold: (1) the 
seizure of power by the revolutionary movement; and (2) the implementation of major 
structural reforms. 87 The goal of these reforms was to create a socialist socio-
economic system; one which was in line with Uruguay's specific historical and 
developmental conditions. The MLN-T' s proposed reforms included: transferring 
ownership of all large farms and industries from employers to employees; state 
control over the economy, especially in such areas as foreign trade, savings and loans, 
and the development of vital industries; the nationalisation of all foreign investments; 
the redistribution of 'excess' land and the provision of housing for Uruguay's 
homeless; the redistribution of wealth on the basis of "to each according to his needs"; 
the provision of free education and modem medical services; and the replacement of 
84 MLN-T, "Proclamation of Paysandu," 298. 
85 MLN-T, "Broadcast on Radio Sarandi," 14 7. 
86 MLN-T, "Today Sr. Pereyra," 66. 
87 MLN-T, "Analisis del MLN," 228-9. 
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the nation's capitalist criminal justice system with one "that takes essential human 
values into consideration. "88 
The overarching strategy which the MLN-T advocated to achieve its goals was 
armed struggle. In this sense, the Tupamaros likened themselves to Jose G. Artigas 
and other heroes of Uruguay's struggle for independence during the early-nineteenth 
century.89 The MLN-T's articulated strategy had two central tenets. The first of these 
was its urban focus. This put the MLN-T at odds withfoco theory, which stressed 
that "the countryside is the basic area of armed fighting."90 However, to the founders 
of the Tupamaros, such an emphasis on the countryside did not appear to suit their 
strategic environment. Uruguay, after all, was one of the most urbanised countries in 
Latin America, with only 15 .1 percent of its population living in rural areas in the 
early-1960s. 91 Furthermore, Uruguay's terrain was not appropriate for the type of 
rural warfare envisioned by Guevara; consisting of "neither vast jungles nor 
mountains." 92 Rather, Uruguay's advantages seemed to lie in its urban centres, 
specifically Montevideo. With approximately 50 percent of the country's population, 
and "300 square kilometres of buildings," the Tupamaros believed that the nation's 
capital could provide them with not only an ideal clandestine environment, but also 
ready access to potential recruits and other necessary resources. 93 Thus, the 
Tupamaros became one of the earliest proponents of urban guerrilla warfare. 
The second tenet of the MLN-T's strategy was that the armed struggle would 
progress in three phases. 94 First, the MLN-T would establish and consolidate a 
'revolutionary movement'. 95 Violence during this phase would be used for three 
purposes: (1) to acquire the necessary materials (such as munitions, money, and 
88 MLN-T, "The Tupamaros' program for revolutionary government," in Urban Guerrilla Warfare in 
Latin America, ed. James Kohl and James Litt (Cambridge and London: The MIT Press, 1974), 293-5. 
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medicine) for waging a guerrilla war; (2) to harass and wear down the forces of 
repression; and (3) to raise popular consciousness about the need for revolution. The 
MLN-T sought to accomplish this last goal though 'occupation broadcasts' and 
'armed propaganda'. That is, acts of violence which would either draw attention to or 
illustrate the repressive nature of the governing regime. 96 After it had established a 
revolutionary movement, the MLN-T would then attempt to transform public support 
for revolution into a 'people's army'. Once this had been achieved, the MLN-T 
would then embark on the final phase: the destruction of the repressive forces. 
Justificatory Arguments 
The MLN-T justified its armed struggle primarily in terms of efficacy. In all, 
the organisation deployed three utilitarian justificatory arguments. The first of these 
was that the underlying conditions were supportive for the waging of an armed 
struggle. The "most important" examples of these favourable circumstances included: 
(1) "The conviction that the [economic] crisis, far from having been overcome, is 
becoming worse by the day," thus ensuring the existence of "popular discontent in the 
coming years"; (2) Uruguay's "high degree of unionization," which presented 
opportunities for synchronising the union movement's ability to paralyse "the basic 
services of the state" with the MLN-T's general insurrection; and (3) the poor state of 
Uruguay's armed forces, which at "some 12,000 men sketchily equipped and trained, 
constitute[d] one of the weakest organizations ofrepression in America."97 
The MLN-T's second utilitarian justificatory argument was that armed 
struggle was the only option available to beget the organisation's goals. Of course, 
the Tupamaros recognised that there were many instruments for affecting change in 
Uruguay's political system, such as parliamentary action, demonstrations, and 
proclamations. 98 However, they portrayed these as largely ineffective; capable of 
only "improbable and remote change." 99 The source of this inefficacy was the 
96 MLN-T, "Las tacticas que usa la guerrilla urbana," in Los Tupamaros, ed. Omar Costa (Mexico: 
Ediciones Era, 1972), 258. 
97 MLN-T, "Thirty questions," 232-3. 
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bourgeoisie domination of the country's legal and conventional avenues of political 
reform. As the MLN-T decried, a 'rich minority' controlled the bureaucracy, 100 
Uruguay's two main political parties (the Blancos and Colorados), 101 and the security 
forces; 102 as well as benefiting from a legal system which was "conceived with the 
idea of maintaining the private ownership principle of the capitalist system."103 The 
bourgeoisie could thus marshal this explicit and implicit power to frustrate any 
legislative or popular threat to their interests. 104 As a Tupamaro stated in 1970: 
The masses are learning that whatever action on their part affects the regime 
always clashes with it in one way or another; that their struggle for wage increases 
invariably comes up against the regime's wage-freeze laws; that any attempt at 
demonstrating or holding assemblies aimed against the interests of the regime or 
the order the regime defends are repressed; and that any means for the expression 
of ideas that say something critical of the order defended by bayonets is muzzled, 
as has happened to so many newspapers. 105 
In this context, "the only means of effective expression and action," the only 
instrument that "will allow the complete destruction of the old so that we can begin to 
build a new, truly free country" was the armed struggle. 106 
The MLN-T's third utilitarian justificatory argument was that armed struggle 
was an effective means of accomplishing the organisation's goals. Despite rejecting 
his focus on the countryside, the Tupamaros were heavily influenced in this regard by 
Guevara's notion of the transformative power of violence. This inspiration is evident 
in the MLN-T's famous Thirty Questions to a Tupamaro of 1967, which stated that 
"revolutionary action in itself, the very act of arming oneself, preparing, equipping 
and pursuing activities that violate bourgeois legality, generates revolutionary 
consciousness, organization, and conditions." 107 In other words, the Tupamaros 
believed that the use of violence against the capitalist system would build support - a 
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"mass movement" - for its overthrow. 108 The use of force would create this 
revolutionary consciousness by polarising Uruguayan society. Specifically, the 
growing intensity of the battle between the government and the Tupamaros would 
force the broader public to make a choice between "support or disappearance" of the 
revolutionary dream; a choice between the inherent ineffectiveness of traditional 
modes of political expression and "the direct road embodied by the armed group and 
its revolutionary action." 109 To support this line of contention, the MLN-T 
highlighted China, Cuba and Algeria as examples where "armed struggle" created 
"revolutionary consciousness and conditions ... even before the 'classic' conditions 
for an insurrection existed."110 
Although the organisation primarily relied on notions of utility, the MLN-T 
also justified its armed struggle in terms of morality. Specifically, the Tupamaros 
framed their use of violence as an "indispensable" response to the "veiled and evident 
violence" which the capitalist regime used to "defend an unjust order."111 However, 
the MLN-T did not fully develop this line of reasoning; nor did they utilise it 
frequently. 
2.2 RECRUITMENT PROCESS 
Keenly aware of the need for new recruits, the MLN-T had a relatively formal 
and organised recruitment network. The key feature of this was the Comandos de 
Apoyo Tupamaro ('Tupamaro Support Commands', or CATs). Formed in 1968, the 
CATs were compartmentalised cells attached to each of the organisation's columns. 
As well as engaging in a host of propaganda and administrative duties (such as 
training cadres and collecting intelligence), the CATs were also responsible for 
recruiting new members. To help facilitate this goal, many CATs integrated 
themselves in the student movement and Uruguay's various trade unions. 112 The 
CATs would seek to establish interpersonal linkages with potential members by either: 
108 Ibid. 
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111 MLN-T, "Carta abierta," 395, MLN-T, "Interview with Urbano," 274. 
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(1) identifying and approaching promising candidates; or (2) simply providing 
potential members a point of contact with which to volunteer. 113 In addition to the 
CATs, the MLN-T also encouraged its broader membership-base to identify 
prospective recruits where possible. 
Once identified, the Tupamaros ·subjected their prospective recruits to a 
lengthy and rigorous investigatory process. 114 As the MLN-T stated in April 1968, its 
goal was "not to incorporate into the Organisation every person who wants the 
Revolution," but only those needed to create and maintain "a highly efficient, 
clandestine apparatus."115 Thus, the Tupamaros repeatedly interviewed prospective 
recruits, and compiled extensive reports on their "life, habits, political and 
occupational background, personality, friends, health record, and all other aspects that 
might [have been] significant." 116 On the basis of these reports, and generally a 
period of probation, the Executive Committee accepted or rejected prospective 
recruits' candidatures for membership. It is important to note, however, that, despite 
this lengthy and seemingly-thorough recruitment process, in retrospect, "many 
Tupamaro leaders have admitted that m reality they were [neither] cautious nor 
selective" in recruiting new members. 117 
3 THE URUGUAYAN GOVERNMENT AND ITS SECURITY FORCES 
At the beginning of the 1960s, Uruguay was a constitutional democracy, with 
a bicameral legislature and a collegial executiveY8 However, during the mid-1960s, 
the country's political elite was concerned that the nine-member colegiado (with its 
seemingly constant bickering and divided responsibilities) was hindering the 
government's ability to reverse Uruguay's economic decline. 119 Thus, in December 
1966, the government convened a plebiscite on constitutional reform; the central 
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115 MLN-T, "Apuntes Sohre Lucha Armada," April 1968, 15. 
116 Porzecanski, Uruguay's Tupamaros, 35. 
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plank of which was the creation of a unitary executive. Passing with 59 percent of the 
vote, Uruguay's new constitution was ratified in February 1967. As well as 
dismantling the colegiado, the 1967 Constitution also gave the Uruguayan President 
the sole ability to invoke Medidas Prontas de Seguridad ('Prompt Security Measures', 
or MPS) "in the event of serious and unexpected external attack or internal 
upheaval."120 This power would later prove to have an important impact on both the 
development and decline of the MLN-T's campaign. 
The Uruguayan Government maintained two security forces: the Policia 
Nacional (PN) and the Fuerzas Armadas (FFAA). The former (along with the 
Maritime Police; an agency under the supervisory of the Uruguayan Navy) was 
responsible for maintaining internal security and was the lead actor in the 
government's counterinsurgency campaign until September 1971. In 1970, the PN 
was comprised of approximately 17,000 officers; 40 percent of which were assigned 
to urban areas. 121 According to Porzecanski, two branches of the PN "were given the 
task of containing and eliminating the Tupamaros." 122 First, the Information and 
Intelligence Directorate, which utilised various forensic, data management and human 
intelligence resources to analyse and provide information about the MLN-T. Second, 
the Metropolitan Guard, a paramilitary organisation under the jurisdiction of the chief 
of police of Montevideo. Consisting of 600 officers in 1966, the Metropolitan guard 
"was originally intended to be an elite police corps," with its members having met 
strict physical requirements and received training in military-style weapons and 
crowd-control devices. 123 
As of 1970, the FFAA consisted of 16,000 soldiers. The majority of these 
(12,000) were members of the Uruguayan Army; split between nine cavalry regiments, 
two armoured regiments, five infantry regiments, five artillery groups and five 
12° Constituci6n de la Republica Oriental del Uruguay, 1967. Accessed: 1 December 2005. Available 
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engineer battalions.124 The Anny's mechanised units were "equipped with both light 
and medium tanks," such as the M-24 and the M-113AI Armoured Personnel Carrier 
(APC). 125 The Navy and Air Force each consisted of approximately 2,000 personnel; 
with the former primarily operating escort and patrol vessels and the latter a small 
number of combat and transport aircraft. 126 In comparison with Uruguay's overall 
population, the FF AA was one of the largest armed forces in Latin America (ranked 
third in 1970).127 However, as Kaufman states, the FFAA's strength was 
still insufficient to prevent aggression from either the Argentinean or Brazilian 
armed forces. Because of this, the military in Uruguay was for a long time seen as 
little more than a decorative force, the minimum required for a 'normal' country. 128 
Nevertheless, Uruguay's armed forces were highly professional and "enjoyed the 
reputation of being one of the most apolitical in Latin America."129 As a result of this 
political aloofness, the FFAA's share of Uruguay's Gross National Product (GNP) 
was relatively modest; averaging at 1.4 percent during the l 960s. 130 However, the 
FFAA's political nature began to erode in September 1971, when the government 
transferred responsibility for combating the Tupamaros from the PN to the Uruguayan 
armed forces. This decision, and its effects, will be discussed in greater detail below. 
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4 THE MLN-T'S REGENERATIVE EXPERIENCE 
4.1 THE PREPARATORY PHASE, 1965-JULY 1968 
At its inception in early-1965, the MLN-T was comprised of approximately 
fifty active members. 131 These 'founders' spent the first three-and-a-half years of the 
organisation's existence engaged in the relatively mundane tasks of effecting a 
revolution, such as establishing training and administrative facilities, as well as 
workshops for the manufacture of explosives, propaganda, and forged 
documentation. 132 The MLN-T was rather inconspicuous during these formative 
years; conducting only thirty-four violent acts between January 1965 and July 
1968.133 These were primarily aimed at securing arms and money; building public 
support for the organisation (i.e. armed propaganda), as well as providing the 
Tupamaros with much-needed ''target practice."134 
Initially, the MLN-T did not place a great emphasis on recruiting new cadres. 
While this process was certainly not discouraged, the 'founders' were more interested 
in consolidating their revolutionary organisation and maintaining clandestinity. As 
Fernandez Huidobro (a former Tupamaro and founder) admitted, growth was not a 
task of the "first order" for the MLN-T. 135 However, a series of clashes with the 
police in late-1966 challenged this attitude. On the 22nd of December, several 
Tupamaros in a stolen car stumbled upon a police patrol. In the ensuing shoot-out, 
one Tupamaro, Carlos Flores, was killed. During the subsequent police investigation, 
a number of hide-outs were discovered, approximately twenty-five Tupamaros were 
forced underground, several Tupamaros were arrested, and a police-officer (Silveira 
Regalado) and a Tupamaro (Mario Robaina) were killed. 136 
131 Arraras, "Armed Struggle", 97, Robert Moss, Urban Guerrillas: The New Face of Political Violence 
(London: Temple Smith, 1972), 211. 
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Although these events did not lead to the destruction of the MLN-T, they did 
constitute a defeat; compelling the organisation to engage in a period of 
reconstruction and reflection. One of the most important insights that emerged from 
this process was that "[l]osses are relatively high in the city."137 Indeed, the MLN-T 
came to perceive attrition as "unavoidable"; "a natural and therefore calculable and 
foreseeable law" of urban guerrilla warfare. 138 The Tupamaros also realised that, 
before December 1966, they had neglected the issue of recruitment; especially the 
political action which was required to attract new personnel. This neglect had placed 
the MLN-T in a precarious position, as the group was not able to adequately replace 
"those who [were] captured."139 As a consequence of these insights, the Tupamaros 
decided to shift greater emphasis to the issue of recruitment; claiming the "only 
growth can save us."140 To facilitate this membership drive, the MLN-T created two 
new columns, and stepped-up its propaganda campaign. 141 For instance, in 1967, the 
organisation released Treinta Preguntas a un Tupamaro ('Thirty Questions to a 
Tupamaro'); a "document destined to attract new members.' 142 Over the next 
eighteen months, the organisation gradually expanded, while conducting few 
operations in a deliberate attempt to avoid possible confrontations with the security 
forces. 
4.2 THE RISE OF THE TUP AMAR OS, AUGUST 1968 -AUGUST 1971 
On 13 June 1968, in an attempt to address the nation's spiralling inflation and 
recent social disturbances, Uruguayan President Jorge Pacheco Areco invoked MPS 
and introduced a series of draconian 'reforms', such as price and wage freezes, and 
the "militarization of striking bank workers." 143 Two weeks later, Pacheco Areco 
followed up these initial measures by declaring martial law, which subject newspapers 
to "official rather than self-censorship," and decreed courts martial for anyone 
137 MLN-T, "Interview with Urbano," 286. 
138 Fernandez Huidobro, Historia, 349. 
139 MLN-T, "Interview with Urbano," 287. 
14° Fernandez Huidobro, Historia, 349. 
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"demanding wage increases."144 It was during this turmoil that the MLN-T judged its 
strategic environment to be favourable for the intensification of its revolutionary 
campaign. Thus, on the morning of 7 August 1968, the Mario Mendez commando 
unit of the MLN-T kidnapped Ulysses Pereira Reverbel; a close friend of the 
Uruguayan President, and director of the Administraci6n Nacional de Usinas y 
Transmisiones Electricas (UTE). 145 After holding Pereira Reverbel for four days in 
their 'people's prison', the Tupamaros released him unharmed. This episode, which 
shocked both the authorities and the general public, marked the beginning of a new 
chapter in the MLN-T's armed struggle. 
Over the next three years, the Tupamaros' campaign would be characterised 
by two trends. The first of these was the MLN-T's increasing rate of violence. Prior 
to August 1968, the Tupamaros had conducted an average of less than one violent act 
per month. However, after Pereira's kidnapping, the MLN-T's monthly average 
skyrocketed; from four during the latter months of 1968, to six in 1969, thirteen in 
1970, and sixteen in 1971 (see Figure 1).146 Indeed, by mid-1971, the MLN-T had 
Figure 1: MLN-T Violent Acts, Monthly, 1965 - August 1971147 
144 Labrousse, The Tupamaros, 10. 
145 Uruguay's state-owned power company. 
146 Data drawn and compiled from: Documentaci6n y Archivo de Lucha Armada DC, "Cronologia 
Basica 1954-1973." The average for 1968 is from August to December. The average for 1971 is from 
January to August. 
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earned the reputation of being "the most effective guerrilla group m Latin 
America"; 148 with The Economist declaring that: 
Uruguay's urban guerrillas, the Tupamaros, can no longer be shrugged off as a gang 
of romantic conspirators, out of touch with the people. In Montevideo ... they are 
running what is virtually a parallel government, and the country is facing the threat 
of an armed takeover. 149 
The second trend of the MLN-T's campaign from August 1968 to August 
1971 was the organisation's increasing rate of attrition. During the first three years of 
their existence, notwithstanding their 'defeat' of December 1966, the Tupamaros had 
few confrontations with Uruguay's security forces. In all, the organisation suffered 
150 only four arrests and two deaths from January 1965 to July 1968. However, from 
August 1968 onwards, the MLN-T's losses began to mount. For example, during the 
last five months of 1968, the Tupamaros suffered an average of three arrests per 
month. In 1969, this figure rose to nine; climbing against to thirteen in 1970 and 
fourteen during the first eight months of 1971 (see Figure 2). 151 Altogether, 389 
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Tupamaros were arrested (and an additional thirteen were killed) between August 
1968 and August 1971. Notable clashes with the police during this period included: 
the loss of twenty Tupamaros (seventeen arrested, three killed) during the MLN-T's 
Pando Operation of 8 October 1969; and the capture of nine members of the MLN-T's 
central leadership (including Sendic, Edith Morales and Raul Bidegain) on 7 August 
1970. 
The MLN-T's losses during 1968-71 did cause the organisation some 
consternation. For example, while reviewing their performance in 1969, the 
Tupamaros acknowledged that "there are too many prisoners," and proposed to 
"reinforce internal security" by creating a centralised "security service" which would 
operate in each column. 153 The MLN-T also stressed the importance of training and 
"military preparation," especially in such areas as discipline, "[ o ]peration of the 
cells," and "conduct in front of the police" (i.e. what to say and how to behave when 
stopped by the security forces). 154 However, this concern notwithstanding, the MLN-
T's losses were not debilitating. As highlighted above, although the organisation's 
rate of attrition increased from August 1968 to August 1971, so did its rate of 
operations. In other words, the Tupamaros were able not only to withstand the 
police's counterinsurgency, but to thrive in the face of it. 
The primary reason why the Tupamaros were able to accomplish this feat was 
because of their strong regenerative capacity. Through a "massive influx" of new 
recruits, the MLN-T was able to both offset its losses and expand. 155 As 
aforementioned, this growth began in 1967 and continued until 1971. 156 
Unfortunately, a lack of accurate data prevents this thesis from identifying exactly 
when and how many new recruits joined. However, some indicative factors include: 
the expansion of the MLN-T's structure in September 1968 from two to seven 
columns; 157 Colonel d'Oliveira's statement that, in the wake of Pereira Reverbel's 
kidnapping, "[n]ew recruits flocked to the movement"; 158 a Tupamaro interviewed by 
153 MLN-T, "Balance 1969," in Las Fuerzas Armadas al Pueblo Oriental, ed. Junta de Comandantes en 
Jefe (Montevideo: Republica Oriental del Uruguay, Junta de Comandantes en Jefe, 1978), 568-9. 
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Lopez-Alves noting that recruitment increased during 1969 - a phenomenon reflected 
in that year's Balance, which hoped that the organisation "continued its growth" over 
the next twelve months; 159 and Kohl and Litt's observation that neither the MLN-T's 
"recruitment nor technical capacity nor leadership capability was, in fact, seriously 
impaired" by the August 1970 seizure of Sendic and other prominent Tupamaro 
leaders. 160 
4.3 THE DECLINE OF THE TUPAMAROS, SEPTEMBER 1971-1973 
Somewhat surprisingly, the catalyst for the demise of the MLN-T and its 
regenerative capacity was an event that, at the time, both the Uruguayan Government 
and the Tupamaros perceived as a tactical success for the insurgent actor. On 6 
September 1971, 100 Tupamaros, including Sendic and other high-profile leaders, 
escaped from Punta Carretas (the country's main penitentiary for holding convicted 
subversives). This dramatic breach came in the wake of a similar mass breakout by 
thirty-eight female members of the MLN-T (known as Tupamaras) from the Penal de 
Mujeres two months earlier. These escapes represented a breaking-point for Pacheco 
Areco and his confidence in the PN's ability to contain and counteract the Tupamaro 
threat. Thus, on 9 September 1971, the Uruguayan President transferred primacy of 
the government's counterinsurgency efforts from the police to the armed forces 
(decree 566/971). 
The impact of this shift, however, was not immediately apparent. On the one 
hand, the leadership of the FF AA decided not to launch an instant counteroffensive; 
but rather, to engage in an extended period of training and organisation. For example, 
Porzecanski describes how the FFAA's Intelligence Service began in September 1971 
(with the assistance of the PN's Information and Intelligence Directorate) to prepare 
"the background information and plans" required for future counterinsurgency 
operations. 161 The Tupamaros, meanwhile, had declared a unilateral ceasefire. , The 
reasoning behind this decision was linked to the creation of the Frente Amplio 
159 Lopez-Alves, "Political Crises," 226, MLN-T, "Balance 1969," 569. 
16° Kohl and Litt, Urban Guerrilla Warfare, 188. 
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('Broad Front', or FA), a coalition of more than a dozen leftist parties, in late-1970. 
Initially, the MLN-T was concerned about the F A's potential to "marginalise" the 
organisation. 162 Thus, in an attempt to maintain both their role as the ''vanguard" of 
the revolution and the legitimacy of the armed struggle, the Tupamaros announced 
their limited support for the FA in December 1970.163 In the wake of the September 
breakout, the MLN-T decided to strengthen its support by declaring a unilateral 
ceasefire to coincide with the FA's campaign for the November presidential election. 
This move was unexpected, given both the MLN-T's intrinsic rejection of the 
electoral process as a means of engendering desired reforms, and the seeming success 
the organisation had attained through the use of revolutionary violence. However, it 
appears that the Tupamaros took the "calculated risk" of declaring a ceasefire in order 
to further prevent their isolation from the broader Uruguayan left. 164 Specifically, the 
MLN-T was seeking to allay FA concerns that continued Tupamaro violence might 
give the government a pretext to postpone the election, as well as encourage the 
burgeoning number of right-wing, anti-Tupamaro vigilante groups (which had first 
appeared in early-1971) to harass and intimidate FA supporters. 
However, notwithstanding the MLN-T's ceasefire, the next two months 
witnessed a campaign "accompanied by a level of violence unparalleled since the civil 
war period at the beginning of the century," and the eventual loss of the Frente 
Amplio (polling just over 18 percent of the vote). 165 In response to this defeat, and 
widespread suspicion about voting irregularities, the Tupamaros revoked their 
ceasefire in December 1971.166 One of the organisation's first major actions was the 
kidnapping of Nelson Bardesio on 25 February 1972. A police officer, Bardesio was 
suspected of, and later confessed to, being a member of a right-wing, vigilante group. 
On the basis of information provided by Bardesio, the Tupamaros issued a 
communique on 14 April 1972 sentencing to death a host of government officials and 
members of the security forces for their alleged role in controlling the anti-Tupamaro 
162 MLN-T, "Balance 70-71," in 3 Documentos Infernos (Montevideo: MLN-T, 1986), 12. 
163 Documentaci6n y Archivo de Lucha Armada DC, "Cronologia Basica 1954-1973.", MLN-T, 
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groups. Within hours of the communique's release, the MLN-T had killed three of 
those listed: Oscar Delega Luzardo (a senior police officer), Ernesto Motta (a naval 
counterintelligence officer), and Professor Armando Acosta y Lara.167 
These assassinations shocked the administration of newly-elected President 
Juan Maria Bordaberry (Pacheco's hand-picked successor); as well as the FFAA, 
which had just lost its first officer to Tupamaro violence. Bordaberry, under strong 
pressure from the military, acted swiftly; immediately asking the General Assembly 
for fresh emergency powers and a declaration affirming the existence of an 'estado de 
guerra interno' ('state of internal war'). The next day, the legislature acceded to the 
President's demands. Martial law descended on Uruguay, as the FF AA were given 
free reign to fulfil their counterinsurgency mandate "without regard for judicial 
accountability of individual rights."168 After an eight-month 'phoney war', the battle 
between the military and the Tupamaros was finally joined. 
It was at this point that the MLN-T's capacity to regenerate began to 
irrevocably weaken. This deterioration was the function of two factors. The first of 
these was a dramatic increase in the MLN-T's rate of attrition. Previously, the 
Tupamaros' losses had been sustainable. However, the advent of the military's 
counteroffensive significantly altered the MLN-T's strategic environment. Striking 
with both speed and ferocity, the FF AA instantly "dominated the street scene"; 
manning roadblocks and systematically raiding houses across the country. 169 
Hundreds (and eventually thousands) of Uruguayans suspected of 'subversive' 
behaviour - including members of the FA, as well as the student and union 
movements -were swept-up in mass arrests.170 The military subjected these detainees 
to abusive yet methodical interrogation sessions; the information from which was 
used to launch new waves of arrests. 
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168 Porzecanski, Uruguay's Tupamaros, 68. 
169 Generals and Tupamaros: The Struggle for Power in Uruguay 1969-1973, (London and Leeds: 
Latin America Review of Books, 1974), 41-2, SERPAJ, Uruguay Nunca Mas: Human Rights 
Violations, 1972-1985, trans. Elizabeth Hampsten (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1992), 29. 
17° Freeman, Freedom or Security, 95. 
Movimiento de Liberaci6n Nacional - Tupamaros 124 
The Tupamaros were simply unable to withstand this onslaught. By the end of 
April, eighty-four Tupamaros had been arrested and a further eleven killed. As 1972 
progressed, the MLN-T's attrition continued to mount, with the organisation 
recording 116 arrests in May; 329 arrests and seven deaths in June; 251 arrests and 6 
deaths in July; and 171 arrests and four deaths in August. Over the remaining months 
of 1972 and the first half of 1973, the organisation lost a further 183 members. In 
addition to these arrests and deaths, approximately 100-200 Tupamaros fled into exile 
after April 1972; primarily settling in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile. 171 
The second factor responsible for the weakening of the MLN-T's regenerative 
capacity was the organisation's declining ability to attract new recruits. Interestingly, 
the Tupamaros had highlighted problems with their recruitment as early as March 
1972; arguing that Uruguayan society (both the oligarchs and the people) had grown 
'accustomed' to their presence. 172 As the FFAA intensified its counterinsurgency 
efforts after April 1972, the MLN-T's recruitment problems worsened. 173 While 
publicly claiming that the organisation continued to receive "popular support," which 
meant, "on a day-to-day basis, new fighters, new hideouts"; 174 in private analyses, the 
MLN-T acknowledged that, after the "blow of 72," its "possibilities of recruitment" 
had "diminished."175 
As a consequence of these two factors, the MLN-T began to shrink. The 
organisation's rate of operations reflected this contraction. Initially, the Tupamaros 
met the FFAA's counteroffensive with a dramatic increase in activity. Indeed, April, 
May, and June of 1972 recorded some of the MLN-T's highest monthly tallies of 
violent acts. However, as Figure 3 illustrates, the Tupamaros' rate of operations 
started to decline from July to September; with the organisation unable to conduct 
more than a handful of violent acts from October 1972 to July 1973.176 By this time, 
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virtually every member of the MLN-T was either dead, in prison, or in exile. 177 Over 
the next few years, those Tupamaros living in Argentina, Chile, and Brazil would 
attempt to revive the organisation in Uruguay. To assist the achievement of this goal, 
they published numerous items of propaganda, and even sought guerrilla training in 
Cuba. 178 However, divisions soon emerged amongst the expatriates over the future 
direction of the MLN-T. This schism, as well as the continued dominance of the 
FFAA, hindered efforts to relaunch the armed struggle. For all extents and purposes, 
by the end of 1973, the MLN-T, as an organisation actively seeking the violent 
overthrow of Uruguay's socio-economic system, ceased to exist. 179 
20 
15 
10 
5 
0 
(/) z ...... 3: 3: '-' (/) z ('1) 0 \D QJ QJ !:.. ('1) 0 
"O < "J .... '< "O < N 
Figure 3: MLN-T Violent Acts, Monthly, September 1971 - 1973180 
An important postscript to the MLN-T's decline was the FFAA's gradual 
subjugation of the Uruguayan political system. As its campaign against the Tupamaro 
wound down, the military, concerned about the quality of Uruguay's civilian 
leadership, became increasingly interventionist. This culminated in February 1973, 
177 Arraras, "Armed Struggle", 226. 
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when the FFAA refused to accept the President's choice for Minister of Defence, 
General Antonio Francese. At first, Bordaberry sought the assistance of other civilian 
political leaders to resist the military's encroachment. However, after realising that he 
commanded little support both within and without his party, Bordaberry formed an 
alliance with the FF AA. Under the terms of this agreement, the President accepted 
that "government policy would be supervised by a newly created National Security 
Council [COSENA] clearly dominated by the military."181 However, this was not the 
final blow against Uruguay's democratic system. On 27 June 1973, after several 
months of tension with the Senate over the immunity of Senator Enrique Erro (whom 
the FF AA suspected of complicity with the Tupamaros), Bordaberry launched a 
military-backed coup. As a result, the Uruguayan Parliament was closed down 
(replaced by a presidential-nominated, twenty-five member council), and the FFAA 
was empowered to ensure the functioning of public services. For the next twelve 
years, Uruguay was governed by a military dictatorship, until democracy was restored 
on 1March1985. 
5 ANALYSIS 
From the above account of the MLN-T's regenerative experience, it appears 
that an increase in attrition played at least an equal, and arguably greater, role than a 
decrease in recruitment in weakening the organisation's capacity to regenerate. Three 
observations form the basis of this judgment. The first of these is that the 
deterioration of the MLN-T's regenerative capacity coincided with both an increase in 
attrition and a decrease in recruitment. The second observation, meanwhile, is that 
the MLN-T's loss of personnel seemingly increased at a rate greater than that at which 
the organisation's intake of recruits declined. Although a lack of adequate data 
prevents this thesis from quantifying the scale at which the MLN-T's recruitment 
decreased following Bordaberry' s declaration of a 'state of internal war'; the language 
used by the Tupamaros to describe their recruitment problems during 1972 (such as 
noting that their 'possibilities of recruitment' had 'diminished', and complaining that 
181 Weinstein, Uruguay: Failure, 130. 
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Uruguayans had become 'accustomed' to their presence) does not convey an 
impression of either urgency or fervency. The MLN-T's loss of personnel, on the 
other hand, clearly increased at a phenomenal, frenzied, and ultimately catastrophic 
rate. Where 502 Tupamaros were arrested over the forty-four month period from 
August 1968 to March 1972 (at an average of approximately eleven per month); more 
than double this amount (1008) were arrested over the six months between April and 
September 1972 (at an average of eleven Tupamaros every two days). 182 
The final observation is that the MLN-T's burgeoning loss of personnel 
appears to have had a greater impact on the organisation's decision-making process 
than its declining intake of recruits. Beginning with its loss of sixty-one Tupamaros 
(including several members of the Executive Committee and a column leader) within 
seven days of the 'state of internal war', the MLN-T's burgeoning rate of attrition 
seemingly threw the organisation into a state of disorientation. As David Campora, a 
former Tupamaro, later acknowledged; reeling under the FFAA's onslaught, the 
Tupamaro leadership "lost control, the Organisation galloped, without knowing where 
it was going."183 Or, in the words of Arraras, the "Tupamaros experienced internal 
chaos as the Armed Forces dismantled their organization."184 The MLN-T's declining 
intake of recruits, in contrast, was ostensibly a secondary concern - with the 
Tupamaros and their supporters seemingly more interested in "avoid[ing] arrest", 
rather than problems of recruitment. 185 
fu light of the above findings, the remainder of this chapter will seek to 
provide greater insight into why the above shifts in Tupamaro recruitment and 
attrition occurred. Specifically, this section will examine: (1) whether the MLN-T's 
increase in attrition was the result of 'the improvement in the government's 
intelligence collection capabilities' and/or 'restricting civil liberties'; and (2) whether 
the MLN-T's decrease in recruitment was the result of 'the amelioration of 
182 Documentaci6n y Archivo de Lucha Armada DC, "Cronologia Basica 1954-1973." 
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grievances', 'selective government repression', and/or 'the discrediting of the 
insurgent actor's ideology'. 
5.1 AN INCREASE IN ATTRITION 
The Improvement of the Government's Intelligence Collection Capabilities 
The MLN-T case provides strong support for the notion that an insurgent 
actor's loss of personnel will increase if the opposing government's ability to collect 
information about the insurgent actor improves. Prior to September 1971, "poor 
intelligence" hampered the Uruguayan Government in its attempts to counteract the 
Tupamaro threat. 186 As the United States Agency for International Development 
(USAID) (which was tasked with advising and training Uruguay's police during the 
1960s) stated in 1968, the PN's "intelligence apparatus [was] deficient"187 - lacking 
the ability to collect not only high-end intelligence derived from "penetrating" the 
insurgent actor, but also "low-level, 'listening post' information."188 However, from 
April 1972 onwards, the Uruguayan Government was able to inflict an increasing 
level of casualties on the MLN-T because, in part, its ability to collect information 
about the Tupamaros improved. 
This improvement had three primary sources. The first of these was the 
military's expanded and systematic use of torture as a means of acquiring information. 
Of course, the FF AA was not the first government institution to use torture against the 
MLN-T. According to the former chief of police intelligence, Alejandro Otero, the 
PN first began to employ torture against suspected Tupamaros in 1968; largely on the 
counsel of U.S. security 'advisor' Dan Mitrione. 189 Indeed, a bipartisan congressional 
committee tasked with investigating the subject "concluded unanimously" in June 
1970 "that 'inhumane' torture, including electric shocks, cigarette bums and 
psychological pressure, was used by police as a 'normal, frequent and habitual' 
186 Robert Moss, The War for the Cities (New York: Coward, McCann & Geoghegan, 1972), 232. 
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manner on Tupamaros, common criminals and innocents alike." 190 However, 
according to Servicio Paz y Justicia's (SERP AJ) investigation of human rights 
violations in Uruguay, it was not until April 1972, when "political prisoners were 
moved to the jurisdiction of the military courts, that the practice of torture reached 
truly alarming levels." 191 To support this claim, SERPAJ cites its survey of 313 
former Uruguayan prisoners (arrested between 1972 and 1985), in which "only 1 
percent of the men and 2 percent of the women said they had not been tortured."192 
Similarly, under the military, the use of torture "become much more prolonged, 
systematic, and 'sophisticated'." 193 During the police's anti-Tupamaros campaign, 
torture was used in a "brutal" yet "haphazard" manner. 194 The FFAA, however, 
deliberately sought to maximise the provision of information from its interrogations. 
Interrogatees were thus subjected to a range of physical and psychological abuse, 
including: prolonged standing in a rigid position without food or rest (known as 
plant6n ); repeated electrocution below 220 volts ("the death threshold"); repeated 
submersion under water "to the limit of asphyxia" (known as tacho or submarinos); 
extended (up to months) use of hoods and blindfolds; and simulated firing squads. 195 
Of course, the information obtained from the use of these cruel measures was not 
always reliable. 196 Nevertheless, it does appear that the sheer quantity of information 
obtained from the FF AA' s "[ e ]nergetic and professional" interrogations did lead to 
the arrest of numerous Tupamaros. 197 This seeming variance in the efficacy of the 
Uruguayan military' s use of torture as a means of acquiring information is in 
accordance with the literature's general understanding of the complex relationship 
between torture and intelligence collection. 198 
190 Generals and Tupamaros, 118, Weinstein, Uruguay: Failure, 12. For first person accounts of 
police torture, see: Maria Esther Gilio, The Tupamaros, trans. Anne Edmondson (London: Secker & 
Warbug, 1972), 141-72. 
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The second source of the authorities' improved ability to collect actionable 
intelligence was Tupamaro defectors. Beginning in March 1972, a number of 
detained members of the MLN-T decided to collaborate with the FFAA's intelligence 
apparatus. The most important of these was Hector Amodio Perez; a former leader of 
the General Command of Montevideo "with seven years combat experience." 199 
After his arrest on 25 February 1972, Amodio Perez is believed to have revealed the 
''whereabouts of at least 30 Tupamaro hideouts, including the carcel de pueblo, a 
principal field hospital, and a number of arsenals and documentation centres."200 
However, as Porzecanski contends, the true value of Amodio Perez's betrayal came 
not from the capture of such Tupamaro facilities, but from the information he supplied 
about the "workings of and individuals involved in the Tupamaro organization."201 
Other prominent Tupamaro collaborators included Marcos Piriz Budes (leader of the 
Interior, arrested 9 May 1972) and Alicia Rey (also a former leader of the General 
Command of Montevideo, detained 19 May 1972). 202 The reasons why these 
Tupamaros decided to defect is unknown. However, some authors have speculated 
about the impact of leadership tensions on Amodio Perez's decision; caused by either 
his own personal ambition, or the reintegration of senior Tupamaros who escaped 
from Punta Carretas back into the organisation. 203 
The third source of the improvement in the authorities' ability to collect 
actionable intelligence was a breakdown in the MLN-T's internal security. As 
aforementioned, the Tupamaros' primary mechanism to frustrate government 
intelligence was the principle of compartmentalisation. That is, the organisation 
effectiveness as a means of simply acquiring information is potentially greater, thought ultimately 
"unknowable". This is not to say that torture is effective in obtaining actionable intelligence in all 
cases; but rather, to acknowledge that "[t]here are times when torture has worked in the past, and there 
undoubtedly would be successes in the future." Marcy Strauss, "Torture," New York Law School Law 
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maintained strict confidentiality amongst its membership, limited contact between 
cells and columns, and dispensed operational information on a rigid 'need-to-know' 
basis. Thus, any information a Tupamaro could pass on to the security forces (either 
voluntarily or involuntarily) would necessarily be limited. The MLN-T also provided 
its members with a plethora of security rules and tips. These included: methods of 
detecting and avoiding intelligence monitoring (such as using the reflection of glass 
mirrors to observe suspicious bystanders); 204 how to evade pursuers; and how to 
neutralise technical devices, such as microphones and telephonic lenses. 205 
According to Lopez-Alves and d'Oliveira, stresses had already begun to 
emerge in the MLN-T's security regime during 1970 and 1971; primarily due to the 
dramatic expansion of the organisation over the previous few years. 206 However, it 
was not until the gaolbreaks of July and September 1971 that the MLN-T's internal 
security truly began to unravel. The main problem was that the "captured guerrillas 
obviously got to know one another well during their imprisonment. "207 While this 
familiarity was undoubtedly beneficial for the prisoners' mental stability, it did 
undermine the MLN-T's compartmentalisation once the incarcerated Tupamaros 
reintegrated back into the organisation. Not only were the escapees acquainted with a 
great number of guerrillas across a variety of cells and columns (facilitating later 
military interrogations); but their obvious familiarity also encouraged the broader 
erosion of the principle of compartmentalisation throughout the remainder of the 
organisation. A further problem triggered by the 1971 gaolbreaks was the escapees' 
general lack of recent operational experience. Many forgot security codes, the 
location of hideouts, and correct operating procedures. Thus, as Arraras states, "it 
was not surprising that numerous Tupamaros broke security rules."208 
Miller proposes a fourth source for the authorities' improved intelligence: the 
Uruguayan public. According to Miller, during the 1960s and early-1970s, the 
majority of Uruguayans maintained a passive demeanour towards the government's 
204 MLN-T, "Organizavion y seguridad," 7 December 1969, 1-2. 
205 MLN-T, "Apuntes Sohre Lucha Armada," 9-11. 
206 d'Oliveira, "Uruguay and the Tupamaro Myth," 32, Lopez-Alves, "Political Crises," 230. 
207 Porzecanski, Uruguay's Tupamaros, 69-70. 
208 Arraras, "Armed Struggle", 192. 
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anti-Tupamaro campaign. This passivity was borne out of a distrust of the police and 
"Tupamaro intimidation." 209 However, Miller contends that, when the FFAA 
assumed control of Uruguay's counterinsurgency campaign, the public's inertia 
evaporated; as individuals "rushed to military headquarters with information on 
suspected guerrilla personnel and activities.',zio Miller credits this popular embrace to 
the public's general respect for the Uruguayan military; a respect associated with the 
FF AA' s apolitical and effective reputation. 
Notwithstanding the confidence in which Miller frames his assertions, it is 
difficult to judge the veracity of this alleged shift in public attitude and action. On the 
one hand, central aspects of Miller's argument - i.e. the police's unpopularity, the 
public's passivity towards counterinsurgency operations, the respect accorded to the 
military (at least up until early-1972)- have been documented elsewhere.211 However, 
on the other hand, few other authors have noted a similar rise in public informants 
after September 1971. Furthermore, Gallup polls taken in late-1971 and 1972 indicate 
that public sympathy for the MLN-T actually rose during the FFAA's campaign (see 
Figure 4); suggesting that the public's passivity towards the government's 
counterinsurgency efforts may have also increased. More research is required on this 
subject before a definitive conclusion can be reached. 
Restricting Civil Liberties 
At first glance, the notion that the MLN-T's loss of personnel increased 
because the Uruguayan Government restricted civil liberties does appear to have some 
validity. After all, the MLN-T's skyrocketing attrition did coincide with the 
Bordaberry Administration's introduction of a series of laws that severely 
circumscribed the freedoms and protections of Uruguay's citizenry. The first of these 
209 Miller, "Urban Terrorism in Uruguay," 172. 
210 Ibid. 
211 For information on the police's unpopularity, see: Labrousse, The Tupamaros, 63-4, Lopez-Alves, 
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information on popular respect for the military, see: Aaron S. Klieman, "Confined to barracks: 
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legislative measures was the declaration of a 'state of internal war'. Approved by the 
Uruguayan Parliament on 15 April 1972, this decree: authorised preventative 
detention; suspended the right of habeas corpus; "derogated the inviolability of the 
domicile, the right of assembly, association, and speech"; "extended the time that an 
individual could be held before being presented to a magistrate"; transferred the 
prosecution of civilians accused of 'subversion' from civilian to military courts; and 
stripped the judiciary and parliament of "control over arrests."213 On 10 July 1972, 
the Uruguayan Parliament, at the urging of President Bordaberry, lifted the 'state of 
internal war' and, in its place, enacted the Ley de Seguridad del Estado y el Orden 
Interno ('Law of the Security of the State and Internal Order', or LES). 214 This 
measure essentially institutionalised the 'state of internal war', while also expanding 
212 Christopher Hewitt, "Terrorism and Public Opinion: A Five Country Comparison," Terrorism and 
Political Violence 2, no. 2 (1990): 156. 
213 Alexandra Barahona de Brito, Human Rights and Democratization in Latin America: Uruguay and 
Chile (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 42, Freeman, Freedom or Security, 93. 
214 Ley de Seguridad de/ Estado y el Orden Intemo, Republica Oriental del Uruguay, Poder Legislativo, 
10 July 1972. Accessed: 28 October 2006. Available from: 
http://www.parlamento.gub.uy/leyes/ley14068.htm. 
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the jurisdiction of military courts to the civilian realm.215 The LES remained as part 
of Uruguay's legal framework until its repeal in 1985.216 
A number of authors have also attested to the seeming importance of the 
Uruguayan Government's restriction of civil liberties to the MLN-T's post-April 1972 
burgeoning loss of personnel. For instance, d'Oliveira, a then-Colonel in the 
Uruguayan Army, declares "[i]t was with" the "legal weapons" of suspending habeas 
corpus, allowing "searches of private property without a warrant," permitting 
preventative detention, and subjecting Tupamaros ''to the more summary and severe 
process of military justice," that "the armed forces obtained the results which are a 
matter of record."217 Likewise, Weinstein contends that, due to it being "given carte 
blanche and unhampered by judicial or constitutional constraints," the FF AA was able 
to enjoy "almost total success against the guerrillas, all but destroying their 
infrastructure, capturing hundreds of active supporters, and detaining thousands of 
other suspects."218 
However, two observations suggest that the relationship between the 
Bordaberry Administration's restriction of civil liberties and the MLN-T's post-April 
1972 increase in attrition was more coincidental, and less causative, than the above 
accounts assume. The first of these is that the declaration of a 'state of internal war' 
and the LES were not the first times that the Uruguayan Government had restricted 
civil liberties as part of its anti-Tupamaro campaign. Rather, the Administration of 
Pacheco Areco curtailed individual freedoms on three occasions during its 
approximately four-year tenure (December 1967 to March 1972). First, by invoking 
Medidas Prontas Seguridad (MPS) between 13 June 1968 and 15 March 1969; 
second, by once again invoking MPS between 24 June 1969 and 29 August 1969; and 
third, by declaring a twenty-day 'state of siege' on 10 August 1970. Both of Pacheco 
Areco's invocations of MPS "limited the right to strike, to hold meetings, and 
215 Barahona de Brito, Human Rights and Democratization, 42, Martin Weinstein, Uruguay: 
Democracy at the Crossroads (Boulder: Westview, 1988), 46. 
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Accessed: 28 October 2006. Available from: http://www.parlamento.gub.uy/leyes/ley15737.htm. 
217 d'Oliveira, "Uruguay and the Tupamaro Myth," 34-5. 
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freedom of speech, restricted the right to judicial due process, habeas corpus, and 
increased police powers and weakened those of the legislature."219 The 'state of 
siege', meanwhile, essentially mirrored that 'state of internal war', except that it did 
not transfer jurisdiction over civilians accused of subversion to the military courts. 220 
The second observation is that the Uruguayan Government's pre-April 1972 
restriction of civil liberties did not trigger an increase in Tupamaro attrition. Indeed, 
it appears that, if a relationship did exist between Pacheco Areco 's emergency powers 
and the MLN-T's loss of personnel, it was most likely negative. For example, during 
the two years between August 1968 and September 1971 221 which the Uruguayan 
Government did not curtail civil liberties, the MLN-T lost a monthly average of 10.4 
members. However, during the twelve months which the Uruguayan Government did 
restrict individual freedoms, the MLN-T lost a monthly average of 10.0 members.222 
It is important to note that this latter figure is inflated, given that thirty-four of the 
sixty-nine Tupamaros arrested in August 1970 were detained prior to the 
government's declaration of a 'state of siege'. 
A possible explanation for why the MLN-T's attritional experience varied 
under Pacheco Areco and Bordaberry' s restrictions of civil liberties is that 
Bordaberry' s emergency powers were more restrictive than Pacheco Areco' s, and thus 
more likely to have had an impact on Tupamaro attrition. Although this line of 
reasoning does have some intuitive appeal, it is undercut by the twin observations that: 
(1) as aforementioned, Pacheco Areco's 'state of siege' was, in essence, equally 
restrictive as Bordaberry's 'state of internal war'; and (2) despite this, Pacheco 
Areco's 'state of siege' had no discernible impact on the MLN-T's loss of personnel. 
For instance, from 10 to 30 August 1970 (the period during which the 'state of siege' 
was in effect), the Uruguayan police arrested thirty-five Tupamaros.223 While this 
figure may seem impressive, especially given that the MLN-T lost a monthly average 
219 Barahona de Brito, Human Rights and Democratization, 42. 
220 Ibid. 
221 As aforementioned, these dates represent the points at which: (1) the Tupamaros decided to intensify 
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of 13.3 members during 1970, it is slightly less than the forty-three Tupamaros that 
the PN arrested during the ten days before and after the 'state of siege' .224 
5.2 A DECREASE IN RECRUITMENT 
The Amelioration of Grievances 
The notion that an insurgent actor's recruitment will decline if its grievances 
are ameliorated has little explanatory power with regard to the MLN-T. Rather, the 
MLN-T's intake of recruits waned even though the grievances which comprised the 
organisation's collective action frame remained more or less unimproved. This is 
arguably most evident concerning the MLN-T's central grievance, the poor state of 
the Uruguayan economy. Indeed, over the last six years of the MLN-T's campaign, 
the organisation's recruitment exhibited a positive relationship with Uruguay's 
economic welfare. For instance, during the late-1960s - a period when the 
Tupamaros experienced a massive influx of new recruits - Uruguay began to emerge 
from its economic doldrums. Through such measures as the devaluation of the peso 
and the introduction of wage and price freezes, the Pacheco Areco Administration 
managed to stimulate economic growth (e.g. in contrast with an annual average of 0.1 
percent between 1958 and 1967, Uruguay's GDP expanded by 1.6 percent, 6.1 
percent. and 4.7 percent in 1968, 1969, and 1970, respectively) and bring the 
country's rampant inflation under some semblance of control (e.g. the rate of change 
in the consumer price index shrank from 125 percent in 1968, to 21 percent in 1969 
and 16 percent in 1970).225 
However, Pacheco Areco's reforms, while seemingly successful, merely 
suppressed, rather than eliminated, the structural problems afflicting Uruguay's 
economy. Thus, the early-1970s - a period when the MLN-T's recruitment began to 
decline - witnessed the return of stagnation, with the country's GDP contracting by 
224 Ibid. 
225 Finch, A Political Economy, 226, 43. According to the World Bank Group, Uruguay's GDP grew 
by 1.9 percent, 5.9 percent, and 2.3 percent in 1968, 1969, and 1970, respectively. The World Bank 
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1.0 percent and 3.6 percent in 1971 and 1972, respectively, and growing by a meagre 
0.8 percent in 1973.226 Though the Uruguayan economy would expand by 3.1 percent 
and 4.4 percent over the next two years, three factors would overshadow this 
growth.227 First, the country's rate of inflation, which had tempered somewhat during 
the late-1960s, once again began to mushroom; reaching 23.9 percent in 1971, 76.5 
percent in 1972, 97 percent in 1973, 77.2 percent in 1974 and 81.4 percent in 1975.228 
Second, and related to the first factor, Uruguay's real wages started to steadily decline; 
contracting by an annual average of 7.1 percent between 1971 and 1975.229 Lastly, 
Uruguay's unemployment rate continued to increase; rising from 7.1 percent in 1971 
to 12.9 percent in 1976.23° From these figures, it is difficult to conclude that the 
Uruguayan economy was in any better shape when the MLN-T's campaign faded 
compared to when it began. 
A similar dynamic to that outlined above is apparent with regard to the MLN-
T's second major grievance, the authorities' defence of the 'established order'. Of 
course, determining the extent to which this grievance was ameliorated is difficult, 
given its highly subjective nature. However, it stands to reason that perceptions of the 
Uruguayan Government's favouritism towards the 'rich and powerful' would likely 
have worsened in the wake of the declaration of a 'state of internal war'. After all, 
beginning on 15 April 1972, the FF AA launched an unrestrained and unprecedented 
assault on Uruguayan society; targeting not only Tupamaros, but also those generally 
associated with the pursuit of societal change (such as students, left-leaning activists 
and politicians, and union members). Furthermore, as Arraras describes, from 1971 to 
197 5, the military and President Bordaberry "disarticulated institutions of the 
opposition and exercised control over society in general"; pursuing "neoliberal 
economic policies which resulted in the demobilization of the nation's popular 
226 Finch, A Political Economy, 262. According to the World Bank Group, Uruguay's GDP contracted 
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World Development Indicators. 
227 Finch, A Political Economy, 262. According to the World Bank Group, Uruguay's GDP grew by 
2.9 percent and 6.1 percent in 1974 and 1975. World Bank Group. World Development Indicators. 
228 Finch, A Political Economy, 253, World Bank Group. World Development Indicators. 
229 Finch, A Political Economy, 253. 
230 Ibid. Results from 1975 are unavailable. 
Movimiento de Liberaci6n Nacional - Tupamaros 138 
sectors."231 In this environment, it is unlikely those who sympathised with the MLN-
T's collective action frame would have reached the judgement that the authorities had 
abandoned, rather than escalated, their defence of the established order. 
Selective Government Repression 
There is mixed support for the notion that the MLN-T's recruitment declined 
because of selective government repression. On the one hand, it is feasible that the 
Uruguayan Government's use of repression from mid-April 1972 onwards deterred 
potential recruits from joining the MLN-T. Two observations form the basis of this 
judgment. The first of these is the demonstrated efficacy of the FFAA's anti-
Tupamaro campaign. In contrast with the police, which unsuccessfully struggled for 
six years to check Tupamaro violence, and, in the process, earned themselves a 
reputation for incompetence;232 the armed forces had essentially destroyed the MLN-
T within five months of the declaration of a 'state of internal war' - capturing and 
killing approximately 1,000 Tupamaros over this period.233 It is likely that such a 
prompt and potent display of government power would have dramatically increased 
the perceived riskiness of joining the MLN-T. 
The second observation is the brutality of the FFAA's anti-Tupamaro 
campaign. Generally speaking, the armed forces conducted its operations against the 
MLN-T with unrestrained aggression, employing the full weight of its coercive power 
and freely resorting to lethal violence when required. Furthermore, as already 
discussed, the FF AA submitted basically all of its captives to physical and 
psychological abuse; a phenomenon which (thanks to MLN-T propaganda) was 
widely-publicised. Of course, the PN was also brutal in its pursuit of the MLN-T, 
engaging in extensive and heavy-handed search operations, and using torture against 
suspected Tupamaros. However, the police's brutality appears to have been merely 
detested, while the FFAA's was genuinely feared. For example, whereas Porzecanski 
231 Arraras, "Armed Struggle", 233. See also: Charles Guy Gillespie, Negotiating Democracy: 
Politicians and Generals in Uruguay (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991 ), 57-9. 
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describes the police's search of 20,000 homes in August 1970 as having "created 
great resentment among Montevideo's population," SERP AJ portrays the military' s 
similar raids and mass arrests after April 1972 as having spread "fear and terror."234 
Weinstein suggests that this difference in perceptions was possibly linked to the 
"systematic" and "sustained manner" in which the FF AA employed its repressive 
techniques, compared to the generally haphazard nature of the PN's repression.235 
However, like the FLQ case, while it is possible to draw a tentative link 
between the Uruguayan Government's repression from mid-April 1972 onwards and 
the MLN-T's declining recruitment, it is much more difficult to describe this 
repression as having been selective. Rather, those knowingly and directly connected 
with the MLN-T formed only a minority of those targeted by the FFAA's repressive 
actions. For instance, from mid-April to December 1972, the armed forces detained 
approximately 5,000 Uruguayans as part of its anti-Tupamaro campaign.236 However, 
only one-fifth of these detainees were MLN-T members. 237 The remainder were 
students, union members, politicians (the most notable of which was Luis Batalla, a 
Christian Democrat labor leader, who was "found dead after four days in an army 
camp"), and ordinary citizens - the majority of whom "had no connection with the 
Tupamaros." 238 Further examples of the FFAA's indiscriminateness include: the 
routine use of "extensive house searches"; 239 and the harassment of the political 
opposition. 240 This latter campaign reached its nadir on 17 April 1972 when the 
armed forces killed seven civilian members of the Partido Comunista (PC). An 
officer at the scene summed up the FFAA's approach when he stated: "So long as my 
comrades are being killed, I am not making fancy distinctions between leftists."241 
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Discrediting the Insurgent Actor's Ideology 
A dearth of adequate data regarding Uruguayan attitudes towards the MLN-
T's goal of establishing a socialist socio-economic system and its strategy of violence 
during 1972 and 1973 prevents this thesis from reaching a definitive judgment about 
whether the MLN-T's recruitment declined because the organisation's ideology was 
discredited. However, two pieces of information suggest that it is unlikely the latter 
factor contributed to the former outcome. The first of these is the 18.3 percent of the 
vote that the Frente Amplio (FA) received at the November 1971 general election. 
This tally is significant because: (1) the FA campaign on a clear socialist platform (e.g. 
the coalition called for the expropriation and redistribution of large-landed estates, the 
nationalisation of Uruguay's banking and export systems, and "active government 
participation in the industrial sector");242 and (2) it was near-double what the member 
parties of the FA had collectively received at the previous election in 1966.243 This 
increase suggests that public approval for the MLN-T's goal of a socialist socio-
economic system was trending upwards immediately before the organisation's 
recruitment problems began. 
The second piece of information is the Gallup polling data measunng 
Uruguayan opinions about whether 'there was some justification for the MLN-T's 
campaign'. Given that (as Figure 5 illustrates) the percentage of people who agreed 
with this statement was ostensibly rising from 1970 to 1972, it is unlikely that public 
approval of the MLN-T' s strategy of violence would have contracted over the same 
period. 
242 See: Ibid., 29. 
243 In 1966, the Frente lzquierda de Liberaci6n (FideL) received 60,541 votes; the Partido Dem6crata 
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6 CONCLUSION 
141 
The primary objective of this chapter has been to shed greater light on why the 
MLN-T's previously-robust capacity for regeneration began to weaken from April 
1972 onwards. It sought to achieve this by first examining a variety of contextual 
information relevant to the emergence and persistence of the Tupamaros. Second, this 
chapter examined the MLN-T's regenerative experience from the organisation's 
inception in 1965 to its eventual demise in 1973. It is clear from this investigation 
that an increase in attrition played at least an equal, and arguably greater, role than 
that of a decrease in recruitment in weakening the MLN-T's capacity to regenerate. 
This finding is seemingly at odds with the prevailing view in the literature that a 
declining intake of recruits is more important than a burgeoning loss of personnel in 
bringing about the deterioration of an insurgent actor's capacity to regenerate. 
Third, this chapter examined whether the MLN-T's attrition increased because 
of 'the improvement of the government's intelligence collection capabilities' and/or 
'the restriction of civil liberties'. Regarding the former, this chapter found that the 
Uruguayan Government's ability to collect information about the Tupamaros did 
improve during 1972 and 1973, and this improvement does appear to, have 
significantly contributed to the MLN-T's burgeoning loss of personnel. These results 
244 Hewitt, "Terrorism and Public Opinion," 156. 
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support the literature's emphasis on enhancing intelligence collection capabilities as a 
means of increasing an insurgent actor's attrition. 
With regard to the latter, this chapter observed that, while the MLN-T's 
burgeoning loss of personnel from April 1972 onwards did coincide with the 
Uruguayan Government's declaration of a 'state of internal war', earlier legislative 
measures which restricted civil liberties (some to the same extent as the 'state of 
internal war') did not have a noticeable impact on the MLN-T's rate of attrition. 
These findings suggest that: (1) in the Tupamaro case, the relationship between 
restricting civil liberties and increasing an insurgent actor's loss of personnel was 
coincidental, rather than causative; and (2) broadly speaking, restricting civil liberties 
is not a necessary condition for increasing an insurgent actor's rate of attrition. 
Finally, this chapter examined whether the MLN-T's recruitment declined 
because of 'the amelioration of grievances', the use of 'selective government 
repression', and/or 'the discrediting of the insurgent actor's ideology'. Regarding the 
former, this chapter found that the grievances which lay at the heart of the MLN-T's 
collective action frame remained more or less unchanged during the period when the 
organisation's recruitment declined. This supports the conclusion from the previous 
chapter that ameliorating grievances is not a necessary condition for reducing an 
insurgent actor's intake of recruits. 
With regard to 'selective government repression', this chapter observed that, 
while it is possible the Uruguayan Government's repression following the declaration 
of a 'state of internal war' deterred aspiring-revolutionaries from joining the MLN-T, 
the authorities' use of repression during this period was not selective. These results 
support the implications from the previous case that: (1) a negative and conditional 
relationship may exist between government repression and insurgent recruitment; and 
(2) selectiveness is not necessarily an indicator of whether a government's use of 
repression will have a deterrent effect. 
Last of all, in reference to 'discrediting the insurgent actor's ideology', this 
chapter found that, although a lack of direct evidence hinders attempts to discern the 
exact nature of the relationship between the MLN-T's recruitment and public approval 
of the organisation's goal and strategy of violence, it is unlikely that the latter 
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contracted while the former declined. This suggests that it is possible for an insurgent 
actor's intake of recruits to decline, even though public support for its ideology 
remains unchanged. 
CHAPTER FIVE 
PROVISIONAL IRISH REPUBLICAN ARMY 
They think they have pacified Ireland. They think that they have purchased half 
of us and intimidated the other half. They think they have foreseen everything, 
think that they provided against everything; but the fools, the fools, the fools! -
they have left us our Fenian dead, and while Ireland holds these graves, Ireland 
unfree shall never be at peace. 
- Padraic H. Pearse, 1915 
At first glance, the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) may appear an 
odd choice for a thesis examining why the regenerative capacities of insurgent actors 
weaken. After all, the PIRA is generally portrayed as having been resistant to any and 
all security force pressure. As Bell states: "A grand sweep of all the active 
[Volunteers], the introduction of internment, all the panaceas to destroy the Provos 
would only have opened the way for the generation in waiting to be~ome 
operational."1 However, it is important to recognise that the PIRA's regeneq1tive 
capacity was not static for the entire twenty-eight years of its campaign. Rather, 
during the period from roughly mid-1972 to 1977, the PIRA not only experienced a 
significant deterioration in its ability to replace lost personnel with new recruits, but 
the organisation also came the "closest" in its history to "collapse and defeat."2 
The central purpose of this chapter is to illuminate why the PIRA's capacity to 
regenerate weakened during the mid-1970s. To assist this undertaking, this chapter is 
1 J. Bowyer Bell, The IRA 1968-2000: Analysis of a Secret Army (London and Portland: Frank Cass, 
2000), 85. 
2 Patrick Bishop and Eamonn Mallie, The Provisional IRA (London: Heinemann, 1987), 217. 
I. 
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divided into six sections. The first three of these are contextual in nature, outlining: 
(1) the history of the Northern Ireland conflict; (2) characteristics of the PIRA itself 
(such as the group's operational history and collective action frame); and (3) the 
security forces with which the Provisionals were confronted. The fourth and fifth 
sections, meanwhile, will focus on the PIRA's capacity to regenerate; describing the 
organisation's fluctuating regenerative experience, and analysing the relative strength 
of an increase in attrition and a decrease in recruitment as catalysts of regenerative 
decay, and the dynamics of these factors. Finally, the sixth section will provide a 
summary of the chapter and its key findings. 
1 THE ROOTS OF THE NORTHERN IRISH CONFLICT 
As Fay, Morrissey and Smyth note, it is possible to trace the antecedents of 
'The Troubles' back into the deep "recesses of Irish, European and British history."3 
For the sake of brevity, however, this thesis will begin its account on Easter Monday 
(the 24th of April), 1916. On this day, approximately 1,300 Irish Volunteers (a 
nationalist militia) and 220 members of the Irish Citizen Army (a socialist 'vanguard') 
occupied key points throughout Dublin and proclaimed the birth of the Irish 
Republic.4 Although this rebellion lasted for only six days, it - or, more specifically, 
the British Government's handling of the crisis - triggered a wave of nationalist 
sympathy across Ireland. 5 The primary benefactor of this 'awakening' was the 
separatist party Sinn Fein; which was thrown from virtual obscurity to a position of 
political dominance when it won seventy-three of Ireland's 105 seats in Westminster 
3 Marie-Therese Fay, Mike Morrissey, and Marie Smyth, Nothem Ireland's Troubles: The Human 
Costs (London and Sterling: Pluto Press, 1999), 51. 
4 Charles Townshend, Ireland: The 20th Century (London, Sydney, Auckland: Arnold, 1998), 76. 
Estimates of the rebels' total strength range from a low of 700 to a high of 1,600. See: Joseph M. 
Curran, The Birth of the Irish Free State 1921-1923 (University: The University of Alabama Press, 
1980), 11, Charles Duff, Six Days to Shake an Empire (London: J.M. Dent & Sons, 1966), 97. 
5 The most incendiary of the British Government actions were: the execution of sixteen of the rebels; 
the deportation of thousands of suspected insurgents to England; and a number of extra-judicial killings 
that took place during the uprising. For more detail, see: Joost Augusteijn, From Public Defiance to 
Guerrilla Warfare: The Experience of Ordinary Volunteers in the Irish War of Independence 1916-
1921 (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 1996), 55, WilliamH. Kautt, The Anglo-Irish War, 1916-1921: A 
People's War (Westport and London: Praeger, 1999), 47-52, Charles Townshend, Easter 1916: The 
Irish Rebellion (London: Penguin Books, 2006), 301-10. 
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at the 1918 general election.6 One month later, these Members of Parliament (MPs) 
assembled at Mansion House in Dublin, convened the first Irish Parliament (Dail 
Eireann), declared Ireland's formal independence from the United Kingdom, and 
called on the Irish Volunteers (now widely known as the Irish Republican Army, or 
IRA) to defend the Dail and repel the British occupation.7 Soon after, the IRA, under 
the leadership of Michael Collins and Richard Mulcahy, launched a bloody guerrilla 
war against the Crown Forces in Ireland. The British Government, loathe to see any 
part of the United Kingdom rise in rebellion, responded with both force and vigour. 
However, as the months and years passed, it gradually became clear that 
neither side could secure a favourable outcome through the force of arms alone. 8 
Thus, in July 1921, the British Government and Sinn Fein agreed to a truce and the 
commencement of negotiations to end the conflict. The result of these deliberations 
was the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921. This agreement established the Irish Free State -
a self-governing dominion of the British Empire (equal in status to that of Canada and 
Australia). However, despite the Treaty's ratification in January 1922, the movement 
for an independent Ireland soon suffered two setbacks. The first of these was the 
splitting of its ranks. The primary source of dissension was the perceived merit of the 
Treaty. Specifically, whether it was the best possible deal under the circumstances or 
a betrayal of the principles for which the War of Independence had been fought. 9 By 
23 June 1922, this split had descended from personal acrimony to civil war. The next 
eleven months witnessed an intensity of fighting that surpassed the War of 
Independence only one year earlier. This conflict eventually came to an end on 24 
May 1923, when Frank Airken, Chief of Staff of the anti-Treaty IRA, called on his 
members to 'dump arms'. Nevertheless, the legacy of the Civil War- approximately 
6 Nicholas Whyte. The Irish Election of 1918, Northern Ireland Elections, 2000. Accessed: 27 June 
2006. Available from: http://www.ark.ac.uk/elections/h1918.htm. 
7 Tim Pat Coogan, The IR.A., Revised ed. (London: HarperCollinsPublishers, 2000), 25-7, Kautt, The 
Anglo-Irish War, 70-1, Townshend, Ireland, 88-9. 
8 Michael Hopkinson, Green against Green: The Irish Civil War (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1988), 9. 
9 Richard English, Armed Struggle: The History of the IRA (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 
31. 
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800 deaths and 10,000 intemees10 - embittered the politics of the Irish Free State well 
into the twentieth century. 
The second setback was the refusal of Ireland's six northeastern counties to 
remove themselves from the Union and join the Irish Free State. The origins of this 
development stretch back to the nineteenth century. It was during this period that 
Ireland's Protestants began to grow increasingly anxious about their status and 
security. The primary source of concern was the rise of Irish nationalism. While to 
Ireland's Catholic-majority, the concept of self-government promised a more 
representative and just governing system; 11 to Ireland's Protestant-minority, it 
"threatened a Catholic Nationalist hegemony in all aspects of Irish society."12 The 
Protestants were mainly concerned that a Catholic-dominated Irish Parliament would 
embrace ultramontanism and, given the agrarian background of most Irish Catholics, 
undermine the economic and political interests of Protestant-owned industry.13 Thus, 
as Ireland's Catholics increasingly embraced nationalism, their Protestant compatriots 
did likewise with unionism. That is, the belief in the desirability of Ireland remaining 
as an undifferentiated part of the United Kingdom. 14 
Though "numerically weak" in both Ireland and Westminster, the unionists 
did have "important political weapons." 15 These included: "close personal and 
economic ties" with Britain's aristocracy (which allowed the unionists to exert 
significant influence over the House of Lords); and, from 1912 onwards, the existence 
1° Coogan, The I.R.A., 29, Townshend, Ireland, 116. It is important to note that "[r]eliable casualty 
figures for the civil war do not exist" and some authors estimate up to 5,000 people were killed. 
Curran, The Birth of the Irish Free State, 276. 
11 D. George Boyce, Nationalism in Ireland, Third ed. (London and New York: Routledge, 1995), 270-
1. 
12 David Burnett, "The modernisation of Unionism, 1892-1914?," in Unionism in Modern Ireland: New 
Perspectives on Politics and Culture, ed. Richard English and Graham Walker (London: Macmillan 
Press, 1996), 41. 
13 D. George Boyce, "Weary patriots: Ireland and the making of unionism," in Defenders of the Union: 
A Survery of British and Irish Unionism since 1801, ed. D. George Boyce and Alan O'Day (London 
and New York: Routledge, 2001), 26, Thomas Hennessey, A History of Northern Ireland 1920-1996 
(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997), 2-3, Joseph Ruane and Jennifer Todd, The Dynamics of Conflict 
in Northern Ireland: Power, Conflict, and Emancipation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1996), 88-9. 
14 J.C. Beckett, "Northern Ireland," Journal of Contemporary History 6, no. 1 (1971): 124, Alvin 
Jackson, "Irish unionism, 1870-1922," in Defenders of the Union: A Sruvey of British and Irish 
Unionism since 1801, ed. D. George Boyce and Alan O'Day (London and New York: Routledge, 2001), 
115. 
15 Burnett, "The modernisation of Unionism," 41. 
Provisional Irish Republican Army 148 
of the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) - a 100,000 strong armed militia dedicated to 
resisting Irish 'Home Rule'. 16 Wielding these various instruments of power, the 
unionists were able to frustrate three attempts (in 1886, 1893 and 1914) to establish a 
devolved Irish Parliament in the Untied Kingdom. It was because of this history of 
(successful) opposition that the British Government's fourth attempt at introducing 
Home Rule (the Government of Ireland Act 1920) included a new feature. 
Specifically, it partitioned Ireland into two parliamentary jurisdictions: Northern 
Ireland', which was to consist of six counties in Ireland's northeast, centred on the 
industrial city of Belfast; and 'Southern Ireland', which was to comprise Ireland's 
remaining twenty-six counties. The significance of this decision (in particular, its 
uneven distribution of counties) lay in Ireland's demography. While unionists were a 
minority in Ireland as a whole, they nonetheless constituted a majority (roughly two-
to-one) in the area of Northern Ireland. Thus, by partitioning Ireland, the British 
Government was essentially trying to temper unionist opposition in the six counties 
by guaranteeing them that they would not be subject to 'Rome Rule' .17 
Of course, given the timing of its enactment, the ongoing war between the 
IRA and the Crown Forces quickly consumed the Government of Ireland Act 1920. 
Although the unionists in the six counties (begrudgingly) acceded to London's 
measure, with King George V opening the first Parliament of Northern Ireland in June 
1921; virtually every MP elected to the Parliament of Southern Ireland refused to 
attend its inauguration, resulting in the assembly's suspension. However, despite this 
rejection by the nationalists, the Government of Ireland Act 1920 did form the basis 
of the eventual negotiations between the British Governments and Sinn Fein. 
Consequently, the Anglo-Irish Treaty, rather than automatically including Northern 
Ireland in the agreement, gave Belfast the option of either joining the newly-created 
Irish Free State or remaining as part of the United Kingdom. Not surprisingly, the 
parliament of Northern Ireland voted for the latter. Initially, most nationalists in the 
16 Ibid, Hennessey, A History, 4, Alan O'Day, "Defending the Union: Parliamentary options, 1869 and 
1886," in Defenders of the Union: A Survey of British and Irish Unionism since 1801, ed. D. George 
Boyce and Alan O'Day (London and New York: Routledge, 2001 ), 105-7. 
17 Beckett, "Northern Ireland," 123, Ian McBride, "Ulster and the British problem," in Unionism in 
Modern Ireland: New Perspectives on Politics and Culture, ed. Richard English and Graham Walker 
(London: Macmillan Press, 1996), 6-7. 
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north were relatively unconcerned about this development. After all, in the event of 
Northern Ireland choosing to preserve the Union, the Treaty called for the 
establishment of a Boundary Commission - the remit of which was to "determine in 
accordance with the wishes of the inhabitants ... the boundaries between Northern 
Ireland and the rest of Ireland."18 Given that much of Northern Ireland's border areas 
contained significant Catholic majorities, many nationalists believed that the 
Boundary Commission would eventually transfer swathes of Northern Ireland's 
territory to the Irish Free State - shrinking the former to such an extent that it would 
no longer be able to continue as a viable political entity. However, in August 1925, 
the British and Irish Governments, due largely to unionist intransigence and Dublin's 
war debt to the United Kingdom, revoked the Boundary Commission and ratified the 
border established by the Government of Ireland Act 1920. The partition of Ireland 
was thus, more or less, finalised. 
Two factors would come to define Northern Ireland as it progressed through 
the twentieth century. The first of these was unionist insecurity. 19 In essence, the 
Protestant-majority in the six counties were anxious that Dublin and London's 
acceptance of Northern Ireland as a constituent part of the United Kingdom was only 
temporary and vulnerable to political expediency.20 As Townshend states, these fears 
of Catholic irredentism and British abandonment were both "quite well founded."21 
For instance, Eamon de Valera, a leading figure in the Easter Rebellion and Prime 
Minister22 from 1932 to 1948, rewrote the constitution of the Irish Free State in 1937 
to explicitly declare that "the national territory consists of the whole island of 
Ireland"; 23 effectively repudiating the entire legal basis of Northern Ireland's 
18 Anglo-Irish Treaty, 6 December 1921, The National Archive of Ireland, 19 June 2006. Available 
from: http://www.nationalarchives.ie/topics/ anglo _ irish/ dfaexhib2 .html. 
19 Feargal Cochrane, Unionist Politics and the Politics of Unionism since the Anglo-Irish Agreement 
(Cork: Cork University Press, 1997), 38. 
20 Beckett, "Northern Ireland," 128-9, Brendan O'Leary and John McGarry, The Politics of Antagonism: 
Understanding Northern Ireland, Second ed. (London and Atlantic Highlands: The Athlone Press, 
1996), 135-9, Townshend, Ireland, 189. 
21 Townshend, Ireland, 189. 
22 de Valera was officially President of the Executive Council from 1932 to 1937, and Taoiseach from 
1937 to 1948. Both positions are the equivalent of a Prime Minister. 
23 Bunreacht Na hEireann - Constitution of Ireland, 19 3 7, Conflict Archive on the Internet (CAIN), 19 
June 2006. Available from: http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/politics/docs/coi37a.htm. 
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existence as a distinct political entity. 24 The British Prime Minister Winston 
Churchill, meanwhile, offered de Valera London's support for Irish unification "in 
return for Eire's entry into the [Second World War] on the side of the British and its 
allies"; a proposal that outraged unionist opinion when it eventually became public. 25 
The second factor which characterised Northern Ireland was a consequence of 
the first: namely, institutionalised unionist discrimination against northern Catholics 
(who constituted approximately one third of the six counties' population). 
Apprehensive about the possibility of being subject to Dublin control (either by 
nationalist scheming or British betrayal), most unionists believed that the "only safe 
course was for Protestants to stand firmly together in order that they might keep a 
tight grip on all the organs of political power and, as far as possible, on all the means 
of economic and social influence." 26 Thus, successive unionist administrations 
introduced numerous measures to strengthen Protestant control over Northern Ireland. 
These included: the abolition in the 1920s of the province's proportional 
representation electoral system, in favour of a first-past-the-post system and a 
property-based franchise (two measures that benefited the numerically-superior and 
wealthier Protestant community);27 the gerrymandering of electorates (most notably in 
Derry, where unionist councillors received only one third of the total vote in 1967, yet 
won sixty percent of the available seats);28 employment discrimination, especially in 
the public sector ("justified ... on the grounds that [Catholics] were a disloyal 'enemy 
within' who could not be trusted in positions of power");29 and favouritism in the 
allocation of public housing, with Catholics restricted to government accommodation 
in existing Catholic-majority areas.30 
The initial response of northern Catholics to the growmg sectarian and 
discriminatory nature of Northern Ireland was to withhold their recognition of 
Ireland's partition and to exclude themselves from Northern Irish institutions. For 
24 O'Leary and McGarry, The Politics, 136. 
25 Paul Dixon, Northern Ireland: The Politics of War and Peace (Houndsmill and New York: Palgrave, 
2001), 52, O'Leary and McGarry, The Politics, 139. 
26 Beckett, "Northern Ireland," 129. 
27 O'Leary and McGarry, The Politics, 120, Townshend, Ireland, 189-90. 
28 "Disturbances in Northern Ireland: Report of the Commission Appointed by the Governor of 
Northern Ireland," (Belfast: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1969), para. 134. 
29 Dixon, Northern Ireland, 51. 
30 Ruane and Todd, The Dynamics, 120. 
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example, Catholic teachers "refused to accept their salaries from the Northern Ireland 
administration" (drawing funds from the Irish Free State instead);31 while nationalist 
politicians either abstained from elections, or participated and then, once elected, 
refused to acknowledge the existence of the Northern Irish Parliament (leading to 
their speedy dismissal). 32 However, as it became increasingly clear that Dublin 
lacked both the means and the will to induce Ireland's reunification, and the 
commitment of the British Government remained (relatively) steadfast, northern 
Catholic attitudes gradually shifted from non-participation to limited acceptance, 
matched by a strong desire for reform. 33 This conversion culminated in the 1960s 
with the emergence of the Northern Ireland civil rights movement. Organised under 
such groups as the Campaign for Social Justice (CSJ), the Derry Housing Action 
Committee (DHAC), and the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA), this 
movement sought to stimulate the pace of reform through the use of non-violent 
protest (a method inspired by the civil rights campaign in America). As the 1960s 
progressed, the civil rights movement drew increasing support from northern 
Catholics, and protest marches become more frequent. 34 
However, as the size and number of the protests grew, so did Protestant 
suspicion. To many unionists, the civil rights movement was less a genuine attempt 
to secure reform, and more Catholic irredentism in disguise. During the late- l 960s, 
tensions between unionists and protestors began to mount. These came to a head on 5 
October 1968, when the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) baton-charged a civil 
rights march in Derry that the Home Affairs Minister had earlier banned.35 Televised 
around the world, the RUC's actions triggered two days of rioting in Derry. 36 
However, it was not until 12 August 1969 that Northern Ireland reached its true 
31 Ibid., 122. 
32 Hennessey, A History, 46. 
33 Ruane and Todd, The Dynamics, 124-6, Townshend, Ireland, 199-201. 
34 Hennessey, A History, 126-38, Ruane and Todd, The Dynamics, 126-7. 
35 After the DHAC and NICRA had announced their plans to march on 5 October 1968, the Apprentice 
Boys of Derry, a unionist group, declared that they would be marching on the same day, at the same 
time, along the same route. This was a favoured tactic by unionists to frustrate civil rights marches, 
since the authorities were required to ban marches if there was a reasonable prospect of intra-
communal violence. 
36 For an account of the events associated with the 5 October 1968 march, see: "Disturbances in 
Northern Ireland," para. 37-55, Niall 6 Dochartaigh, From Civil Rights to Armalites: Derry and the 
Birth of the Irish Troubles (Cork: Cork University Press, 1997), 20-1. 
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tipping point. A march by the Apprentice Boys (a militant unionist group) provoked 
nationalist rioting in the Bogside area of Derry. The RUC's attempt to impose order 
soon escalated into a two-day pitched battle (romantically known as the 'Battle of the 
Bogside'). 37 Violence soon spread to the rest of the province, as Protestant mobs 
attacked Catholic enclaves throughout Belfast. On the 14th of August, with the RUC 
stretched thin and exhausted, the Northern Ireland Government called on London for 
assistance. The latter responded by deploying British troops to help secure the six 
counties. Two days later, a degree of calm finally descended on Northern Ireland. By 
this stage, however, five Catholics and two Protestants had been killed, "[h]undreds 
had been injured," and 3,500 families - the majority of them Catholic - had been 
forced from their homes.38 The scar from these events would prove a long time to 
heal. 
2 THEPIRA 
It was soon after the rioting of August 1969 that the PIRA emerged. Its birth 
marked the second major split in the IRA since the latter's inception in 1919. The 
first split occurred during the Irish Civil War, with pro-Treaty Volunteers joining the 
National Army and anti-Treaty Volunteers waging a campaign against the Irish Free 
State. Despite its surrender in May 1923, however, the anti-Treaty IRA (henceforth 
referred to as simply the IRA) did not fade from existence. After adopting an 
amended constitution in 1925, the organisation was able to regroup and continue 
agitating for its desired goal of an independent, thirty-two county republic. 39 
Although persistent pressure from governments in both Belfast and Dublin 
constrained the IRA's ability to conduct operations, it was, nevertheless, responsible 
for a number of significant actions. These included: the Bombing (or Sabotage) 
Campaign of 1939-40 (primarily targeted against economic and military infrastructure 
in Britain); and the Border Campaign of 1956-62. This latter undertaking was an 
37 6 Dochartaigh, From Civil Rights, 119-30. 
38 Ruane and Todd, The Dynamics, 129, Peter Taylor, Provos: The IRA and Sinn Fein (London: 
Bloomsbury, 1997), 53. 
39 J. Bowyer Bell, The Secret Army: The IRA, Third ed. (New Brunswick and London: Transaction 
Publishers, 1997), 48-53, Coogan, The l.R.A., 44-5, English, Armed Struggle, 42-3. 
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attempt to "break down the enemy's administration until he is forced to withdraw" 
through the use of guerrilla warfare in Northern Ireland (particularly in the nationalist 
areas along the border).40 However, the IRA made little effort to win over northern 
Catholic opinion and, after both the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland 
Government introduced Internment in 1957, the Border Campaign petered out until 
the IRA Army Council was forced to call on its Volunteers to 'dump arms' on 26 
February 1962.41 
This failure was a serious blow to the IRA's morale. 42 Consequently, the 
organisation underwent a leadership change, with Cathal Goulding assuming the 
position of Chief of Staff. His major proposal for reversing the IRA's fortunes was 
for the organisation to shift its emphasis away from physical force to more political 
means (such as 'grassroots' campaigning and contesting elections). 43 Goulding's 
prescription did generate some dissension in the IRA. However, it was not until the 
rioting of August 1969 that this discord became destabilising. Traditionally, the IRA 
had portrayed itself as the defender of Catholics living in Northern Ireland; the 
ultimate guarantee against unionist excess. However, in line with Goulding's policy, 
the IRA had sold-off most of its weaponry and neglected military training. 44 The 
organisation was thus unable to adequately protect Catholic communities during the 
trauma of August 1969.45 This incapacity shamed many Volunteers (especially those 
in the north); a feeling compounded by the increasingly prevalent belief amongst 
northern Catholics that the IRA was cowardly (famously represented by the Belfast 
graffiti, 'I Ran Away').46 After it became clear that the Gouldingites, despite the 
events of August 1969, would not alter their political focus, a number if dissident 
republicans, led by the likes of Sean MacStiofain, Seamus Twomey and Gerry Adams, 
40 J. McGarrity (pseudonym), cited in: M.L.R. Smith, Fighting for Ireland? The Military Strategy of the 
Irish Republican Movement (London and New York: Routledge, 1995), 67. 
41 Bell, The Secret Army, 289-309, Coogan, The J.R.A., 297-329, Smith, Fighting for Ireland?, 68-71. 
42 Bishop and Mallie, The Provisional IRA, 32, Tony Geraghty, The Irish War: The Hidden Conflict 
Between the IRA and British Intelligence (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 
2000), 3. 
43 English, Armed Struggle, 94, Kevin J. Kelley, The Longest War: Northern Ireland and the IRA, New 
ed. (London: Zed Books, 1988), 126-7. 
44 English, Armed Struggle, 84. 
45 Kelley, The Longest War, 121-2. 
46 Ed Moloney, A Secret History of the IRA (New York and London: W.W. Norton & Company, 2002), 
68. 
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began to discuss the possibilities of forming a breakaway organisation. These moves 
culminated on 18 December 1969, when twenty-six dissidents met and elected a 
'Provisional' IRA Executive, who in tum elected a 'Provisional' Army Council.47 
The Provisionals' split with the IRA (later known as the Official Irish Republican 
Army, or OIRA) was finalised on 11January1970 when MacStiofain led a walkout at 
Sinn Fein's ard jheis (annual convention); forming the Provisional Sinn Fein (PSF) 
and announcing that a Provisional Army Council had been established to capture the 
true spirit of the IRA. 
Over the next twenty-eight years, the PIRA first regrouped, then concentrated 
on protecting Catholic communities in Northern Ireland (particularly in Derry and 
Belfast), before engaging in a full-scale uprising against the Northern Ireland 
Government and, eventually, British security forces. By the time the Belfast (or 
'Good Friday') Agreement was signed on 10 April 1998,48 3,440 people had been 
killed and over 40,000 injured as a result of paramilitary and security force violence 
(see Table 1).49 As Hayes and McAllister note, these figures suggest that "in its 
duration and intensity relative to population size, the conflict [in Northern Ireland] 
approaches that of a war rather than a local insurgency." 50 The PIRA was 
unquestionably the dominant actor of The Troubles; responsible for approximately 50 
percent of the total conflict-related deaths. As Table 1 illustrates, the primary target 
of Provisional violence was British security personnel, followed by civilians. Though 
47 English, Armed Struggle, 106. 
48 It is important to note that, although the Belfast Agreement is commonly used as an end-date of The 
Troubles, violence persisted in Northern Ireland after April 1998. Indeed, one of the bloodiest attacks 
in the six counties occurred on 15 August 1998, when a Real Irish Republican Army (RlRA) bomb 
killed twenty-nine people. Rather than being seen as the end of violence in Northern Ireland, the 
Belfast Agreement should be conceptualised as the point at which the Northern Ireland conflict 
transformed. That is, from an extended period of organised, insurgent conflict, to a period of 
warlordism and (generally) low-level sectarian attacks. Neil Jarman, "From war to peace? Changing 
patterns of violence in Northern Ireland, 1990-2003," Terrorism and Political Violence 16, no. 3 (2004). 
49 PSNI. Casualties as a Result of Paramilitary-Style Attacks, 1973 - 2005, Statistics Branch, 2005. 
Accessed: 1 August 2005. Available from: http://www.psni.police.uk/persons_injured_cy-21.doc, 
Malcolm Sutton. An Index of Deaths from the Conflict in Ireland, Conflict Archive on the Internet 
(CAIN), 2004. Accessed: 1 August 2005. Available from: http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/sutton/index.html. 
50 Bernadette C. Hayes and Ian McAllister, "Sowing dragon's teeth: Public support for political 
violence and paramilitarism in Northern Ireland," Political Studies 49 (2001): 901. 
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specific statistics about the PIRA's activities do not exist, the organisation appears to 
have most commonly engaged in hit-and-run assaults and bombings. 
No. Killed PIRA Victim's Status by the PIRA Total Killed Deaths as % of Total 
British Security Personnel 1,011 1,110 91.1 % 
Civilians 516 1,799 28.7 % 
Republican Paramilitaries 140 389 36.0 % 
Loyalist Paramilitaries 32 132 24.2 % 
Irish Security Personnel 7 10 70.0 % 
Total 1,106 3,440 49.6% 
Table 1: PIRA and Total Conflict-Related Deaths in Northern 
Ireland, 5 October 1968 to 10 April 199851 
In line with its insistence that the Provisionals represented the 'real' IRA, the 
PIRA initially adopted the IRA's historic organisational structure (first devised in July 
1923).52 As Bell states: 
This inheritance was never seen as a matter of choice, sometimes as a responsibility, 
but mostly as desirable. With it came the right to wage war, even to claim the right 
to govern in the name of the Irish people. 53 
At the apex of this structure lay the Army Council. Comprised of seven Volunteers, 
the Army Council was the PIRA's supreme decision-making body. A sixteen man 
Executive determined the composition of the Army Council; while a General 
Convention, consisting of delegates from the entire organisation, was endowed with 
the responsibility of electing the Executive. As well as deciding military strategy and 
policy, the Army Council also chose a commanding officer, or Chief of Staff, to 
conduct the PIRA's campaign.54 A General Headquarters Staff (GHQ) assisted both 
the Army Council and the Chief of Staff. Below the GHQ, the PIRA was organised 
"along British Army lines into brigades, battalions, and companies." 55 While 
elements of this structure were in place for the length of the PIRA's campaign, the 
51 Data drawn from: Sutton. An Index of Deaths. 
52 Extracts from the IRA's 1923 constitution that outlined the organisation's structure can be found at: 
Coogan, The I.R.A., 42-4. 
53 Bell, The IRA, 126. 
54 Bishop and Mallie, The Provisional IRA, 21. 
55 Taylor, Provos, 17. 
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Provisionals did undergo a significant reorganisation during the late-1970s. This will 
be discussed in greater detail below. 
2.1 COLLECTIVE ACTION FRAME 
Diagnosis 
The central tenet underlying the PIRA's diagnosis was that the English 
presence in Ireland had "been the root cause of Ireland's ills."56 In this respect, the 
PIRA was echoing centuries of republican thought, which, since the time of Theobald 
Wolfe Tone, had "regarded the connection between Ireland and Great Britain as the 
curse of the Irish nation, and felt convinced, that whilst it lasted, this country would 
never be free or happy. "57 Like their republican forefathers, the Provisionals based 
their condemnation of the British presence in Ireland on a colonial perspective. 58 
From this point of view, Ireland had been "[f]or centuries ... an exploited dependency 
of England, remaining underdeveloped and a source of cheap food and cheap labour 
for her growing industry. The results were depopulation and poverty for us."59 Prior 
to the Anglo-Irish War, Britain was able to subjugate Ireland directly through its 
agents in Dublin Castle and sympathetic Protestant settlers. After 1922, however, 
London's primary instrument of maintaining its imperial control was the 'artificial' 
partition of Ireland. Through its occupation of the six counties, Britain kept the Irish 
"divided and weak"; 60 retarded Ireland's progress as a political, economic, and 
cultural unit;61 and allowed "the British in the North, and their neo-colonial business 
56 PIRA, "No opportunity will be lost: Army Council's Easter message," An Phoblacht 1, no. 3 (1970): 
1. 
57 Tone, 1798, cited in: Frank Charles MacDermot, Theobald Wolfe Tone: A Biographical Study 
(London: Macmillan, 1939), 296. Tone is generally considered as one of the 'fathers' of 
Republicanism, and was heavily promoted by both the IRA and PIRA. 
58 For an overview of the colonial argument in Republican thinking, see: Smith, Fighting for Ireland?, 
6-9. 
59 PIRA, "Our aims and methods," An Phoblacht 1, no. 2 (1970): 8. 
60 Ibid. 
61 PIRA, "Dole queus [sic], guns, unemployment, talks and handouts," An Phoblacht 1, no. 6 (1971): 7. 
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allies in the South, to carry on making their mint out of the exploitation of the Irish 
people."62 
A related theme in the PIRA's diagnosis was that the British Army were not 
neutral peacekeepers (as many Catholics initially perceived them to be);63 but rather, 
anti-nationalists agents like the RUC, willing to engage in all forms of indiscriminate 
repression to maintain the status quo. To support this charge, the PIRA highlighted: 
the British Army's tendency to conduct massive 'search and seal' operations (such as 
the "mass intimidation reminiscent of the Nazi regime in Europe" that the residents of 
Ballymurphy were subjected to in January 1971);64 British Army killings of innocent 
Catholics (e.g. after the death of Daniel O'Hagan on 31 July 1970, the PIRA angrily 
claimed that "HE HAD NOT A PETROL BOMB in his hand, as alleged; but was 
deliberately SHOT down in cold blood");65 and the seemingly random and prejudiced 
nature of British Army actions, with soldiers assaulting, arresting, and jailing 
Catholics for simply 
... walking down a street and being unfortunate enough to be in the path of an army 
patrol, to be standing on a street comer, to be talking to a girlfriend. Homes wrecked, 
wives and mothers shattered: tom, sad hearts hurt by blatant injustices and positive 
discrimination. 66 
62 Smith, Fighting for Ireland? , 7. See also: Garrett O'Boyle, "Theories of justification and political 
violence: Examples from four groups," Terrorism and Political Violence 14, no. 2 (2002): 30, Joanne 
Wright, Terrorist Propaganda: The Red Army Faction and the Provisional IRA, 1968-86 (Basingstoke 
and London: Macmillan, 1991), 53-4. 
63 As Kelley states, the "nationalist people of Northern Ireland did not usually welcome the sight of a 
British anny uniform, especially in their own neighbourhoods. Now, however, the soldiers were 
viewed less as agents of an occupying power, than as a comparatively benign alternative to the R.U.C. 
and B-Specials." Kelley, The Longest War, 121. 
64 PIRA, "Army of occupation," Republican News l, no. 7 (1971): 7. 
65 PIRA, "Another victim of British rule," Republican News l, no. 3 (1970): 3. See also: PIRA, 
"British army murders," An Phoblacht 5, no. 11 (1974): 8, PIRA, "'Para' security," An Phoblacht 6, no. 
37 (1975): 1. 
66 PIRA, "Terror in Belfast," Republican News l, no. 8 (1971): 1. The PIRA also frequently referred to 
the British Army's alleged open and derogatory attitude towards 'paddys'. For instance, see: PIRA, "'I 
hate paddys'," Republican News l, no. 8 (1971): 10. 
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The Provisionals also heavily exploited the introduction oflnternment in August 1971 
and 'Bloody Sunday' in March 1972 - two events which will be discussed in greater 
detail below. 67 
Interestingly, the PIRA's diagnosis (at least during the 1970s) focused 
relatively-little on unionist-related problems. Of course, the Provisionals did agitate 
for the fall of the unionist-dominated government in Stormont, and the PIRA's 
Dublin-based publication An Phoblacht did highlight the inequities of the unionist 
regime (such as gerrymandering, the lack of "political and civil rights," and 
discrimination in the "allocation of housing, employment, and political 
representation"). 68 However, generally speaking, the PIRA tended to downplay 
unionist issues, even going so far as to attribute deaths caused by loyalist 
paramilitaries to British 'murder gangs'. 69 This minimising of the unionist threat 
(which was considerable during the mid-1970s) was a result of not only the PIRA's 
avowed non-sectarianness, but also the organisation's simplistic comprehension of 
unionist motives. In essence, the Provisionals believed that the unionists were as Irish 
as the nationalists and (if justly compensated) "would not strenuously object to some 
form of united or federally united Ireland."70 The PIRA explained away the history of 
unionism and contemporary unionist actions and attitudes by blaming partition. 
Specifically, Britain's division oflreland and continued occupation of the six counties 
had "served to blind unionists ... to their true nationality. "71 Thus, once Ireland was 
reunited, the Provisionals believed that unionist-nationalists tensions would dissipate. 
Prognosis 
The PIRA's proposed solutions to the aforementioned problems were, 
unsurprisingly, the expulsion of the British presence from Ireland, the annulment of 
67 For example, see: PIRA, "The north raped," Republican News 2, no. 3 (1971): 1,12, PIRA, "Revolt in 
the north," An Phoblacht 1, no. 9 (1971): 1, PIRA, "We repeat - don't fraternise!," Republican News 1, 
no.11(1971):1. 
68 PIRA, "Civil rights," An Phoblacht 1, no. 1 (1970): 2, PIRA, "Fermanagh 1970 ... and how it was 
maintained," An Phoblacht 1, no. 5 (1970): 5, PIRA, "The IRA - justified," An Phoblacht 3, no. 6 
(1972): 7. 
69 PIRA, "British murder gangs step-up campaign," Republican News 2, no. 72 (1973). 
70 PIRA, 1974, cited in: Smith, Fighting for Ireland?, 118. 
71 O'Boyle, "Theories of justification and political violence," 30. 
Provisional Irish Republican Army 159 
the Government of Ireland Act 1920 and the creation of a thirty-two county republic. 
In September 1971, the Provisionals detailed the type of republic they sought when 
they unveiled their Eire Nua ('New Ireland') policy. This prescription proposed a 
federal system, "based on the four ancient Provinces of Ireland: Ulster, Munster, 
Leinster and Connaught."72 The PIRA envisaged that the regional parliaments would 
be responsible for the vast majority of governance and administrative duties, with the 
central government restricted to the realms of defence and diplomacy. Eire Nua was 
intended to address two concerns. First, by establishing strong regional parliaments, 
the PIRA hoped to allay unionist concerns about 'Dublin-rule'. Second, by expanding 
the Ulster of Northern Ireland (with its six counties) to traditional Ulster (with its 
nine), the PIRA sought to balance the province's ratio of Catholics to Protestants and 
thus hopefully prevent the discrimination and excesses of the past. Furthermore, 
despite the fact that concerns over the avowed Marxism of the Gouldingites was often 
sighted as one of the principal factors behind the split of 1969,73 the PIRA often 
framed its desired thirty-two county republic in socialist terms.74 For instance, the 
organisation stated during the early-1970s that it wanted to create a system of 
government which would "give everyone a joint share of the nation's wealth" and 
ensure "social and economic justice for all."75 
The PIRA sought to achieve these various goals through armed struggle. As 
the organisation stated in 1971, "THEY [the British] HAVE NO RIGHT TO BE 
HERE, OUT WITH THEM! RESIST THEM! DRIVE THEM FROM OUR 
SHORES!"76 To facilitate the accomplishment of its goals through the application of 
violence, the PIRA originally adopted a three-phase guerrilla strategy devised by the 
organisation's first Chief of Staff, Sean MacStiofain. The first phase of this approach 
was for the Provisionals to recapture the IRA' s traditional reputation as the guardian 
72 Bishop and Mallie, The Provisional IRA, 166. 
73 Sean Cronin, Irish Nationalism: A History of its Roots and Ideology (Dublin: The Academy Press, 
1980), 202, English, Armed Struggle, 84. 
74 Wright, Terrorist Propaganda, 61-5. 
75 PIRA, "Our aims and methods," 8, PIRA, "The price of freedom," Republican News 2, no. 11 (1971): 
4. 
76 PIRA, "And what shall I do now?," Republican News l, no. 9 (1971): 12. 
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of northern Catholics. 77 Thanks largely to such laudable defensive actions as the 
'Battle of St. Matthews', the PIRA had, more or less, recovered its standing amongst 
the Catholic community by mid-1970. 78 MacStiofain's second phase entailed the 
PIRA moving "from a purely defensive position" to "combined defence and 
retaliation." 79 That is, the Provisionals would not only seek to prevent attacks against 
northern Catholics, but also to retaliate against British Army and RUC actions that 
"brutalised" Irish people. 80 
By the end of 1970, the PIRA was strong enough, both in terms of manpower 
and weaponry, to advance to MacStiofain's third phase. That is, engaging in a ''war 
of psychological attrition"; the "proto-typ[ical] anti-colonial campaign of the 
twentieth century."81 The principal goal of psychological attrition is to undermine an 
adversary's confidence in their chosen course of action (ideally to a state of 
hopelessness). Whereas the strategy of 'shock and awe' (heavily publicised during 
the early stages of the Iraq war) seeks to achieve this cognitive effect through the 
demonstration of sudden and devastating destruction and/or dominance; 82 
psychological attrition attempts to accomplish the same affect gradually, through the 
sustained application of small-scall military operations. 83 
Justificatory Arguments 
The PIRA justified its armed struggle using a mix of utilitarian and normative 
arguments. With regard to the former, the organisation's first justificatory argument 
was that Ireland's history had proved how ineffective constitutional (broadly defined 
as non-violent) methods were as instruments of political change. As the Provisionals 
stated in 1972, for the past fifty years, nationalists had relied on "constitutional 
agitation" to remedy Northern Ireland's ''undisguised discrimination and repression ... 
77 Andrew Garfield, "PIRA lessons learned: A model of terrorist leadership succession," Low Intensity 
Conflict & Law Enforcement 11, no. 2/3 (2002): 278. 
78 Taylor, Provos, 77. 
79 Sean MacStiofain, Memoirs of a Revolutionary {Edinburgh: Gordon Cremonesi, 1975), 146. 
80 PIRA, "Will defend Irish people: The IRA answers Belfast CCDC," An Phoblacht 1, no. 11 (1970): 8. 
81 Smith, Fighting/or Ireland?, 97. 
82 For more information on 'shock and awe', see: Harlan K. Ullman and James P. Wade, Shock and 
Awe: Achieving Rapid Dominance (Washington, D.C.: National Defense Universty Press, 1996). 
83 Smith, Fighting for Ireland? , 97. . 
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It achieved nothing." 84 This point was stressed again in 1973, when the PIRA 
asserted that, in response to those who questioned whether the organisation's use of 
violence was justified, 
[t] his viewpoint ignores the fact that we have gone through most phases of passive 
resistance and political activity which have only provided limited success. Even 
party politicians who had attended Stormont for many years, eventually admitted that 
the exercise had been a waste of time as the Unionist regime treated them with 
contempt. 85 
The PIRA even reached back deep into Ireland's history to demonstrate the limited 
efficacy of constitutional approaches. For example, after noting that "[b ]oth 
constitutional and violent methods were used" over the previous two centuries to 
secure Irish's independence, the organisation claimed "[i]t is a historical fact that, 
although initial gains were often made, the constitutional movements were invariably 
crushed by military strength."86 "Of course," as the Provisionals were quick to note, 
"it can be argued that most of the revolutionary movements failed as well. However, 
the reason for their failure is different ... The revolutionary movements failed because 
of incompetence in practice rather than in theory."87 
The PIRA's second utilitarian justificatory argument was deeply intertwined 
with the first; specifically, that "English rule in Ireland can only be ended by force."88 
This line of reasoning was essentially an off-shoot of the organisation's colonial 
analysis. The Provisionals contended that, since Britain had such strong economic 
and strategic interests to maintain its occupation of the six counties, only the use of 
force could compel the British authorities to disengage from Ireland. As evidence of 
this, the PIRA highlighted such instances in Irish history as the Irish Republican 
Brotherhood's (IRB) uprising in 1867 (which resulted in heightened British concern 
about the 'Irish Question', the "disestablishment of the Protestant Church of Ireland 
and the beginnings of the Home Rule movement''),89 and the IRA's actions during the 
Anglo-Irish War, to illustrate that "England never yields to right, reason or justice, 
84 PIRA, "The IRA - justified," 7. 
85 PIRA, "The question of physical force," Republican News 2, no. 71 (1973): 5. 
86 PIRA, "The IRA - justified," 6. 
87 Ibid. 
88 Wright, Terrorist Propaganda, 55. 
89 Smith, Fighting for Ireland? , 15. 
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only to force."90 The Provisionals also pointed to the success of guerrilla campaigns 
in Aden and Cyprus as confirmation of the utility of violence in forcing the British 
Government to abandon its colonial possessions.91 The PIRA even went so far as to 
claim that the broader human experience demonstrated the utility of violence. As the 
organisation stated in 1973, "almost all civilisations on earth owe their continued 
existence during conflicts on the success of violence. I don't think the fact that the 
use of violence can bring success is an issue."92 
The PIRA's third utilitarian justificatory argument was that the organisation's 
track record demonstrated the efficacy of violence. For example, the Provisionals 
maintained that, prior to 1970, "a united Ireland was never even considered or 
mentioned by either London or Stormont."93 Then came the PIRA and its campaign 
of resistance, "a resistance which has been so successful as to seem incredible ... 
Today [1972], the leader of the opposition in Britain ... as well as many Tories and 
even unionists recognise the inevitability of a united Ireland. 94 Two years later, the 
Provisionals claimed that there were only two groups in Northern Ireland "who [were] 
making the pace, calling the tune."95 That is, the PIRA and the Ulster Workers' 
Council (UWC); the latter being responsible for a two-week strike in May 197 4 that 
brought down the power-sharing Northern Ireland Executive. The PIRA attributed 
the success and importance of itself and the UWC to both group's reliance on 
guerrilla warfare; a tactic which has "shown to be effective."96 Indeed, the PIRA was 
so confident in the efficacy of its violence that it habitually declared the organisation's 
imminent victory. For instance, in 1971, the Provisionals announced that victory was 
"in sight.'m Twelve months later, the PIRA was ready to affirm 1972 as "the year of 
victory";98 an appellation that the organisation would also attribute to 1974.99 The 
9° Cronin, Irish Nationalism, 1. 
91 Maria McGuire, To Take up Arms: A Year in the Provisional IRA (London: Macmillan, 1973), 74-5. 
92 PIRA, "The question of physical force," 5. 
93 PIRA, "The IRA - justified," 6. 
94 Ibid. 
95 PIRA, "Guerrilla war a legitimate political tactic," An Phoblacht 5, no. 27 (1974): 7. 
96 Ibid. 
97 PIRA, "Victory in sight," Republican News 2, no. 11 (1971): 12. 
98 PIRA, "1972: The year of victory," Republican News 2, no. 18 (1972): 1. 
99 PIRA, "The final phase," An Phoblacht 5, no. 15 (1974): 1. 
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Provisionals confidence in "victory" was still evident three years later when they 
pronounced they were in "the final phase of [their] war with England."100 
Generally speaking, the PIRA employed two normative arguments to justify it 
use of violence. The first of these was one of retributive justice. 101 As 
aforementioned, the Provisionals accused the British Army of conducting sectarian 
repression against Catholics in Northern Ireland. As a result, northern Catholics 
"have seen their young men and women murdered. They have seen their old men and 
women assaulted."102 Furthermore, this state of affairs was unlikely to change in the 
foreseeable future. As the organisation stated in 1971, 
When Cardinal Conway says that violence has been rejected by all responsible 
political parties, does he not realise that Mr Heath and Mr Wilson are both regarded 
as 'responsible' but they are the people who maintain partition by violence. And all 
thinking people must admit that partition is the problem. What responsible political 
leader on the British or Unionist side has ever put forward any solution to the 
problem other than British military force? 103 
Thus, if "the British will not rule out the use of force to maintain" partition and the 
subjugation of the Irish people, "logic decrees - meet force with force!" 104 
The PIRA's second normative argument was that the Irish nation's right of 
self-determination justified the organisation's recourse to violence. 105 According to 
the Provisionals: (1) every nation has an undeniable right to freely determine their 
political status and government structures (a prerogative enshrined in Woodrow 
Wilson's Fourteen Points and the United Nations International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights); and (2) the Irish people exercised this right at the general election of 
100 PIRA, 1977, cited in: Smith, Fighting for Ireland?, 135. 
101 Rogelio Alonso, "The Modernization in Irish Republican Thinking Toward the Utility of Violence," 
Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 24, no. 2 (2001): 132. 
102 PIRA, "British terrorists MURDER six catholics: Hierarchy condemns the IRA," Republican News 
2, no. 10 (1971): 1. 
103 PIRA, "Our view," Republican News 2, no. 4 (1971): 1. Edward Heath was the Prime Minister of 
the United Kingdom from 1970 to 1974. James Wilson was the Prime Minster of the United Kingdom 
from 1964 to 1970 and from 1974 to 1976. 
104 PIRA, "Get off the fence," Republican News 1, no. 8 (1971): 10. 
105 Frank Burton, The Politics of Legitimacy: Struggles in a Belfast Community (London, Henley and 
Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978), 90-1, O'Boyle, "Theories of justification and political 
violence," 30, Wright, Terrorist Propaganda, 52. 
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1918, when a majority of the Irish people (approximately 53 percent)106 endorsed a 
political party (Sinn Fein) whose platform explicitly demanded the "complete 
independence for the unitary state of Ireland." 107 However, by introducing the 
Government of Ireland Act in 1920, and continuing to occupy the six counties since 
then, the British Government has prevented the Irish people from truly and fully 
implementing their desired right for a unified, independent Ireland. Thus, because of 
this unjust violation of the Irish nation's will, and the unquestionable importance of 
the right involved, the PIRA maintained that it was justified in engaging in any 
necessary act to free Northern Ireland from its imperialist yoke. 
2.2 RECRUITMENT PROCESS 
Traditionally, familial ties underpinned recruitment into the IRA. Strong 
Republican families (such as the Adamses) tended to dominate the organisation, with 
membership being "passed from father to son, mother to daughter." 108 White 
provides an example of this when he quotes a Donegal Republican who joined the 
IRA in the 1940s: 
I was involved with the Republican Movement at a very early age because of my 
father being a member of the Republican Movement as well. From 1916 'til the 
Civil War my home was a place for anybody who came on the run, or to seek help. 
It was always given to them. So I was sought of brought up, you know what I mean, 
within Republican circles, my father being a Republican. And uh, I supposed it 
rubbed off on me. 109 
106 It is important to note the difficulties associated with ascertaining Sinn Fein's level of popular 
support at the 1918 general election. Although the party won 69.5 percent of Ireland's seats in 
Westminster, it only received 46.9 percent of the total vote. However, this latter percentage likely 
undervalues Sinn Fein's actual public support in 1918, given that the party won twenty-five of its 
seventy-three seats unopposed (thus depressing its vote). According to Whyte, if one assumes that 
Sinn Fein would have received a similar proportion of votes in its unopposed electorates as it received 
in its contested electorates, then the party would have likely won 53 percent of the total vote. See: 
Whyte. The Irish Election of 1918. 
107 Leslie Macfarlance, "The right to self-determination in Ireland and the justification of IRA 
violence," Terrorism and Political Violence 2, no. 1 (1990): 38-9. 
108 Moloney, A Secret History, 80. 
109 Cited in: Robert W. White, Provisional Irish Republicans: An Oral and Interpretive History 
(Westport and London: Greenwood Press, 1993), 38. 
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However, with the emergence of The Troubles in the late-1960s, the recruitment 
dynamics of the Republican movement changed. Although 'traditional' Volunteers 
would continue to join the PIRA, the majority of the organisation's recruits after 1969 
were neither from Republican families, nor extensively-versed in Republican 
ideology. 110 Instead, their motivation for joining the Provisionals stemmed from the 
continuing violence in Northern Ireland. Not surprisingly, most of these 'new' 
Volunteers came from the six counties. Known as the 'Sixty-niners', they were 
driven by "an atavistic fear of loyalist violence," seething rage over state repression, 
and an "overwhelming need' to defend their community and "strike back."111 Due to 
a number of "barriers" (e.g. "time, social and political change, and state censorship") 
that made the "Northern war less immediate for Southern Irish people," the PIRA's 
recruitment in the twenty-six counties was relatively-paltry. 112 Nevertheless, 'new' 
Volunteers did emerge in the Republic of Ireland; primarily driven by anger at the 
perceived injustice of British actions (most notably, 'Bloody Sunday' of 1972 and the 
Hunger Strikes of the early-1980s) against their fellow Irish people. 113 
Generally speaking, the PIRA had two recruitment networks to accommodate 
the influx of 'new' Volunteers. In Northern Ireland, Sixty-niners typically sought to 
join the PIRA by approaching a known Republican in their area and "drop[ping] a 
word in his ear."114 This was a relatively easy undertaking, given the PIRA's broad 
and established presence in the working-class neighbourhoods of Belfast and Derry 
(the main recruitment centres). For the 'new' Volunteers in the Republic of Ireland, 
establishing such an interpersonal relationship with an existing-member of the PIRA 
was a more difficult task; primarily because the "Dublin Government actively 
work[ ed] to limit the organizational abilities of Republicans" and the relative death of 
Provisionals in the twenty-six counties. 115 Thus, according to White, contacts 
between 'new' Volunteers and the PIRA were generally made at events (like' 
110 Bell, The IRA, 80-3. 
111 English, Armed Struggle, 120-4, Moloney, A Secret History, 80, White, Provisional Irish 
Republicans, 89-93. 
112 White, Provisional Irish Republicans, 103. 
113 Ibid., 104-8. 
114 Taylor, Provos, 71. 
115 White, Provisional Irish Republicans, 106. 
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"marches and protest rallies" against British actions m Northern Ireland) where 
potential- and existing-members would be concentrated in the same area. 116 
3 THE BRITISH AND NORTHERN IRELAND GOVERNMENTS AND 
THEIR SECURITY FORCES 
For the fifty years after the British Government introduced the Government of 
Ireland Act in 1920, the Northern Ireland Parliament (also known as Stormont) was 
the six counties' principal legislative body. Although London theoretically retained 
significant control over Northern Ireland during this period, thanks to a convention 
which restricted MPs in Westminster from raising "any issue within the direct 
responsibility of a Stormont minister," the British Government's authority was 
effectively "limited to such issues as foreign trade, defence, major taxation, customs 
and excise, and the High Court."117 However, the British administration of Edward 
Heath terminated this constitutional arrangement in March 1972. After becoming 
convinced that Stormont lacked both the capacity and legitimacy to address Northern 
Ireland's spiralling crisis, Heath suspended the Northern Ireland Parliament and 
introduced Direct Rule. For the next two-and-a-half decades, Northern Ireland was 
governed by London through a Secretary of State for Northern Ireland (SSNI) and a 
handful of junior ministers. 118 Direct Rule was only brought to an end in 1998, when 
a devolved Assembly was created as part of the Belfast Agreement. 119 
The British and Stormont Governments maintained three principal security 
forces in Northern Ireland: the British Army, the RUC, and the Ulster Defence 
Regiment (UDR). The British Army was arguably the most important of these. Prior 
to The Troubles, the army garrison in the six counties was approximately 2,000 strong 
and a "popular posting."120 However, after London's decision to deploy troops in 
116 Ibid., 107-8. 
117 Sydney Elliott and W.D. Flackes, Conflict in Northern Ireland: An Encyclopedia (Santa Barbara, 
Denver and Oxford: ABC-CLIO, 1999), 606. 
118 Ibid., 607. 
119 It is important to note that the Northern Ireland Assembly has been suspended from 14 October 
2002. London has been governing the province since then. 
120 Elliott and Flackes, Conflict in Northern Ireland, 648. 
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mid-August 1969- a move which essentially made the British Army the lead actor for 
law and order in Northern Ireland - the army garrison began to swell. By the end of 
1970, 6,300 soldiers were deployed in the province (see Table 2). Over the next 
decade, the British Army's presence in Northern Ireland would average at 14,000 
troops per year; peaking at 16,900 in 1973 (though approximately 22,000 British 
troops were involved in Operation Motorman in mid-1972). 121 During this period, 
the army garrison in the six counties largely consisted of personnel from Britain's 
various infantry and support units. 122 Prominent regiments included: the Special Air 
Service (SAS) regiment (first publicly deployed in January 1976) and 14 Intelligence 
Company ('the Det'). 123 
Year 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
British 
Army 
2,700 
6,300 
7,800 
14,300 
16,900 
16,200 
15,000 
15,500 
14,300 
14,400 
13,600 
11,900 
RUC 
3,500 
3,750 
4,083 
4,273 
4,421 
4,563 
4,902 
5,253 
5,692 
6,110 
6,614 
6,935 
UDR 
0 
2,292 
4,044 
8,476 
8,443 
7,815 
7,692 
7,645 
7,651 
7,970 
7,518 
7,376 
Table 2: Security Forces' Stren~th, Northern Ireland, 
1969-1980 24 
Established in June 1922, the RUC was a descendant of the Royal Irish 
Constabulary (RIC); the British regime's chief police force in Ireland during the 
nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries. Like its predecessor, the RUC was 
structured as a paramilitary force and was tasked with the dual functions of curtailing 
crime and maintaining the "existing socio-political order" (i.e. the unionist 
121 Peter R. Neumann, Britain's Long War: British Strategy in the Northern Ireland Conflict, 1969-98 
(Houndmills and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 190. 
122 For a list of the tour of duties of all British Army units that served in Northern Ireland during the 
1970s, see: Michael Dewar, The British Army in Northern Ireland (London: Arms and Armour Press, 
1985), 255-64. 
123 Peter Taylor, Brits: The War against the IRA (London: Bloomsbury, 2002), 190. 
124 Neumann, Britain's Long War, 190. 
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domination of the six counties ). 125 However, after the breakdown in security during 
the late-1960s, the British Home Secretary, James Callaghan, reorganised the RUC; 
bringing the force in line with traditional police practices used throughout the rest of 
the United Kingdom. 126 After the imposition of Direct Rule, the British Government 
sought to professionalise the RUC further, primarily by increasing its full-time 
component and seeking to boost its number of Catholic recruits. 127 -Driving these 
efforts was London's desire to shift responsibility for law and order from the British 
Army back to the RUC. The British Government initiated this policy of 'police 
primacy' in September 1974, and it was eventually finalised by June 1977.128 As 
Table 2 illustrates, the RUC's strength gradually expanded during the 1970s, 
effectively doubling from 1969 to 1980. One of the most important units of the RUC 
was the Special Branch; responsible for the force's intelligence collection and analysis. 
A major support element of the RUC during The Troubles was the UDR. A 
(largely part-time) infantry regiment of the British Army, the UDR can trace its 
origins to the Ulster Special Constabulary (USC; more popularly known as the 'B' 
Specials). Formed in November 1920, the USC was a part-time paramilitary 
organisation that acted as a reserve force for the police in Northern Ireland. 129 Over 
the next fifty years, the 'B' Specials would play a significant role in Stormont's 
various campaigns against the IRA. However, due largely to its overt-sectarianness, 
the Home Secretary abolished the USC in 1969; replacing it with a locally-raised and 
professional army regiment. Though the UDR actively sought recruits from both 
denominations, it was never able to fully earn the trust of northern Catholics. 130 At its 
peak in 1972, the UDR had 8,476 full- and part-time troops. However, from 1972 
onwards, the UDR's strength slowly declined (see Table 2). It is important to note 
125 Cynthia H. Enloe, "Police and military in Ulster: Peacekeeping or peace-subverting forces?," 
Journal of Peace Research 15, no. 3 (1978): 250. 
126 Chris Ryder, The RUC 1922-1997: A Force Under Fire, Revised ed. (London: Mandarin, 1997), 
115-6. Callaghan was acting on the recommendations of Lord Hunt, whose report on the RUC was 
published in October 1969. 
127 Enloe, "Police and military," 251-3, Neumann, Britain's Long War, 109. 
128 Desmond Hamill, Pig in the Middle: The Army in Northern Ireland 1969-1984 (London: Methuen 
London, 1985), 154, 217, Neumann, Britain's Long War, 81-2. 
129 For more information on the establishment of the USC, see: Michael Farrell, Arming the Protestants: 
The Formation of the Ulster Special Constabulary and the Royal Ulster Constabulary 1920-27 
(London and Sydney: Pluto Press, 1983), 30-54, Arthur Hezlet, The 'B' Specials: A History of the 
Ulster Special Constabulary (London: Tom Stacey, 1973), 1-26. 
130 Elliott and Flackes, Conflict in Northern Ireland, 656. 
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that, in 1992, the British Government amalgamated the UDR with the Royal Irish 
Rangers, forming the Royal Irish Regiment (RIR). 
4 THE PIRA'S REGENERATIVE EXPERIENCE 
4.1 THE RISE OF THE PIRA, DECEMBER 1969-JUNE 1972 
Two characteristics marked the PIRA's campaign during the first thirty 
months of its existence. The first of these was the general inefficacy of the British 
and Stormont Governments in their attempts to contain (let alone defeat) the 
Provisionals. The most prominent example of this ineptitude was the introduction of 
Internment on 9 August 1971. This was not the first time that the authorities had 
sought to detain suspected-insurgents without trial. Under the Special Powers Act 
(ratified on 7 April 1922), the Minister of Home Affairs had the ability to "arrest 
without warrant or intern without trial" any person s/he deemed to pose a threat to the 
province's security. 131 Prior to The Troubles, the most recent large-scale exercise of 
this power occurred during the late- l 950s, when Stormont (and Dublin) interned 
hundreds of Volunteers; 132 greatly contributing to the eventual defeat of the IRA's 
Border Campaign.133 
However, despite this seeming familiarity with its application, the British and 
Stormont Governments' introduction of Internment in August 1971 was largely (and 
startlingly) ineffective. Specifically, while the authorities were able to apprehend and 
intern some members of the PIRA, the vast majority of those detained "were not 
members of that organisation." 134 For instance, within twenty-four hours of 
interment's introduction, the RUC and the British Army had detained 342 people. Of 
these, 116 were released almost immediately (their alleged relationship with 
Republican paramilitaries having been unable to withstand even the most basic 
scrutiny). Of the 226 that remained, "[ f]ewer than a hundred" were connected with 
131 Ryder, The RUC, 57. 
132 Bell, The Secret Army, 302-3. 
133 Kelley, The Longest War, 153. 
134 John E. Finn, Constitutions in Crisis: Political Violence and the Rule of Law (New York and Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1991), 69, R.J. Spjut, "Internment and detention without trial in Northern 
Ireland 1971-1975: Ministerial policy and practice," Modern Law Review 49 (1986): 716. 
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the IRA; the majority of whom were members of the more-pacific OIRA (the 
membership of which tended to be better known by the police). 135 Unfortunately for 
the security forces, as the months progressed, their ability to intern significant 
numbers of actual Provisionals did not. Indeed, of the 1, 179 people who were 
interned between August 1971 and June 1972, 239 were released by the Stormont 
Government, and a further 700 were released by the British Government during the 
first five months of Direct Rule. 136 
The second characteristic of the PIRA's campaign was the organisation's 
dramatic influx of recruits. Due to a lack of data, it is impossible to ascertain when 
and how many Volunteers joined the PIRA during this period. 137 Nevertheless, the 
literature does highlight a number of key episodes that stimulated the Provisionals' 
recruitment. These episodes included: (1) the 'Battle of St. Matthew's' on 27 June 
1970, during which a handful of Provisionals repulsed a Protestant mob in the 
Catholic enclave of the Short Strand in East Belfast ("It was very significant. .. A lot 
of people joined the Republican Movement after St. Matthew's. It finished the 
business of IRA equals 'I Ran Away."'); 138 (2) the 'Rape of the Falls' in early-July 
1970, during which British troops battled with residents and Republican paramilitaries 
on the Lower Falls road in Belfast, resulting in the widespread use of CS gas, the 
imposition of a curfew, and the death of four civilians ("[a]fter that," according to 
Gerry Adams, "recruitment to the IRA was massive"); 139 (3) the introduction of 
Internment on 9 August 1971, which, due to its seeming bias against nationalists (no 
unionists were interned until February 1973) and targeting of innocent people, 
"enraged Catholics in the north" and "provided [the] PIRA with an enormous 
propaganda victory [that] boosted recruitment"; 140 and (4) 'Bloody Sunday' on 30 
January 1972, during which soldiers from the British Parachute Regiment opened fire 
135 Bishop and Mallie, The Provisional IRA, 144, English, Armed Struggle, 139, W.D. Flackes, 
Northern Ireland: A Political Directory 1968-79 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1980), 99. 
136 Spjut, "Internment and detention," 740. 
137 As Bell notes, the PIRA "did not feel the need for membership rolls"; and (as this author 
experienced) former-Volunteers generally exhibit a reluctance to talk in detail about the organisation's 
recruitment. Bell, The IRA, 130. 
138 An anonymous member of the IRA, cited by: Moloney, A Secret History, 90. 
139 Gerry Adams, The Politics of Irish Freedom (Dingle: Brandon Books, 1986), 55. Bell supports 
Adams' observation, noting that "IRA recruiting soared" in the aftermath of the 'Rape of the Falls'. 
See: Bell, The Secret Army, 377. 
140 English, Armed Struggle, 140, Smith, Fighting for Ireland?, 101. 
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on a civil rights march in Derry, killing fourteen and injuring many more. This last 
act had arguably the greatest impact on the PIRA's recruitment. As Taylor states: 
As a result [of 'Bloody Sunday'], hundreds joined the Provisional IRA, eager to seek 
revenge for the murders they believed the British army had committed and the cover-
up they were convinced had been perpetrated by Lord Widgery. If any young men 
had previously held back because they felt morally uncomfortable about killing, 
'Bloody Sunday' removed any lingering restraint... 'Bloody Sunday' had given the 
Provisional IRA the biggest boost in its history. 141 
As a consequence of these two characteristics, the PIRA experienced a 
significant expansion in its membership. From an initial core of "40 to 50 volunteers" 
at its inception, the PIRA grew to approximately 100 members in mid-1970; 
increasing again to "several hundred volunteers by the end of the first year."142 As 
1971 progressed, the Provisionals' strength ballooned to between 1,000 and 1,500 
members. 143 By 1972, Jeffrey estimates that the PIRA had grown to 2,000 Volunteers, 
the peak of the organisation's strength. 144 The Provisionals' rate of operations 
reflected this dramatic growth. As Table 3 illustrates, the number of conflict-related 
incidents recorded by the RUC increased by over 600 percent from 1970 to 1971, and 
increased again (exponentially with regard to shooting incidents) from 1971 to 1972. 
The number of people killed by the PIRA also exhibited this expansive nature, with 
fifteen people falling to Provisional violence in 1970 (out of a total twenty-six people 
killed), eighty-five in 1971 (171), and a remarkable 234 in 1972 (479).145 
141 Taylor, Provos, 126-7. In the immediate aftermath of the killings, the British Government 
established an inquiry under the Lord Chief Justice, Lord Widgery, to investigate the events of 30 
January 1972. His report, published eleven weeks after 'Bloody Sunday', essentially upheld the British 
Army's assertion that the Parachute Regiment had been fired on first, and that the soldiers were 
shooting primarily at armed paramilitaries. 
142 Bell, The IRA, 77, Bell, The Secret Army, 374, Dewar, The British Army in Northern Ireland, 47. 
Though, it is important to note that both English and Kelley estimate the PIRA's strength at 1,000 
strong in mid-1970. See: English, Armed Struggle, 114, Kelley, The Longest War, 137. 
143 Bell, The Secret Army, 364, Moloney, A Secret History, 103, Smith, Fighting for Ireland?, 92. 
144 Keith Jeffery, "The British army and Ireland since 1922," in A military history of Ireland, ed. 
Thomas Bartlett and Keith Jeffery (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 452. 
145 Sutton. An Index of Deaths. 
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Shooting Bombings Year Incidents Bomb Devices Total Devices 
ExeJosions Neutralised Used 
1970 213 153 17 170 
1971 1,756 1,022 483 1,515 
1972 10,631 1,382 471 1,853 
Table 3: Conflict-Related Incidents, Northern Ireland, 1970-72146 
4.2 THE DETERIORATION OF THE PIRA's REGENERATIVE CAPACITY, Mm-1972-
1977 
Unbeknown to the Provisionals at the time, 1972 would later prove to be the 
peak of their campaign. Never again would the PIRA be able to inflict so much 
damage upon Northern Ireland society and the British security forces. Furthermore, 
and partly because of this, the PIRA would never again enjoy so much potential 
power to influence the political situation in Northern Ireland. 147 After all, the first 
seven months of 1972 had witnessed the abolition of Stormont and the imposition of 
Direct Rule (a political and strategic triumph for the Provisionals) and the British 
Government agreeing to secret talks with the insurgent actor. These talks, held in 
London on the ih of July between seven Volunteers (including MacStiofain and 
Adams) and the SSNI, William Whitelaw, achieved little. Nevertheless, they were an 
indication of the seriousness with which the British Government viewed the 
Provisionals and their coercive capability. 
The tipping-point for the PIRA came during the last ten days of July 1972. On 
the twenty-first of that month, in an attempt to intensify their pressure on London and 
to overshadow recent Loyalist activity, the Provisionals detonated twenty-one bombs 
in the Belfast city centre within the space of an hour. In the resulting pandemonium, 
nine people were killed and 130 were injured;148 earning 21 July 1972 the epithet of 
146 PSNI. Security-related incidents, 1969-2005, Statistics Branch, 2005. Accessed: 1 August 2005. 
Available from: http://www.psni.police.uk/security_related_incidents_cy-18.doc. 
147 According to Smith, "The year 1972 was the simultaneous zenith and nadir of the IRA's campaign. 
It was at this time that the IRA reached its potentially most powerful position in the conflict." See: 
M.L.R. Smith, "Fin de Siecle, 1972: The Provisional IRA's strategy and the beginning of the eight-
thousand-day stalemate," in Political Violence in Northern Ireland: Conflict and Conflict Resolution, 
ed. Alan O'Day (Westport: Praeger, 1997), 30. 
148 Hennessey, A History, 212, Sutton. An Index of Deaths. 
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'Bloody Friday'. There were two consequences of this outrage. The first was that the 
Provisionals became "politically untouchable. There was no way back to the 
negotiating process." 149 The second was that 'Bloody Friday' gave the British 
Government the pretext it had been looking for to remove the 'no go' areas. 
Beginning in August 1969, Catholic residents in Derry had instinctively sought to 
protect themselves from incursions by Loyalist mobs by erecting a series of barricades 
around their communities. As the conflict in Northern Ireland escalated, this practice 
soon spread to other Catholic districts in Belfast. Given London's desire not to offend 
either the nationalist or unionist populations, the British Army left the barricades in 
place and generally refrained from patrolling in the neighbourhoods behind them.150 
As this practice became institutionalised, the PIRA increasingly established itself in 
these 'no go' areas. Not only did the Provisionals assume responsibility for 
maintaining law and order, but they also exploited the 'no go' areas as operational 
bases. As Smith states, "[t]hese areas were a considerable military asset. They 
provided the Provisionals with safe havens from where they could mount operations 
and remain effectively immune from the security forces." 151 
As the years progressed, London maintained its reluctance about moving 
against the 'no go' areas; even in the face of opposition from both the unionist 
community (who constructed their own barricades in protest) and the British Army. 
As Neumann states, "Westminster believed that employing the military instrument 
was harmful to the prospect of regaining the trust of the Catholic community and 
persuading its political leaders to participate in negotiations over power-sharing."152 
However, 'Bloody Friday' transformed the "political and military calculus within 
which British strategy operated."153 On hearing the Provisionals had just killed nine 
civilians, "Whitelaw reportedly turned to Minister of Defence Peter Carrington and 
said, 'Right, now they've given it to us. We can go into the no-go areas' ."154 -Ten 
days later, the security forces launched Operation Motorman. Within twenty-four 
149 Smith, "Fin de Siecle, 1972," 28. 
150 Neumann, Britain's Long War, 51-2, 78-80. 
151 Smith, Fighting for Ireland?, 110. 
152 Neumann, Britain's Long War, 79. 
153 Ibid. 
154 Kelley, The Longest War, 184. 
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hours, 31,000 British Army and UDR troops (the largest British military operation 
since the Suez Crisis of 1956) had reoccupied all the 'no go' areas throughout 
Northern Ireland. Eager to limit potential bloodshed, the authorities had broadcast 
their intention to move against the 'no go' zones. Because of this, and the PIRA's 
realisation that to stand and fight would have been "suicidal," causalities were 
minimal. 155 
It was at this point that the PIRA's capacity to regenerate began to weaken. 
This degeneration was the function of two factors. The first of these was the 
Provisionals' declining ability to attract new recruits. As previously acknowledged, 
there is a general absence of precise information about the PIRA's recruitment. This 
deficiency is even starker for the mid-1970s, due to the literature's typical refrain 
from commenting on either the organisation's strength or recruitment during this 
period. Nevertheless, it is possible to deduce that, while the PIRA never lost its 
ability to attract new recruits, its rate of recruitment from 1972 to the late-1970s was 
less than during the initial years of the organisation's campaign, and was (if only 
slightly) declining. 
Three observations form the basis of this deduction. The first of these is that, 
as Bell notes, the Provisionals' "influx of volunteers peaked in 1972."156 The PIRA 
was never again to experience the flood of recruits that beset the organisation during 
the early-1970s. The second observation is that, as the 1970s progressed, a feeling of 
war-weariness emerged amongst northern Catholics;157 an environment that was likely 
to have depressed the PIRA's recruitment. The third observation is that the 1975 
Ceasefire between the PIRA and the British Government had a disastrous impact on 
the morale of many Volunteers; an effect which was also likely to have been felt by 
the organisation's potential members. The Provisionals agreed to a ceasefire with 
London in February 1975 after they believed they had secured a commitment from 
155 Bishop and Mallie, The Provisional IRA, 181. 
156 Bell, The IRA, 84. 
157 Bell, The Secret Army, 394, Charles Drake, "The Provisional IRA: Reorganisation and the Long 
War," in Terrorism's Laboratory: The Case of Northern Ireland, ed. Alan O'Day (Aldershot: 
Dartmouth, 1995), 89, Kelley, The Longest War, 235, Smith, Fighting for Ireland? , 133, Taylor, 
Provos, 173-5. 
Provisional Irish Republican Army 175 
Merlyn Rees (the then-SSNI) that the British would gradually begin to withdraw their 
forces from the six counties. However, as 1975 progressed, it became increasingly 
clear that the British Army was not leaving Northern Ireland. This dawning 
comprehension, as well as the forced inactivity of the ceasefire, slowly chipped away 
at the PIRA's "morale and numbers."158 Martin McGuiness, on his return to Derry 
from prison during 1975, alluded to the impact this 'atrophy' was having on the 
PIRA's recruitment when he stated that "good operations are the best recruiting 
sergeant." 159 Tommy McKeamey, another senior Provisional, also hints at the 
debilitating effect the ceasefire had on the organisation's recruitment, when he notes 
that the results of the 1975 ceasefire prompted a debate within the ranks of the PIRA 
about: 
'how do we make progress from here?' ... It wasn't just a question of getting more 
recruits for the IRA. It was a much wider debate than that. It was how to bring the 
struggle forward in every sense. But more recruits for the Republican Army was part 
of the debate. One couldn't be separated from the other. It was a question of how to 
involve the population, the republican population, in the struggle. 160 
The second factor that led to the deterioration of the PIRA's regenerative 
capacity was the organisation's burgeoning rate of attrition. It is important to note 
that deaths of Volunteers, while substantial, played only a minor role in this upsurge. 
Although 105 Provisionals were killed between 31July1972 and 31December1977, 
the rate at which they were killed was (more or less) equal to what the PIRA 
experienced during the first thirty months of its campaign.161 Rather, the increase in 
the Provisionals' rate of attrition was primarily due to a gradual, yet relentless, rise in 
the number of Volunteers who were arrested and convicted on terrorism-related 
charges. 'Motorman' was the trigger for this escalation of arrests; exposing the PIRA 
to greater contact with the security forces. By December 1972, the British Army 
claimed that it had detained 200 Volunteers since 'Motorman'. 162 The Provisionals' 
vulnerability to security force pressure even extended across the border. During the 
158 Bishop and Mallie, The Provisional IRA, 218. 
159 Ibid. 
16° Cited in: Taylor, Provos, 213. 
161 Over both periods, the PIRA lost an average of three Volunteers every two months. See: Sutton. An 
Index of Deaths. 
162 Taylor, Brits, 153. 
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final two months of 1972, the Irish Gardai arrested such PIRA luminaries as: 
MacStiofain, Ruairi O'Bradaigh and Maire Drumm (the President and Vice-President 
of Sinn Fein, respectively), and Martin McGuiness and Joe McCallion (the 
commander and deputy commander of the Derry Brigade). 
The arrests of Volunteers continued through 1973. In July, the Northern 
Ireland Office (NIO) declared that 500 Provisionals had been convicted and sentenced 
over the past year; "eight of whom had been given life sentences, the rest an average 
of four years in jail apiece." 163 Not counted in the NIO's figure was Joe Cahill, 
MacStiofain's successor as Chief of Staff. The Irish Navy arrested Cahill on 28 
March 1973 aboard the Claudia, a West German-registered cargo ship loaded with 
five tons of Libyan arms. 164 1974 was also a difficult year for the PIRA. As Bishop 
and Mallie state, Volunteers were "being increasingly hard-pressed by the Army ... 
The more experienced of them now ran considerable risks with every operation they 
carried out. They either persisted and courted arrest and a long prison sentence or 
they stopped active service."165 Brendan Hughes and Billy McKee, two prominent 
Provisionals, confirmed this analysis, declaring that: "for the first time since the early-
1970s, the police and the military machine were actually working and the IRA was 
under severe pressure"; and that the Belfast Brigade was "in a very poor state, a very 
poor state indeed ... There were only a handful of men in each area and weaponry was 
very poor."166 
Arrests of Volunteers declined slightly during the 1975 Ceasefire. However, 
the Provisionals' loss of personnel continued when the truce dissolved in late-1975. 
In December 1976, the newly-appointed SSNI, Roy Mason, claimed that "690 
members of the PIRA had been charged since the start of the year, that is, more than 
twice the total (320) in 1975."167 Jackie McMullan, a former Provisional, supports 
Mason's statement, stating that a "very large number of volunteers [were] arrested in 
1976-77, many of them experienced volunteers"; consequently, "a large gap had been 
163 Moloney, A Secret History, 128. 
164 Bishop and Mallie, The Provisional IRA, 192. 
165 Ibid., 188. 
166 Cited in: Taylor, Brits, 172. 
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left in structures that lasted several years."168 By the end of 1977, it was clear that the 
"type of campaign" the PIRA "had deemed necessary to achieve [its goals] quickly 
had proved costly in terms of volunteers killed and imprisoned."169 The result: the 
PIRA was "left ... in a situation where we found that numbers were smaller, and a 
smaller number of men were carrying more and more responsibility on their 
shoulders."17° Circumstances were so dire that, according to Kelley, "[s]ome Provos 
today admit that there were fewer than 250 active guerrillas at the end of 1977."171 
The PIRA's operational activity reflected the organisation's increased rate of 
attrition and shrinking membership. As Table 4 illustrates, paramilitary violence 
exhibited a clear downward trend during the mid-1970s. Indeed, by 1977, the number 
of shooting incidents, bombings, and attempting bombings in Northern Ireland had 
dropped by 89.8 percent, 73.5 percent, and 64.1 percent, respectively, from 1972.172 
Deaths attributed to the PIRA also fell over this period. From a high of 234 in 1972, 
the Provisionals killed 126 people in 1973 (out of a total of 253), 134 in 1974 (294), 
seventy-nine in 1975 (260), 112 in 1976 (295), and sixty-seven in 1977 (111). 173 
Year 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
Shooting 
Incidents 
10,631 
5,019 
3,208 
1,803 
1,908 
1,081 
Bomb 
Explosions 
1,382 
978 
685 
399 
766 
366 
Bombings 
Devices Total Devices 
Neutralised Used 
471 1,853 
542 1,520 
428 1,113 
236 635 
426 1,192 
169 535 
Table 4: Conflict-Related Incidents, Northern Ireland, 1972-77174 
4.3 THE PIRA REGAINS ITS COMPOSURE, 1978 -
The disastrous state of the PIRA's campaign was not lost on its membership. 
Consequently, as the organisation approached the end of the decade, there was 
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growing dissent within its ranks. The most notable source of this discord was Her 
Majesty's Prison Maze (colloquially known as 'the Maze' or 'Long Kesh'). 
Beginning in 1975, a number of Provisional inmates, following the tradition of such 
Republican luminaries as Michael Collins, sought to use the "time, leisure, and 
opportunity" provided by their imprisonment to reflect on the problems besieging the 
Republican movement. 175 Moloney describes how 'cages' nine and eleven in the 
Maze, under the guidance of Adams, Ivor Bell and Brendan Hughes, "became think 
tanks devoted to planning new structures and policies designed to rescue the [P]IRA 
from what every activist, inside and outside the jail, could see was imminent 
defeat." 176 These debates and discussions eventually formed the intellectual 
foundations of a 'blueprint' for reforming the PIRA. From late-197 5 to late-1977, the 
'dissident' Provisionals began to trial-balloon some aspects of this blueprint; 
primarily through a semi-regular column in the Republican News (authored by Adams 
under the pseudonym 'Brownie') and selected proxies that had avoided imprisonment 
(e.g. Danny Morrison and Jimmy Drumm).177 Later, as Adams and his allies were 
released from Long Kesh and took over key positions within the PIRA, the 
organisation gradually adopted elements of the proposed reforms. This process was 
largely completed by late-1978 and early-1979. 
The reforms implemented by the PIRA were organisational, educational, and 
strategic in nature. With regard to the first, the Provisionals adopted a cellular 
structure, as well as creating a 'Northern Command' - that is, a body, separate from 
the GHQ in Dublin, in charge of all operations in Northern Ireland and the five border 
counties of the Republic. Educationally, the PIRA devised a new training manual, the 
Green Book, which sought to improve security discipline within Provisional ranks. 
Lastly, the PIRA introduced two major strategic reforms. The first of these was the 
concept of 'politicisation'; the essence of which was that the PIRA would abandon its 
"mono-military approach" and instead utilise both political and military means to 
175 Moloney, A Secret History, 149. 
176 Ibid. 
177 English, Armed Struggle, 216-8, Moloney, A Secret History, 150, Smith, Fighting for Ireland?, 148. 
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beget the organisation's goals. 178 The Provisionals' chief political instrument was 
Sinn Fein, which was unleashed and tasked with the duty of "agitat[ing] about social 
and economic issues which attack the welfare of the people."179 The second strategic 
reform, meanwhile, was that of the 'Long War'. The central assumption of this 
concept was that, due to their imperial interests in maintaining a presence in Ireland, 
the British were in "for a long haul against the IRA."180 Thus, it was necessary for the 
PIRA to prepare for a "long term armed struggle" if it wanted to achieve its goal of a 
sovereign, untied Ireland. 181 
It was during the implementation of these reforms that the PIRA's capacity to 
regenerate regained its previous vigour. This rejuvenation was the function of two 
factors. The first of these was that, as Smith notes, the PIRA's previously 
"haemorrhage[ing]" loss of personnel began to subside. 182 As Figure 1 illustrates, the 
number of people charged in Northern Ireland with terrorism-related offences dropped 
by 35.5 percent from 1977 to 1978, and continued to trend downwards 
(notwithstanding a brief upsurge in 1981) for the remainder of the PIRA's campaign. 
The second factor, meanwhile, was that the Provisionals' rate ofrecruitment stabilised. 
As Brigadier James M. Glover noted in his renowned 1978 intelligence assessment, 
while the Provisionals were still unable to "attract the large number of active terrorists 
they had in 1972/73," they, nevertheless, were able to recruit enough new members to 
replace their losses and, as a result, "sustain" their "manpower" and "violence."183 
The likes of Bell, Drake and Reilly share Glover's assessment, indicating that, after 
the late-1970s, the PIRA's pool of potential members consistently outstripped the 
178 Smith, Fightingfor Ireland?, 154. 
179 PIRA, "Extracts of the 'Staff Report'," in The J.R.A., ed. Tim Pat Coogan (London: 
HarperCollinsPublishers, 2000), 467. 
180 Jimmy Drumm, 1977, cited in: Gerry Adams, Before the Dawn: An Autobiography (London: 
Heinemann, 1996), 265. 
181 PIRA, "Extracts of the 'Staff Report'," 467. 
182 Smith, Fighting for Ireland?, 145. 
183 James M. Glover, "Appendix XVIII - Northern Ireland: Future Terrorist Trends (2 November 
1978)," in Irish Nationalism: A History of its Roots and Ideology, ed. Sean Cronin (Dublin: The 
Academy Press, 1980), 342. 
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organisation's recruitment needs. 184 From this period onwards, the organisation's 
membership would remain at approximately 300 Volunteers until the Belfast 
Agreement of 1998.185 
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Figure 1: Number of People Charged with terrorism-related 
offences, 1973-1998186 
5 ANALYSIS 
From the above account of the PIRA's regenerative experience, it appears that 
an increase in attrition played at least an equal, and arguably greater, role than a 
184 Bell, The IRA, 90-3, Charles Drake, "The Provisional IRA: A case study," Terrorism and Political 
Violence 3, no. 1 (1991): 54, Wayne G. Reilly, "The management of political violence in Quebec and 
Northern Ireland: A comparison," Terrorism and Political Violence 6, no. 1 (1994): 57. 
185 Estimates of the PIRA's strength since the late-1970s vary, but generally fall around the 300 range. 
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time period, and the approximate number of volunteers. References will be outlined after the estimates. 
Glover, 1978, 310; Smith, late-1970s, 300; Sluka, early-1980s, 300-250; Thomas, 1985, 300; English, 
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late-1980s, 100-200; Freeman, 1990s, 300. See: Drake, "The Provisional IRA," 94, English, Armed 
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Emergency Powers to Fight Terror (Westport and London: Praeger, 2003), 64, Glover, "Future 
Terrorist Trends," 343-4, Jeffrey A. Sluka, Hearts and Minds, Water and Fish: Support for the IRA and 
INLA in a Northern Ireland Ghetto (Greenwich, CT: JAi Press, 1989), 63, Smith, Fighting for 
Ireland? , 145, Jo Thomas, "The agony of Ulster," The New York Times, 10 March 1985, 6, Wright, 
Terrorist Propaganda, 221. 
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Statistics Branch, 2005. Accessed: 1 August 2005. Available from: 
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decrease in recruitment in weakening the organisation's capacity to regenerate. Three 
observations form the basis of this judgment. The first of these is that the 
deterioration of the PIRA's regenerative capacity coincided with both an increase in 
attrition and a decrease in recruitment. The second observation, meanwhile, is that, 
while this thesis is unable to quantify the rates at which the PIRA's loss of personnel 
increased and intake of recruits decreased, the language used by the literature to 
describe the organisation's attrition and recruitment during the mid-1970s suggests 
that the former grew at a rate greater than at which the latter declined. For instance, 
Bell, in one of the few analyses of Provisional recruitment, implies that, while the 
PIRA had "fewer recruits" after 1972, this reduction was not an overly-pressing issue, 
since the organisation was sill able to attract aspiring-Volunteers ("recruits still 
came"). 187 In contrast, scholars tend to depict the PIRA's loss of personnel during the 
mid-1970s in much more expansionary and consequential terms. For example: (1) 
according to Bishop and Mallie, "[a]s the [1970s] progressed it became increasingly 
hazardous to be in the IRA";188 (2) Smith describes the PIRA's rate of arrests during 
the mid-1970s as 'haemorrhaging'; 189 (3) Kelley notes that, in 1976 and 1977, the 
security forces were "sending more and more volunteers off to prison"; 190 and ( 4) a 
host of authors have highlighted how, due to the efforts of the security forces during 
the mid-1970s, the PIRA came the closest in its history to "collapse and defeat."191 
The final observation is that the PIRA's burgeoning loss of personnel appears 
to have generated greater concern within the organisation than its declining intake of 
recruits. The infamous 'Staff Report' arguably provides the best evidence of this 
seemmg contrast. Commissioned by the PIRA's GHQ in 1977 to assess the 
organisation's current position and "long-term military plans," the 'Staff Report' was 
seized by the Irish Gardai, along with the PIRA's then-chief of staff, Seamus 
Twomey, in December of the same year. 192 The 'Staff Report' is notable not only for 
the "dramatic insight" it offers "into the Provisional IRA after the setback of the 
187 Bell, The IRA, 85. 
188 Bishop and Mallie, The Provisional IRA, 254. 
189 Smith, Fighting for Ireland?, 145. 
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truce"; 193 but also for its overwhelming emphasis on attrition-related issues. Opening 
with the observation that the success of the security forces in "breaking volunteers" 
during interrogations, and the "inefficient" nature of the organisation's structure were 
"contributing to [the PIRA's] defeat," the vast remainder of the 'Staff Report' set out 
in detail how the PIRA could: (1) "return to secrecy and strict discipline"; (2) endow 
Volunteers with the psychological strength to resist interrogations; and (3) restructure 
the organisation (along cellular lines) to limit the amount of information Volunteers 
could willing and unwillingly provide the security forces. 194 Only a fraction of the 
'Staff Report' was concerned with recruitment-related issues; specifically, its 
recommendation that Sinn Fein become more active in winning "support for, and 
sympathy to, the movement."195 
In light of the above findings, the remainder of this chapter will thus seek to 
provide greater insight into why the above shifts in Provisional recruitment and 
attrition occurred. Specifically, this section will examine: (1) whether the PIRA's 
increase in attrition was the result of 'the improvement in the government's 
intelligence collection capabilities' and/or 'restricting civil liberties'; and (2) whether 
the PIRA's decrease in recruitment was the result of 'the amelioration of grievances', 
'selective government repression', and/or 'the discrediting of the insurgent actor's 
ideology'. 
5.1 AN INCREASE IN ATTRITION 
The Improvement of the Government's Intelligence Collection Capabilities 
The PIRA case provides strong support for the notion that an insurgent actor's 
loss of personnel will increase if the opposing government's ability to collect 
information about the insurgent actor improves. According to a host of scholars, at 
the outset of The Troubles, the British and Northern Ireland Governments' 
193 Taylor, Provos, 210. 
194 PIRA, "Extracts of the 'Staff Report'," 465-7. 
195 Ibid., 467. 
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intelligence capability was generally defective. 196 This was partly due to the relative-
speed of the emergence of both sectarian violence and the Provisional threat in the six 
counties. As Jeffrey observes, "[b]efore 1969 there had been very little [British] 
'intelligence' involvement in Northern Ireland at all, for the very good reason that the 
sort of threats to the state against which such personnel might be employed were 
virtually non-existent."197 However, the deficiency of the security forces' intelligence 
capability was also due to negligence on behalf of the RUC. As Charters notes, 
owing to a lack of funds, personnel and "foresight," the RUC' s "files were out of date, 
and their intelligence network in the Catholic areas badly neglected." 198 A lack of 
coordination between the British Army and the RUC soon exacerbated these initial 
problems. This was primarily the result of the British Army's general contempt for, 
and distrust of, the RUC; which many officers saw as a "shambles" and a "busted, 
discredited force." 199 
Given this unwillingness to work with the RUC and its intelligence arm 
(Special Branch), and the paucity of London's initial intelligence infrastructure in 
Northern Ireland (comprising of "one Intelligence Corps captain and one sergeant"), 
the British Army set out to dramatically expand its ability to collect and process 
information.200 The ensuing months and years witnessed an "intelligence 'gold rush"' 
as the army "poured in huge sums of money, men and effort" into its intelligence 
system. 201 However, establishing an intelligence presence from scratch is a difficult 
undertaking; especially in a hostile environment like the Nationalist areas of Northern 
Ireland, where the British Army was "a 'foreign force', unfamiliar with the area, the 
people, and the sources of information."202 Thus, it took the British Army some time 
to find its intelligence 'feet'. The best example of this learning process was the brief 
196 Bradley W.C. Bamford, "The role and effectiveness of intelligence in Northern Ireland," 
Intelligence and National Security 20, no. 4 (2005): 586, David A. Charters, "Intelligence and 
psychological warfare operations in Northern Ireland," RUSI Journal 122, no. 3 (1977): 23, Keith 
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199 Geraghty, The Irish War, 136, Hamill, Pig in the Middle, 51-2, Jeffery, "Security policy in Northern 
Ireland," 27. 
200 Jeffery, "Security policy in Northern Ireland," 26. 
201 Geraghty, The Irish War, 136, Hamill, Pig in the Middle, 52, Jeffery, "Security policy in Northern 
Ireland," 26. 
202 Bamford, "The role and effectiveness," 586, Charters, "Intelligence and psychological," 23. 
Provisional Irish Republican Army 184 
experience of the Mobile Reconnaissance Force (MRF; also known as the Military 
Reconnaissance Force). The British Army created this covert surveillance unit in late-
1971 with a desire to obtain a stream of ready-to-use contact intelligence. The MRF 
did partly achieve this goal, as well as display a flair for innovation. For example, 
one of the unit's more infamous operations involved the establishment of a laundry 
service (the 'Four Courts') in West Belfast. The MRF used this conventionally-run 
business as a cover to forensically-analyse the clothing of suspected Provisionals, and 
run high-tech and mobile surveillance equipment (disguised as a delivery van) around 
sensitive Republican areas. 203 However, the MRF had a tendency to engage in 
"piratical ventures";204 seemingly driven more by an impulse to action and a desire to 
'get at' the enemy, rather than tactical, strategic, or propagandistic concerns. 
Consequently, after the Provisionals launched a surprise attack on the Four Courts on 
2 October 1972 (resulting in the death of one British soldier) and a series of 
controversial shootings involving MRF agents, the British Army shut the unit down. 
Nevertheless, it was from this point onwards that the security forces' 
intelligence capability gradually began to improve. This was especially evident with 
regard to the security forces' ability to collect actionable intelligence. This 
improvement had four sources. The first of these was Operation Motorman, which 
allowed the British Army to expand its surveillance of the 'no go' areas - previously 
intelligence "black spots."205 This expansion consisted of both increased patrolling -
the routine, but necessary, chore of intelligence collection - and the construction of a 
fixed-base surveillance infrastructure. This was comprised largely of observation 
posts "equipped with newly-designed night-vision equipment, large telescopes fitted 
with cameras, and swift communications." 206 The British Army erected these 
observation posts extensively in nationalist areas. Adams, for instance, claims that, 
203 Martin Dillon, The Dirty War: Covert Strategies and Tactics used in Political Conflicts (New York: 
Routledge, 1990), 26-42. 
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after Motorman, the security forces constructed nine in the Andersontown area of 
Belfast alone. 207 
The second source was the influence of Brigadier Frank Kitson. After writing 
Low Intensity Operations during a fellowship at Oxford University, Kitson was 
deployed to Belfast in September 1970. He immediately set about challengirig the 
army's prevailing approach to managing the conflict in Northern Ireland-particularly 
the seemingly-common belief amongst commanders that 'intelligence' was a task best 
left to the 'spooks'. K.itson's contrary view was that the only way the British Army 
could maximise its intake of timely and accurate information was if every soldier and 
unit became actively involved in the collection of intelligence. As Bishop and Mallie 
and Hamill note, due to the successes he enjoyed with 39 Brigade in Belfast, K.itson's 
approach to intelligence collection soon spread to most other British Army units in 
Northern Ireland, and was enthusiastically embraced by General Frank King, General 
Officer Commanding (GOC) in Northern Ireland from 1973 to 1975.208 
The third source was the MRF' s replacement, 14 Intelligence company 
(commonly known as the 'Det'). Formed in early-1973, the Det's mission was "to 
infiltrate republican and loyalist areas and become part of the landscape in order to 
watch and track the enemy."209 The Det soon developed a reputation for secrecy and 
professionalism; pointedly avoiding the 'piratical ventures' and controversies that had 
plagued the MRF.210 More importantly, the Det was also highly-effective. As Taylor 
states: 
In terms of results, a single 'operator' was said to be worth a Company ofa hundred 
regular soldiers. As the years went by . . . the 'Det' became an even more lethal 
weapon in the counter-terrorist armoury of the 'Brits' and played a huge part in the 
war of attrition against the IRA. 211 
The final source was the Provisionals' own security deficiencies. The first of 
these was the PIRA's tendency to base its brigades and companies in the 'cities and 
207 Adams, Before the Dawn, 211. 
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neighbourhoods from which its members came. This not only meant that most 
Volunteers were well-known to their local communities; but also that the security 
forces had an easier time linking Provisional units with their violent acts. 212 The 
second PIRA weakness was the average Provisionals' seeming disdain for security. 
As Coogan states: 
One only had to stroll into an IRA haunt like the Prisoners Defence Fund Club in 
Andersontown and listen to the audience join in a rousing rebel chorus to the music 
of the W olfehounds or some other group ... to tell where the spectators came from -
they used to raise their aims in the air, swaying in time to the music, holding up one, 
two or three fingers on each hand to show which battalion they belonged to, 
supported, or lived under the aegis of. In either case a useful starting point for any 
police agent present. 213 
However, the PIRA's most pressing security deficiency was the organisation's 
structure.214 As aforementioned, at this inception in December 1969, the Provisionals 
adopted the IR.A's long -standing hierarchical pyramid structure, which was formed 
along traditional military lines. Although this organisational framework had provided 
the dissident Republicans with a sense of continuity, it had also proved to heighten 
their susceptibility to presentation by spies and informers. Specifically, by organising 
Volunteers into large groups (i.e. companies and brigades), the PIRA's military 
structure increased the potential amount of information that a 'tout' could supply the 
authorities. As the mid-1970s progressed, the security forces were able to take 
increasing advantage of this vulnerability. Both the Det and Special Branch expanded 
their efforts to recruit informers within the PIRA; an undertaking that accelerated 
during the 1975 ceasefire.215 In addition to this, the RUC became progressively more 
adept at obtaining information from captured Volunteers. Although its interrogation 
methods attracted growing criticism during the mid- and late-1970s,216 the RUC's 
cross-examination centre at Castlereagh was, nevertheless, "the engine room of the 
212 Bamford, "The role and effectiveness," 591. 
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Government's 'criminalization' policy, churning out the confessions that put scores of 
IRA men (and loyalists) behind bars."217 This judgment was shared by a number of 
Provisionals. For instance, the PIRA's Staff Report (famously seized along with the 
capture of Seamus Twomey in 1977) acknowledged that Volunteers were being 
'broken' while serving either three- or seven-day detention orders. 218 Similarly, a 
Volunteer quoted by Moloney stated that: "Men were breaking in the police stations. 
We'd hear of people handing over twenty-five to thirty names at a time. In the first 
twelve to eighteen months of Castlereagh we suffered great damage."219 
Further support for the notion that the PIRA's attrition increased during the 
mid-1970s because the authorities' intelligence collection capabilities improved is 
derived from the twin observations that: (1) a number of the Provisionals' reforms of 
the late- l 970s were implemented with the intention of hampering the British 
Government's ability to collect intelligence; and (2) these reforms appear to be linked 
to the decline and eventual stabilisation of the PIRA's loss of personnel from 1978 
onwards. The seemingly-most consequential of these reforms was the PIRA's 
adoption of a cellular structure in 1977. This modification primarily involved the 
PIRA channelling its 'active' Volunteers (i.e. those responsible for conducting violent 
operations) into Active Service Units (ASUs). Ideally, each ASU was to comprise 
four Volunteers; one of which was the cell's Officer in Command (OC).220 These 
ASUs were also intended to be autonomous (i.e. responsible for arranging their own 
finances, safe houses and transport) and specialise in a particular type of action (e.g. 
intelligence work, "sniping ... , executions, bombings, robberies, etc."). 221 
Furthermore, each ASU was to function under the principle of compartmentalisation; 
with operational information restricted to a 'need-to-know' basis, identities limited to 
pseudonyms, and the cell's contact with the broader organisation confined to a link 
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between the OC and a Brigade Adjutant. As the last condition implies, the 
Provisionals' new cellular structure did not replace their "old system of organisation"; 
but rather, was "superimposed upon it."222 Nevertheless, the PIRA's reorganisation 
did transform its companies and brigades, with the former now responsible for various 
support and policing duties, and the latter for organising and directing the companies 
and ASUs.223 The apex of the PIRA's traditional structure (i.e. the Army Council, 
Executive and General Convention), meanwhile, remained more or less unaffected by 
the reorganisation. 
The primary objective of the PIRA's adoption of a cellular structure was "to 
improve security by limiting the amount of information known by individual 
volunteers"; which would, as a consequence, restrict the amount of information an 
individual Volunteer could willingly or unwillingly provide the security forces. 224 Of 
course, the PIRA's ASUs ''were not watertight"; as attested by the 'supergrass' trials 
of the early-1980s - during which scores of Provisionals were imprisoned on the word 
of a small number of informers who divulged the identities of their compatriots in 
exchange for immunity from prosecution.225 Nevertheless, it does appear that "after 
the reorganisation the average member's detailed knowledge of the membership and 
activities of the rest of the organisation was severely constrained" and this, in tum, 
helped the PIRA reduce the "damaging losses" it had been suffering through 
informants and interrogations over the previous five years.226 
The PIRA's second 'intelligence-hampering' reform was the development of a 
training manual, the Green Book. A "cunningly thought out mixture of philosophy 
and guide to action,"227 the Green Book not only contained extensive tracts about the 
history, ideology and strategy of the Republican movement; but it also sought to 
improve security discipline within the PIRA and "indoctrinat[ e] volunteers with the 
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psychological strength to resist interrogation." 228 The Green Book attempted to 
achieve the former objective by providing Volunteers with a series of basic 
regulations about how they should conduct themselves. For instance, the manual 
states: 
The most important thing is security, that means you: 
DON'T TALK IN PUBLIC PLACES: 
YOU DON'T TELL YOUR FAMILY, FRIENDS, GIRL-FRIENDS OR WORK-
MATES THAT YOU ARE A MEMBER OF THE IRA. DON'T EXPRESS VIEWS 
ABOUT MILITARY MATTERS, IN OTHER WORDS YOU SAY NOTHING to 
any person. Don't be seen in public marches, demonstrations or protests. Don't be 
seen in the company of known Republicans, don't frequent known Republican 
houses, Your prime duty is to remain unknown to the enemy forces and the public at 
large.229 
The Green Book sought to help Volunteers withstand interrogations in two 
respects. First, the Green Book informed aspiring-Provisionals about the trials 
associated with membership in the PIRA. For example: "It [the PIRA] enters into 
every aspect of your life. It invades the privacy of your home life, it fragments your 
family and friends, in other words claims your total allegiance"; and "all people 
wishing to join the Army must fully realize that when life is being taken, that very 
well could mean their own."230 The Green Book also stressed the need for members 
to adhere to Republican and Socialist principles ("[b ]efore any potential volunteers 
decides to join the Irish Republican Army ... he should examine his political motives 
bearing in mind that the Army are intent on creating a Socialist Republic") and accept 
the necessity of using violence to achieve the organisation's objectives. 231 The 
intention here was that, by providing such information, the Green Book would deter 
all but the truly committed; in other words, those who were thought (amongst other 
things) to be less likely to 'crack' if caught and interrogated. 
Second, the Green Book supplied Volunteers with a comprehensive account of 
what they could expect if they were caught by the security forces. Specifically, the 
Green Book focused on: (1) the likely actions of the police and the interrogators (with 
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particular emphasis on possible forms of physical and psychological torture to which 
a Volunteer may be subjected); and (2) the motives and strategies behind the 
interrogators' actions ("[t]he best defence in anti-interrogation techniques is to 
understand the techniques as practiced by the police force"). 232 The purpose of this 
information was to minimise ''the surprise element that interrogators used, and thus 
place activists in a more confident and secure footing."233 The Green Book also 
provided its readers with a stream of advice on how to endure interrogations. For 
example: 
The most important thing to bear in mind when arrested is that you are a volunteer of 
a revolutionary army, that you have been captured by an enemy force, that your 
cause is a just one, that you are right and that the enemy is wrong and that as a 
soldier you have taken the change expected of a soldier and that there is nothing to 
be ashamed of in being captured .... 
This cannot be overstressed: where arrested SAY NOTHING ... 
Another important point to be remembered and one which is extremely important, 
DON'T GET INVOLVED IN A POLITICAL CONVERSATION.234 
By late-1978 and early-1979, the Green Book had become a fixture of the 
PIRA's recruitment process, and required reading for new and current members 
alike.235 As Sarma notes, "[i]t is difficult to estimate the importance of [the Green 
Book]," especially its impact on the PIRA's rate of attrition.236 However, the training 
manual does appear to have: (1) "strengthened" internal discipline "a great deal";237 
and (2) "minimised the surprise element that interrogators utilised, and thus placed 
activists in a more confident and secure footing.'.238 Consequently, it is likely that the 
Green Book contributed to the PIRA's declining loss of personnel from the late-1970s 
onwards. 
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In summary, the relationship between the British Government's intelligence 
collection capabilities and the PIRA's attrition appears strong; given that when the 
former improved, the latter increased, and that when the Provisionals sought to hinder 
the former, the latter decreased. 
Restricting Civil Liberties 
Unlike both the Canadian and Uruguayan authorities during their respective 
campaigns against the FLQ and MLN-T, the British and Northern Ireland 
Governments restricted civil liberties for essentially the entirety of their twenty-eight 
year struggle with the PIRA. Three legislate measures formed the basis of this near-
permanent curtailment of freedoms and protections. The first of these was the Civil 
Authorities (Special Powers) Act (Northern Ireland). Enacted by the recently-
inaugurated Northern Ireland Parliament on 7 April 1922 in response to growing 
sectarian violence in the six counties (a by-product of the ongoing Irish Civil War), 
the Special Powers Act: provided the "minister for home affairs, and members of the 
police force acting at his discretion . . . virtually unlimited power to search for and 
seize contraband and to detain those suspected of subversive behaviour"; 239 
empowered the civil authority to "prohibit the circulation of any newspaper for any 
specified period"; and authorised the government "to take all such steps and issue all 
such orders as may be necessary for preserving the peace and maintaining order."240 
Although the duration of the act was initially limited to one year, Stormont repeatedly 
renewed it before eventually making it permanent in 1933. It was under the Special 
Powers Act that the security forces introduced Internment in August 1971. 
The second legislative measure was the Northern Ireland (Emergency 
Provisions) Act. Ratified on 8 August 1973, this statute was born out of an attempt by 
the British Government to reform the Special Powers Act; primarily from a utilitarian 
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perspective. 241 Thus, the Emergency Provisions Act retained many aspects of the 
Special Powers Act - such as allowing indefinite internment (though only at the 
request of the SSNI and subject to limited judicial review) and search for and seizure 
of proscribed goods without a warrant - while also introducing a range of new 
regulations.242 These included: suspending the "right to trial by jury"; allowing the 
security forces to detain individuals for up to three days before deciding whether "to 
bring them to trial, release them, or intern them"; and relaxing the "evidentiary 
requirements to allow confessions obtained under interrogations to be sufficient for 
conviction. "243 
The third legislative measure was the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary 
Provisions) Act. Enacted on 29 November 1974, this statute was Westminster's 
response to a series of OIRA and PIRA bombings that rocked Great Britain during the 
early-1970s - culminating with the Birmingham pub bombings of 21November1974 
that killed twenty-one people.244 Unlike the Emergency Provisions Act, which it was 
in force alongside, the Prevention of Terrorism Act applied to the entire United 
Kingdom and not just Northern Ireland. The act's primarily regulations included: 
allowing the police to detain 'suspected terrorists' for up to seven days for 
questioning; empowering the civil authority to exclude 'suspected terrorists', even if 
they were British citizens, from entering Great Britain; and permitting the police to 
"search and make arrests without warrant."245 
241 A key document in this regard is the Diplock Report, which the British Government commissioned 
in October 1972 to consider "what arrangements for the administration of justice in Northern Ireland 
could be made in order to deal more effectively with terrorist organisations . . . otherwise than by 
Internment." "Report of the Commission to consider legal procedures to deal with terrorist activities in 
Northern Ireland (Diplock Report)," (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1972), para. 1. The 
recommendations of the Dip lock Report eventually formed the basis of the Emergency Provisions Act. 
242 Laura K. Donohue, "Civil Liberties, Terrorism, and Liberal Democracy: Lessons from the United 
Kingdom," in BCSIA Discussion Paper 2000-05 (John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard 
University, 2000), 4, Gerard Hogan and Clive Walker, Political Violence and the Law in Ireland 
(Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1989), 27. 
243 Finn, Constitutions in Crisis, 88-9, 99-109, Freeman, Freedom or Security, 59. 
244 Clive Walker, The Prevention of Terrorism in British Law (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 1986), 23. 
245 Finn, Constitutions in Crisis, 119-25, Freeman, Freedom or Security, 59, Prevention of Terrorism 
(Temporary Provisions) Act, Conflict Archive on the Internet (CAIN), 1974. Accessed: 13 April 2006. 
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There is little support for the notion that the PIRA's attrition increased during 
the mid-1970s because the British and Northern Ireland Governments' restricted civil 
liberties. On the one hand, the timing of the enactment of both the Emergency 
Provisions and Prevention of Terrorism Acts (i.e. near the beginning of the PIRA's 
attritional problems) suggests that a relationship may have existed between the 
authorities' restriction of civil liberties and the Provisionals' burgeoning loss of 
personnel. However, this linkage is undercut by two observations. The first of these 
is that, prior to mid-1972, the authorities' restriction of civil liberties under the 
Special Powers Act did not have a discernible impact on the PIRA's attrition. For 
instance, even though the security forces detained over 1, 100 people during the first 
eleven months of Internment (August 1971 - June 1972), the vast majority of these 
(over 80 percent) "were not members of' the PIRA and were eventually released 
without charge. 246 The second observation is that, as discussed (and demonstrated in 
Figure 1) above, from 1978 onwards, the PIRA's loss of personnel first abated, before 
eventually stabilising - despite the continued presence of the Emergency Provisions 
and Prevention of Terrorism Acts and their respective curtailments of individual 
freedoms. The apparent weakness of the relationship between the restriction of civil 
liberties and the PIRA's attrition before mid-1972 and after 1977 suggests that the 
relationship between the restriction of civil liberties and the PIRA's burgeoning loss 
of personnel from mid-1972 to 1977 was similarly weak. 
5.2 A DECREASE IN RECRUITMENT 
The Amelioration of Grievances 
There is mixed support for the notion that the PIRA's intake of recruits 
declined during. the mid-1970s because the organisation's grievances were 
ameliorated. On the one hand, the PIRA's recruitment problems were preceded by the 
rectification of one of the organisation's highlighted grievances. Specifically, the 
British Government's decision to impose Direct Rule in March 1972 brought an end 
246 Spjut, "Internment and detention," 716. 
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to the unionist-dominated government in Stormont and its perceived institutionalised 
discrimination against the Catholic minority. The apparent link between the 
amelioration of this grievance and the PIRA' s declining recruitment is further 
strengthened (though not beyond doubt) by the observation that the fall of Stormont 
brought about a noticeable change in Catholic opinion. As authors like Moloney and 
Smith note, while "[ m ]ost Catholics, moderate as well as militant," celebrated 
Stormont's abolition, this celebration came with "an important qualification. Many 
Catholics believed that, having achieved this success, the IRA should then at least 
review its options," such as calling a ceasefire. 247 This attitudinal shift would not 
likely have been conducive for the FIR.A's ability to attract new recruits. 
However, while it is possible to draw a tentative link between the fall of 
Stormont and the PIRA's declining recruitment, it is important to note that the PIRA's 
other highlighted grievances remained more or less unchanged as the 1970s 
progressed. Consider, first of all, the Provisionals' overarching grievance, the British 
presence in, and control over, Northern Ireland. This condition not only persisted, but 
arguably intensified, during the mid-1970s. This is evident from three perspectives. 
Politically, the mid-1970s witnessed the apparent solidification of Northern Ireland's 
position within the United Kingdom, as: (1) the British Government, in an attempt to 
mollify unionists after the abolition of Stormont, frequently reaffirmed its 
commitment to the 'consent principle' (i.e. "that there would be no change to the 
constitutional status of Northern Ireland without the consent of the majority of its 
people");248 and (2) the 'Border Poll' of March 1973, which saw 57.5 percent of the 
electorate vote in favour of Northern Ireland remaining as part of the United Kingdom, 
demonstrated that such consent would unlikely be forthcoming well into the 
foreseeable future. 249 Militarily, as Figure 2 illustrates, the mid- l 970s represented the 
peak of British Army troop levels in the six counties. It was also during this period -
specifically, in January 1976 - that the British Government formally announced the 
247 Moloney, A Secret History, 112, Smith, Fighting for Ireland?, 104. 
248 Michael J. Cunningham, British Government Policy in Northern Ireland, 1969-2000 (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 2001), 79, Neumann, Britain's Long War, 71. 
249 Fionnuala McKenna. Referendum ('Border Poll~ (NJ), Thursday 8 March 1973, Conflict Archive on 
the Internet (CAIN), 2007. Accessed: 1 February 2007. Available from: 
http://cain.ulst.ac. uk/issues/politics/election/refl 973 .htrn. 
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deployment of the SAS to Northern Ireland to assist the local security forces manage 
the PIRA threat. Last of all, from an economic perspective, the mid-1970s witnessed 
"a major expansion in the British state's role in the [Northern Irish] economy."25° For 
instance, in the 1969/70 financial year, the British Government paid £612 million251 to 
cover the difference between public revenue and expenditure in the six counties; a 
figure which represented roughly 5 percent of Northern Ireland's Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP).252 However, by the 1976/77 financial year, London's subvention to 
Northern Ireland had essentially quadrupled to £2,279 million, and now represented 
over 20 percent of the six counties' GDP.253 
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Figure 2: British Army Strength in Northern Ireland, 1969-1998254 
A further of the PIRA's identified grievances which remained more or less 
unchanged during the mid-1970s was the British Army and RUC's use of 
indiscriminate repression. Although the pattern of the security forces' repression did 
change from 1969-72 to 1972-77, the British Army and RUC nevertheless persisted in 
targeting large numbers of people who were not directly connected with the PIRA or 
250 Ruane and Todd, The Dynamics, 158. 
251 Both this figure and the subsequent are in 1992 prices. 
252 Fionnuala McKenna and Martin Melaugh. Table NI-EC0-02: Subvention (£ million) to Northern 
Ireland from the United Kingdom, 1966-67 to 1992-93, Conflict Archive on the Internet (CAIN), 1993. 
Accessed: 28 October 2006. Available from: http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/ni/economy.htm#02, Ruane and 
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253 McKenna and Melaugh. Table NI-EC0-02, Ruane and Todd, The Dynamics, 158-9. 
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Provisional Irish Republican Army 196 
any other paramilitary group. This is evident from three sources. The first of these is 
Sluka' s contention that, while the period following Operation Motorman did not 
witness a repeat of such defining provocations as the 'Rape of the Falls' or 'Bloody 
Sunday', the security forces still continued to subject the inhabitants of working-class 
Catholic districts to more mundane forms of indiscriminate repression. These 
included: "the constant presence of heavily armed and sometimes overly aggressive 
troops and policemen"; "constant surveillance, identity checks, census taking, and 
other forms of intelligence gathering activities"; and "petty and not so petty acts of 
harassment, verbal abuse, vandalism, and brutality by policeman and British soldiers 
on patrol and at checkpoints."255 According to Sluka, the accumulation of these 
"everyday" acts of repression did "as much in the long run to alienate public opinion" 
as the security forces' "larger and more systematic actions did."256 
The second source is that Internment, despite the best intentions of the British 
Government, continued to detain "many innocent people" until the program was 
eventually phased-out in 1975. 257 When London assumed direct control over 
Northern Irish affairs in March 1972, it was quick to realise that, under the Stormont 
Government, Internment had not been a surgical instrument. 258 Thus, the British 
Government introduced a number of safeguards in an attempt to ensure that only those 
individuals who posed a genuine threat to security in the six counties would be 
interned. These safeguards included: entrusting the initial decision to detain a person 
without charge to the SSNI; and guaranteeing all internees a review of their detention 
by a relatively-independent Commissioner after twenty-eight days.259 However, while 
these reforms undoubtedly represented an improvement over the excesses witnessed 
during 1971, they nevertheless failed to make Internment "sufficiently discerning."260 
As Spjut highlights, over 30 percent of internees whose detention came before a 
Commissioner for review in 1973 were summarily released; indicating that their 
255 Sluka, Hearts and Minds, 171. 
256 Ibid., 172. 
257 Spjut, "Internment and detention," 731. 
258 For instance, the Diplock Report stated that the reintroduction oflnternment in August 1971 "led to 
the arrest and detention of a number of persons against whom suspicion was founded on inadequate and 
inaccurate information." "Diplock Report," para. 15. 
259 David R. Lowry, "Internment; Detention without trial in Northern Ireland," Human Rights 5, no. 3 
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relationship to the PIRA or other paramilitary groups was minimal.261 Lowry even 
suggests that this 30 percent rate of release was possibly deflated, given the low 
evidentiary requirements for Commissioners to recommend continued detention, and 
that the ability of internees to "present a defense" was hamstrung by their lack of 
rights to know "the precise nature of the charge against [them]," or "the facts upon 
which the charge [was] based. "262 
The final source is the seeming abuse by the security forces of their powers to 
detain people for up to seven days for questioning without a warrant. The British 
Government bestowed these powers on the British Army and the RUC through 
section 14 of the Emergency Provisions Act and section 12 of the Prevention of 
Terrorism Act. As Table 5 illustrates, the security forces detained people under these 
sections from 1975 to 1978 (the first years for which statistics are available) at a level 
that greatly exceeded the number of people who were eventually charged with 
terrorism-related offences. 
Year s.14 (EPA) s.12 (PTA) Persons charged with terrorism-related offences 
1975 4,141 8 1,197 
1976 8,321 246 1,276 
1977 5,878 162 1,308 
1978 3692 155 843 
Table 5: Numbers of Individuals Detained under the Emergency 
Provisions and Prevention of Terrorism Acts, and Charged with 
Terrorism-Related Offences, 1975-78.263 
Selective Government Repression 
There is little support for the notion that the PIRA's recruitment declined 
during the mid-1970s because of selective government repression. Two observations 
form the basis of this judgment. The first of these is, as discussed in detail above, the 
authorities' use of repression from mid-1972 to 1977 was not selective. The second 
observation is that, during the 1970s and early-1980s (if not the entire twenty-eight 
years of The Troubles), the use of repression by the British Army, the RUC, and the 
261 Spjut, "Internment and detention," 722. 
262 Lowry, "Internment," 305. 
263 Hogan and Walker, Political Violence, 55-6, PSNI. Number of Persons Charged. 
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UDR appears to have facilitated (rather than hindered) recruitment into the PIRA. 
Support for this observation is drawn from two sources. First, Provisionals, in 
discussing why they joined the PIRA, tend to highlight the role played by security 
force repression. For instance, after interview twenty-seven republicans who joined 
either the PIRA or PSF between 1969 and 1984, White concludes that the "common 
experience . . . of state violence" - either against ''their families, neighbours, 
friends, ... or themselves" - was "the essential catalyst in the collective recruitment of 
post-1969 Republicans."264 Likewise, English quotes a recruit from the early-1970s 
who states: "Why did I become involved in the IRA? It was because of a process of 
British state repression as clearly distinct from any sort of attachment to republican 
ideology."265 
Second, ethnographies conducted in working-class areas of Belfast (one of the 
PIRA's primary recruiting grounds) reveal that security force repression was an 
important drive of support for the PIRA. For example, Burton, who lived in and 
studied the Short Strand between September 1972 and April 1973, observed that: (1) 
"community support for the IRA" was not static, but rather, fluctuated in reaction to 
external events; and (2) "[ o ]ffensive and aggressive British activity, whether or not in 
response to IRA activity, had the effect in the community of tilting the balance of 
allegiance towards the Provisionals. "266 Similarly, Sluka, who undertook fieldwork in 
the Divis Flats during 1981, noted that "[t]he actions of the Security Forces in 
Northern Ireland" - ranging from Bloody Sunday to the "everyday acts of harassment 
and abuse by individual soldiers" - "have done as much, if not more, to sway public 
support towards the IRA and [Irish National Liberation Army] as anything done by 
the guerrillas themselves."267 
Discrediting the Insurgent Actor's Ideology 
The PIRA case provides some support for the notion that an insurgent actor's 
recruitment will decline if its ideology is discredited. First of all, there is evidence 
264 White, Provisional Irish Republicans, 65, 171. 
265 English, Armed Struggle, 123. 
266 Burton, The Politics of Legitimacy, 85-8. 
267 Sluka, Hearts and Minds, 172. 
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that the PIRA' s recruitment problems during the mid- l 970s did coincide with a 
contraction in public approval for the organisation's goal of establishing a sovereign, 
thirty-two county republic. For instance, in his examination of the link between 
terrorism and public opinion, Hewitt collated a series of surveys that measured 
Northern Irish attitudes towards the prospect of a united Ireland. The results from 
these polls (outlined in Figure 3) reveal an apparent collapse in Catholic support for 
Irish unity from 1973 to 1976. Hewitt links this plunge to the attempts at 
constitutional reform (such as the creation of a new Northern Irish Assembly, a 
'power-sharing' executive, and a Council of Ireland) which dominated the politics of 
the six counties during the mid- l 970s, and the seeming favourable opportunities these 
reforms offered the nationalist community. 268 Likewise, the partial recovery of 
northern Catholic support for a united Ireland that is evident during the late-1970s can 
be interpreted as a reaction to the forceful rejection of the aforementioned reforms by 
both the PIRA and, more importantly, a seeming majority of northern Protestants. 
The epitome of this Protestant rejectionism was the Ulster Workers' Council (UWC) 
strike of May 197 4, which brought the six counties to an economic standstill, and led 
to the eventual demise of the Assembly and its power-sharing executive. 
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Furthermore, it appears that the PIRA's recruitment problems also coincided 
with a contraction in northern Catholic acceptance of the utility of the PIRA's armed 
struggle. According to authors like Kelley and Smith, as the 1970s progressed and the 
"British gave no sign that they were preparing to pull out," it became increasingly 
clear to the Catholic community that, despite the PIRA's frequent claims of imminent 
victory, the organisation's strategy of violence was "completely fail[ing] to secure its 
objectives."270 As a consequence of this and such factors as the continued threat 
posed by loyalist killers and the oppressive nature of the PIRA's policing of the 
ghettoes, a sense of 'war-weariness' emerged amongst northern Catholics. The most 
prominent manifestation of this despondency was the emergence of the 'Peace 
People' in August 1976.271 Formed by two Catholic women from Belfast in the wake 
of the tragic death of three children, the Peace People sought the end of paramilitary 
violence in the six counties.272 During August and September of 1976, marches in 
Belfast and Dublin organised by the group attracted approximately 40,000 people 
from across the sectarian divide.273 
The seeming popularity of the Peace People amongst northern Catholics, and 
the growing war-weariness that the group represented, alarmed the PIRA. 274 The 
organisation's response, beyond public criticism and denigration of the Peace People, 
was to introduce the two strategic reforms of 'politicisation' and the 'Long War'. 
Regarding the former, the PIRA hoped that, by unleashing Sinn Fein, the organisation 
would not only become more responsive to the needs of the Catholic community, but 
also be able to educate 'the people' about the importance of its campaign, and how 
Provisional violence was a "direct outgrowth" of Catholic suffering in the six 
27° Kelley, The Longest War, 199, Smith, Fighting for Ireland?, 136. 
271 Bell, The Secret Army, 428-30, Bishop and Mallie, The Provisional IRA, 228-30, Brendan Lynn, 
"Tactic or principle? The evolution of Republican thinking on abstentionism in Ireland, 1970-1998," 
Irish Political Studies 17, no. 2 (2002): 77. 
272 The three children were killed (and their mother, Anne Maguire, seriously injured) on 10 August 
1976 after they were hit by an out-of-control car; the driver of which (Danny Lennon, a member of the 
PIRA) had moments earlier been shot and killed by a British Army patrol in pursuit. 
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counties. 275 With regard to the latter, the PIRA sought to reframe how northern 
Catholics judged the effectiveness of the organisation's armed struggle. Previously, 
the PIRA had claimed that its campaign of violence would be able to achieve the 
organisation's goals rapidly; promising victory 'just around the comer'. However, the 
problem with this assertion was that when the PIRA's goals were not achieved rapidly 
- or, for that matter, did not even appear close to realisation - the efficacy of the 
organisation's violence was called into question. The Provisionals thus sought to 
redress this issue by linking their armed struggle not to 'imminent victory'; but rather, 
a long haul of indeterminate duration. This new frame allowed the PIRA to persist 
with its contention that violence was the most efficient means of begetting Ireland's 
reunification, while excusing for the fact that the organisation's armed struggle had 
not yet achieved this goal. 
6 CONCLUSION 
The primary objective of this chapter has been to uncover why the PIRA's 
previously-robust capacity for regeneration weakened during the mid-1970s. It 
sought to achieve this by first examining the political and strategic environments in 
which the Provisionals arose and pursued their campaign. Second, this chapter 
examined the PIRA's regenerative experience from the organisation's inception in 
late-1969 to the late-1970s and beyond. It is clear from this investigation that an 
increase in attrition played at least an equal, and arguably greater, role than a decrease 
in recruitment in weakening the PIRA' s capacity to regenerate. This finding is at 
odds with the prevailing view in the conflict studies literature that a declining intake 
of recruits is more important than a burgeoning loss of personnel in bringing about the 
deterioration of an insurgent actor's regenerative capacity. 
Third, this chapter examined whether the PIRA's attrition increased during the 
mid-1970s because of 'the improvement of the government's intelligence collection 
capabilities' and/or 'the restriction of civil liberties'. Regarding the former, this 
chapter found that: (1) the British authorities' ability to collect information about the 
275 Smith, Fighting for Ireland? , 14 7. 
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Provisionals improved from mid-1972 to 1977; (2) this enhancement seems to have 
contributed to the PIRA's burgeoning loss of personnel over the same period; and (3) 
the Provisionals appear to have reduced their attrition from the late-1970s onwards by, 
in part, hampering the British Government's ability to collect intelligence about the 
insurgent actor. These findings support the literature's emphasis on enhancing 
intelligence collection capabilities as a means of increasing insurgent attrition; but 
also suggest that, due to the interdependent nature of insurgencies, any improvement 
in a government's intelligence collection capabilities is likely to be only temporary in 
nature. 
With regard to the latter, this chapter observed that, since the British and 
Northern Ireland Governments' restriction of civil liberties prior to mid-1972 and 
after 1977 had seemingly no impact on the PIRA' s rate of attrition, it is likely that the 
relationship between the authorities' restriction of civil liberties and the Provisionals' 
burgeoning loss of personnel from mid-1972 to 1977 was similarly weak. These 
results call into question the validity of the notion that a government can improve its 
ability to arrest and kill members of an insurgent actor by restricting civil liberties. 
Finally, this chapter examined whether the PIRA's recruitment declined 
because of 'the amelioration of grievances', the use of 'selective government 
repression', and/or 'the discrediting of the insurgent actor's ideology'. Regarding the 
first, this chapter found that, while the PIRA's recruitment problems did coincide with 
the rectification of one of the organisation's grievances (i.e. the fall of Stormont), the 
PIRA's other major grievances remained more or less unchanged during the period 
when the organisation's recruitment declined. This supports the conclusion from the 
previous chapters that ameliorating grievances is not a necessary condition for 
reducing an insurgent actor's intake ofrecruits. 
With regard to 'selective government repression', this chapter observed that 
the British and Northern Ireland Governments' use ofrepression: (1) was not selective; 
and (2) appears to have facilitated, rather than deterred, recruitment into the PIRA. 
These results call into question the validity of 'selectiveness' as an indicator of 
whether a government's use ofrepression will or will not have a deterrent effect. 
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Last of all, in reference to 'discrediting the insurgent actor's ideology', this 
chapter found that there is some evidence the PIRA's recruitment declined during the 
mid-1970s because public approval for the insurgent actor's goal of a united Ireland, 
and the utility of the actor's armed struggle contracted. This finding suggests that a 
link does exist between public approval for an insurgent actor's ideology and the 
strength of the actor's intake of recruits. 
CHAPTER SIX 
CONCLUSION 
For an 'insurgent actor' like al-Qaeda, Jemaah Islamiah, or Jaish al-Mahdi, 
there are many factors which can affect the likely intensity and success of its 
campaign. These include: the group's access to resources, the proficiency of its 
leadership, and the extent of its territorial control. However, perhaps one of the most 
important factors is the strength of the insurgent actor's capacity to regenerate (i.e. its 
ability to replace lost personnel with new recruits). While a strong regenerative 
capacity will allow the group to withstand opposing security force pressure and (at the 
very least) persist with its 'armed struggle'; a weak regenerative capacity will trigger a 
contraction in the group's membership - threatening its ability to conduct operations 
and, eventually, the very existence of the group itself. Thus, from a government 
perspective, attempting to weaken an insurgent actor's capacity to regenerate is a 
seemingly intuitive and attractive means of 'managing', if not outright defeating, the 
insurgent actor. However, being able to affect insurgent regeneration is far from a 
simple undertaking; one that a number of governments - including, most notably, the 
Bush Administration in relation to al-Qaeda - have struggled to realise. 
The primary objective of this thesis was to provide scholars and officials with 
a greater understanding of how governments can favourably influence the capacity to 
regenerate of an insurgent actor. It sought to achieve this by exploring: why do the 
regenerative capacities of insurgent actors weaken? The exploration of this question 
took the form of a two-level examination of three insurgent actors whose capacity to 
regenerate weakened in the past - namely, the Front de liberation du Quebec (FLQ) 
of Canada, the Movimiento de Liberaci6n Nacional - Tupamaros (MLN-T) of 
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Uruguay, and the Provisional Irish Republican Anny (PIRA) of Northern Ireland. 
The findings and implications (for both academic research and policy-making) of 
these two levels will be discussed below. 
AN INCREASE IN ATTRITION VERSUS A DECREASE IN RECRUITMENT 
At the first level of its examination, this thesis investigated the extent to which 
the regenerative capacities of the FLQ, MLN-T, and PIRA weakened because of an 
increase in attrition and a decrease in recruitment. The primary objective of this 
analysis was: (1) to uncover whether a declining intake of recruits played a lesser, 
equal, or greater role than a burgeoning loss of personnel in weakening the capacities 
to regenerate of the three insurgent actors; and (2) in tum, to shed greater light on the 
broader validity of the prevailing view in the conflict studies literature that a decrease 
in recruitment is more important than an increase in attrition in effecting the corrosion 
of an insurgent actor's capacity to regenerate. 
The relative strength of a burgeoning loss of personnel and a declining intake 
of recruits as catalysts of regenerative decay varied between the FLQ case, on the one 
hand, and the MLN-T and PIRA cases, on the other. With regard to the former, a 
decrease in recruitment clearly played the greater role in weakening the movement's 
capacity to regenerate. Although the FLQ's attrition in the wake of the 'October 
Crisis' of 1970 was considerable, it was no more considerable than what the 
movement had experienced prior to the kidnappings of Cross and Laporte. The only 
real difference was that, while aspiring:felquistes repeatedly stepped forward to 
replace lost members and networks before October 1970, they gradually stopped 
doing so after - leading to the movement's eventual demise by the end of 1972. 
Conversely, an increase in attrition appears to have played at least an equal, 
and arguably greater, role than a decrease in recruitment in weakening the MLN-T's 
capacity to regenerate. Three observations form the basis of this judgment. The first 
of these is that the deterioration of the MLN-T's regenerative capacity coincided with 
both an increase in attrition and a decrease in recruitment. For instance, although the 
MLN-T suffered a steadily increasing rate of attrition prior to April 1972 (with the 
number of arrested Tupamaros rising from an average of three a month in 1968 to 
thirteen in early-1972), it was easily able to offset these losses through the 
organisation's bountiful intake of new recruits. However, following the Tupamaro 
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assassinations of 14 April 1972 and the Uruguayan Government's declaration of a 
'state of internal war' the following day, the MLN-T experienced not only a 
contraction in its recruitment, but also a dramatic increase in the number of arrested 
and killed Tupamaros that it had to replace. Buffeted between these two trends, the 
MLN-T first began to shrink, before disappearing entirely from the Uruguayan scene. 
The second observation is that the MLN-T's loss of personnel seemingly 
increased at a rate greater than that at which the organisation's intake of recruits 
declined. This is largely evident from the contrast between the apparent lack of 
urgency with which the MLN-T framed its recruitment problems during 1972, and the 
unbridled ferocity of the organisation's losses following the 'state of internal war' -
with the average number of arrested Tupamaros rising from four a week over the six 
months before April 1972, to an average of thirty-nine a week over the six months 
after. The third observation, meanwhile, is that the MLN-T's burgeoning loss of 
personnel appears to have had a greater impact on the organisation's decision-making 
process than its declining intake of recruits. This is evident from the utter 
disorientation seemingly engendered by the MLN-T's mounting losses from April 
1972 onwards (as Arraras states, the "Tupamaros experienced internal chaos as the 
Armed Forces dismantled their organization"); 1 compared to the relative apathy 
generated by the organisation's recruitment problems over the same period. 
Similar to the MLN-T, an increase in attrition appears to have played at least 
an equal, and arguably greater, role than a decrease in recruitment in weakening the 
PIRA's capacity to regenerate. Three observations underlie this assessment. The first 
of these is that the deterioration of the PIRA's regenerative capacity coincided with 
both a burgeoning loss of personnel and a declining intake of recruits. For instance, 
during the first thirty months of its campaign, the PIRA was virtually impervious to 
security force pressure. Yet, in the months and years following 'Operation 
Motorman' in July 1972, the Provisionals suffered both a reduction in their intake of 
recruits (which had peaked after 'Bloody Sunday' in January 1972), and a surge in 
their loss of personnel. As Bishop and Mallie state: "As the decade progressed it 
became increasingly hazardous to be in the IRA." 2 Accordingly, the PIRA's 
membership strength began to contract, and the organisation looked destined to follow 
1 Astrid Arraras, "Armed Struggle, Political Leaming and Participation in Democracy: The Case of the 
Tupamaros" (PhD, Princeton University, 1999), 219. 
2 Patrick Bishop and Eamonn Mallie, The Provisional IRA (London: Heinemann, 1987), 254. 
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in the footsteps of its predecessor during the 'Border Campaign' of the early-1960s. 
However, unlike the Tupamaros, the Provisionals were able to reverse their 
regenerative fortunes. After introducing a series of reforms, the PIRA witnessed the 
reduction of its attrition, and the stabilisation of its recruitment. This state of affairs 
would remain unchanged until the signing of the 'Good Friday' Agreement in April 
1998. 
The second observation is that the PIRA's loss of personnel appears to have 
increased at a rate greater than that at which the organisation's intake of recruits 
declined. This is apparent from the contrast between the lack of urgency in which the 
literature frames the PIRA's reduction in recruitment following 1972, and the more 
expansionary and consequential language the literature uses to describe the 
organisation's attritional problems over the same period. The third observation, 
meanwhile, is that the PIRA's burgeoning loss of personnel appears to have generated 
greater concern within the organisation than its declining intake of recruits. This is 
evident from the contrasting emphasis in which Provisional documents such as the 
'Staff Report' discussed and proposed remedies for the PIRA's increasing attrition 
and decreasing recruitment during the mid-1970s. 
These findings provide mixed support for the prevailing view in the conflict 
studies literature that a decrease in recruitment is more important than an increase in 
attrition in bringing about the deterioration of an insurgent actor's capacity to 
regenerate. On the one hand, it is clear from the FLQ (and, as briefly outlined in 
Chapter One, the Malayan Races' Liberation Army and the Viet Cong) that the above 
notion is a valid explanation for why the regenerative capacities of some insurgent 
actors weaken. However, it is also clear from the MLN-T and PIRA that the 
literature's tendency to emphasise a decrease in recruitment, and disregard an increase 
in attrition, as likely sources of regenerative capacity deterioration is not an accurate 
representation of the regenerative experiences of all insurgent actors. Indeed, the 
Tupamaro and Provisional cases suggest that the prevailing view in the literature: (1) 
underestimates the role a burgeoning loss of personnel can play, either as an equal or 
primary source, in weakening an insurgent actor's capacity to regenerate; and (2) 
mistakenly universalises a declining intake of recruits as the most important catalyst 
of regenerative decay. 
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In light of these conclusions, the conflict studies literature should refashion 
how it conceptualises the relationships between a declining intake of recruits, a 
burgeoning loss of personnel, and regenerative decay. A better approach, from this 
thesis's perspective, is for scholars and officials to assume not that the relative 
strength of an increase in attrition and a decrease in recruitment is static; but rather, as 
the three cases illustrated, that it varies across insurgent actors. Such an approach 
would not only seemingly be more in accordance with the 'reality' of insurgent 
regeneration; but also encourage the literature to focus on perhaps the most important 
and intriguing question: why does the relative strength of the two factors vary? Why, 
for instance, did a burgeoning loss of personnel play a significant role in weakening 
the MLN-T's capacity to regenerate, but not the FLQ's? The exploration of questions 
like these would both give scholars a richer understanding of regenerative capacity 
deterioration; as well as provide policy-makers with much-needed guidance about 
how much emphasis they should place on attempting to influence a specific insurgent 
actor's recruitment and attrition when seeking to weaken that actor's capacity to 
regenerate. 
Three further policy implications emerge from the above findings. The first of 
these is that a government seeking to weaken an insurgent actor's capacity to 
regenerate should focus at least part of its efforts on reducing the actor's intake of 
recruits. Although the relative strength of a decrease in recruitment varied between 
the cases, it nevertheless played a role in weakening the regenerative capacities of all 
three insurgent actors. Indeed, the FLQ, MLN-T, and PIRA cases raise the possibility 
that a declining intake of recruits is a necessary condition for regenerative decay. 
However, more testing is required before this relationship can be asserted with any 
certainty. 
The second policy implication is that a government specifically seeking to 
weaken the regenerative capacity of al-Qaeda should focus a significant amount of its 
efforts on reducing the actor's intake of recruits. Underlying this prescription is the 
observation that al-Qaeda and the FLQ share a number of pertinent similarities. For 
instance, both insurgent actors seem less like a centralised, "coherent and tight-knit 
organisation" (along the lines of the PIRA), and more like a "loose association" of 
networks, which share a common desire to beget theirs goals through the application 
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of violence.3 Furthermore, recruitment into the FLQ and al-Qaeda (at least after 11 
September 2001) appears less a "top down" phenomenon than an organic process 
based around familial and friendship ties.4 Last of all, the regenerative experience of 
al-Qaeda over the last six years resembles that of the FLQ prior to the October Crisis. 
Specifically, although al-Qaeda has suffered considerable losses since the '9/11' 
attacks, aspiring-jihadists have repeatedly stepped forward to either join existing 
networks or, with the assistance of like-minded associates, form their own. 5 
Similarities such as these raise the possibility that, as with the FLQ, a decrease in 
recruitment will play the greater (indeed, solitary) role in weakening al-Qaeda's 
capacity to regenerate. 
The final policy implication is that governments should not automatically 
assume that the only way they can beget the decay of an insurgent actor's capacity to 
regenerate is by focusing on the actor's intake of recruits. Rather, policy-makers 
should be aware that: (1) a burgeoning loss of personnel can play a significant role in 
weakening the regenerative capacities of some insurgent actors; and (2) trying to 
increase insurgent attrition may thus offer further, and possibly even better, options to 
weaken an insurgent actor's capacity to regenerate than simply trying to reduce 
insurgent recruitment. The key for governments is to be able to identify those 
insurgent actors whose capacities to regenerate are vulnerable to a burgeoning loss of 
personnel (like the MLN-T and the PIRA during the mid-1970s) from those whose are 
not (such as the FLQ). Such wisdom will hopefully emerge with greater scholarly 
exploration of the question: why does the relative strength of an increase in attrition 
and a decrease in recruitment as catalyst of regenerative decay vary? 
3 Jason Burke, Al-Qaeda: Casting a Shadow of Terror (London, New York: LB. Tauris, 2003), 12-7, 
R. T. Naylor, Wages of Crime: Black Markets, Illegal Finance, and the Underworld Economy, Revised 
ed. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004), 290, Xavier Raufer, "Al Qaeda: A different diagnosis," 
Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 26 (2003): 393-5. 
4 Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 
2004), 107-9. 
5 Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, The Next Attack: The Failure of the War on Terror and a 
Strategy for Getting it Right (New York: Owls Books, 2006), 23-5, Dafna Linzer and Walter Pincus, 
"Intelligence chief pessimistic in assessing worldwide threats," The Washington Post, 12 January 2007, 
12, Mark Mazzetti, "New generation of Qaeda chiefs is seen on rise," The New York Times, 2 April 
2007, 1. 
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EXAMINING THE DYNAMICS OF INSURGENT RECRUITMENT AND ATTRITION 
At the second level of its examination, this thesis investigated whether: (1) the 
decrease in recruitment that the FLQ, MLN-T, and PIRA experienced was the result 
of 'the amelioration of grievances', the use of 'selective government repression', 
and/or 'the discrediting of the insurgent actor's ideology'; and (2) the increase in 
attrition that the MLN-T and PIRA experienced was the result of 'the improvement of 
the government's intelligence collection capabilities', and/or 'the restriction of civil 
liberties'. The central purpose of this analysis was to strengthen the empirical 
foundations of the literature's understanding of the best ways in which a government 
can favourably influence an insurgent actor's loss of personnel and intake of recruits. 
Each of the five prescriptions will be discussed in turn below. 
The Amelioration of Grievances 
The FLQ, MLN-T, and PIRA cases provided little or no support for the notion 
that an insurgent actor's intake of recruits will decline because the grievances which 
are driving the actor's recruitment are ameliorated. Rather, in all three cases, the 
insurgent actor's intake of recruits fell (and with regard to the FLQ and MLN-T, 
ultimately evaporated), even though the grievances which formed the basis of their 
collective action frames remained more or less unchanged. For instance, during the 
period when the FLQ's recruitment declined: (1) the structural basis of Quebec's 
perceived political colonisation (i.e. the power differential between English- and 
French-Canada) had not been rectified; (2) French-Canada's relative-economic 
deprivation and the 'Anglo-Saxon' domination of Quebec's economy continued 
largely unabated; and (3) concern over the precarious state of the French language in 
Quebec remained high. Likewise, the primary grievance identified by the MLN-T -
the state of Uruguay's economy- appeared to exhibit a positive relationship with the 
organisation's intake of recruits from the late-1960s onwards (i.e. the MLN-T's 
recruitment declined as Uruguay's economy worsened, and vice versa); and the 
Uruguayan military's actions following 15 April 1972 were unlikely to have changed 
many opinions that the authorities acted in defence of the 'established order'. Lastly, 
while the fall of Stormont in March 1972 did address one of the PIRA's grievances; 
the organisation's other major grievances - i.e. the British presence in, and control 
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over, Northern Ireland, and the British Army's use of indiscriminate repression -
either remained unchanged or, in the case of the former, arguably intensified during 
the mid-1970s. 
While these results do not support the notion that ameliorating grievances will 
reduce an insurgent actor's recruitment, they do not disprove it either. Further 
research on the recruitment patters of insurgent actors whose identified grievances 
were ameliorated is required before a judgment in this regard can be made. 
Nevertheless, the felquiste, Tupamaro, and Provisional cases do suggest that: (1) 
ameliorating grievances is not a necessary condition for reducing an insurgent actor's 
recruitment; (2) the role of 'grievances' in influencing an individual's decision to join, 
and not to join, an insurgent actor may be relatively-minor, or at least smaller than 
other factors, such as the 'perceived efficacy of violence', the 'threat of possible 
harm', and the 'accessibility of recruitment networks'; and (3) while decision-makers 
should not desist from attempting to ameliorate grievances as part of their counter-
insurgent efforts, scholars and officials should not regard the amelioration of 
grievances as the 'be-all and end-all' of counter-insurgent policy. 
Selective Government Repression 
The second level of this thesis's examination provided mixed support for the 
notion that an insurgent actor's intake of recruits will decline if the opposing 
government employs selective repression. On the one hand, in the cases of the FLQ 
and MLN-T, there is some evidence that the use of government repression did have a 
deterrent effect on insurgent recruitment. Regarding the former, this evidence is 
comprised of judgments drawn from the secondary literature, and the observation that 
the movement's recruitment problems coincided with the expansion and 
intensification of the Canadian authorities' anti-FLQ campaign. With regard to the 
latter, the evidence is primarily composed of the contrast between the fear generated 
by, and the perceived proficiency of, the Uruguayan military's counter-insurgent 
efforts from April 1972 onwards, and the resentment generated by, and the perceived 
incompetence of, the police's anti-Tupamaro campaign prior to September 1971. On 
the other hand, however, interviews with Volunteers and ethnographies conducted in 
Catholic, working-class ghettoes in Belfast indicate that, in the PIRA case, 
government repression during the mid-1970s (if not the entire Troubles) was more 
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likely to have facilitated an individual's recruitment into the PIRA, rather than have 
discouraged it. 
Nevertheless, while it is possible to discern contrasting relationships between 
the Canadian, Uruguayan, and British Governments' use of repression and the FLQ, 
MLN-T, and PIRA's intake of recruits; it is not possible, in any of the cases, to 
describe the relevant government's use of repression as having been selective. For 
instance, the vast majority of the 468 people detained by the Canadian authorities 
under the War Measures Act during late-1970 had no connection with the FLQ; 
approximately two-thirds to four-fifths of the 5,000 people imprisoned by the 
Uruguayan military following the declaration of a 'state of internal war' were not 
Tupamaros; and, during the mid- l 970s, the British Government continued to intern 
"many innocent people," killed more or an equal number of civilians than Volunteers, 
and detained suspects for up to seven days for questioning at a rate that greatly 
exceeded the number of people eventually charged with terrorism-related offences.6 
A number of implications emerge from these findings. The first of these is 
that a conditional relationship does appear to exist between government repression 
and insurgent recruitment. That is, under different conditions, a government's use of 
repression can either have a deterring or radicalising effect on an insurgent actor's 
intake of recruits. This conclusion is in accordance with Leites and Wolfs writings 
on insurgent recruitment and government repression; as well as the broader literature 
on political protest, which has long noted the existence of a conditional relationship 
between repression and protest participation. 7 
A second implication is that, while a conditional relationship may exist 
between government repression and insurgent recruitment, 'selectiveness' 1s a 
seemingly poor indicator of whether a government's use of repression will have a 
deterring or radicalising effect on an insurgent actor's intake of recruits. As 
aforementioned, each of the opposing governments in the three cases employed 
indiscriminate repression. Yet, while the British Government's repression appears to 
have facilitated recruitment into the PIRA, the Canadian and Uruguayan 
Governments' repression seems to have tempered recruitment into the FLQ and 
6 R.J. Spjut, "Internment and detention without trial in Northern Ireland 1971-1975: Ministerial policy 
and practice," Modern Law Review 49 (1986): 731. 
7 For information on the relationship between repression and protest participation, see: Jennifer Earl, 
"Introduction: Repression and the social control of protest," Mobilization: An International Quarterly 
11, no. 2 (2006): 134-5, Mark Irving Lichbach, "Deterrence or escalation? The puzzle of aggregate 
studies of repression and dissent," The Journal of Conflict Resolution 31, no. 2 (1987). 
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MLN-T. These results undermine the claim by Leites and Wolf and others that the 
more selective government repression is, the more likely it will discourage, rather 
than encourage, people from joining an insurgent actor. 
A final implication is that policy-makers should be wary about attempting to 
use repression as a means of influencing an insurgent actor's recruitment. As the FLQ, 
MLN-T, and PIRA cases demonstrate, while it is possible that repression may, under 
some conditions, deter people from joining an insurgent actor, identifying these 
conditions is a difficult exercise. Until the conflict studies literature is able to address 
its own ignorance in this regard, governments should temper their expectations about 
the possibilities of using repression to 'control' an insurgent actor's intake of recruits. 
Discrediting the Insurgent Actor's Ideology 
The three cases provided mixed support for the notion that an insurgent actor's 
intake of recruits will decline if its ideology is discredited. On the one hand, the 
MLN-T's waning recruitment during 1972 and 1973 does not appear to have 
coincided with a contraction in public approval for either the organisation's goal of a 
socialist Uruguay or its strategy of revolutionary violence. Underlying this judgment 
are the observed upswings in: (1) support for political parties that advocated socialist 
ideals between the 1966 and 1971 elections; and (2) the number of respondents who 
told the Gallup Organisation during 1970-72 that they believed there was 'some 
justification' for the Tupamaros' campaign. 
On the other hand, however, while public approval for the FLQ's goal of an 
independent, socialist Quebec remained steady during the early-1970s, the FLQ's 
declining recruitment did appear to coincide with a contraction in public support for 
the movement's strategy of violence. This latter shift was driven by two factors: (1) 
the October Crisis, and its repudiation of the notion that violence was an effective 
instrument of change; and (2) the rise of the Parti Quebecois (a separatist political 
party) in 1968, which, through its convincing performance at the 1970 provincial 
election, demonstrated the possibilities of 'electoralism' as a means of achieving le 
Quebec libre. 
Likewise, the Provisionals' recruitment problems during the mid-1970s did 
appear to coincide with a transitory contraction in northern Catholic approval for both 
the PIRA's overarching goal of a united Ireland, and the utility of the PIRA's armed 
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struggle. The former of these shifts was linked to: (1) the various attempts at 
constitutional reform that dominated Northern Irish politics during the mid-l 970s 
(which sought, amongst other things, to share executive power between the warring 
communities, and to create a pan-Ireland body to facilitate harmonisation and 
cooperation between the six and twenty-six counties); and (2) the eventual and 
forceful rejection of these reforms by an apparent majority of northern Protestants. 
The latter shift, meanwhile, was linked to: (1) the seeming lack of progress achieved 
by the PIRA's campaign - especially given the organisation's frequent claims of 
'imminent victory'; and (2) the PIRA's eventual embrace of two strategic reforms that 
increased the PIRA's political activity, and reframed the timescale by which northern 
Catholics judged the efficacy of the organisation's use of violence. 
These results suggest that discrediting an insurgent actor's ideology has both 
promise and limitations as a means of reducing insurgent recruitment. On the one 
hand, it is clear from the FLQ and PIRA cases that contracting public approval for an 
insurgent actor's ideology can have a significant impact on the strength of the actor's 
intake of recruits. Indeed, in the former case, waning support for the FLQ's strategy 
of violence appears to have played the leading role - particularly in the medium- to 
long-term - in reducing the movement's recruitment. Conversely, however, the 
MLN-T case demonstrates that discrediting an insurgent actor's ideology is not a 
necessary condition for reducing the actor's intake of recruits. Furthermore, the 
above findings also raise questions about the extent to which governments can exert 
control over public approval for an insurgent actor's ideology. For instance, while 
contracting support for the FLQ's strategy of violence did play a key role in 
weakening the movement's recruitment; this contraction was primarily driven by 
factors (such as the Parti Quebecois' impressive results at the May 1970 election, and 
the discernible revulsion triggered by Laporte's murder) which were not the 
consequence of direct or deliberate action by the Canadian authorities. Similarly, but 
from a different perspective, although the British Government's efforts in pushing 
constitutional reform and frustrating the PIRA's campaign arguably influenced 
northern Catholic perceptions about the desirability of a united Ireland and the utility 
of violence; these efforts eventually came to naugh~ due to the actions of parties 
beyond London's control - namely the Ulster Workers' Council (UWC) and the PIRA. 
This is not to suggest that governments should not seek to discredit an insurgent 
actor's ideology as a means of reducing its recruitment; but rather, that they should be 
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aware that their ability to influence public approval for an insurgent actor's ideology 
may be limited, and possibly held hostage to the whims of other parties, including the 
insurgent actor itself. 
Improving the Government's Intelligence Collection Capabilities 
The MLN-T and PIRA provided strong support for the notion that an insurgent 
actor's loss of personnel will increase if the opposing government enhances its 
intelligence collection capabilities. For example, prior to September 1971, the 
Uruguayan Government's ability to gather information about the Tupamaros was 
generally defective. However, the period from early-1972 onwards witnessed a 
dramatic improvement in the authorities' intelligence collection capabilities. This 
improvement was the function of three factors. Namely: a breakdown in the MLN-
T's internal security (a consequence of the breakout of 100 imprisoned Tupamaros 
and their reintegration back into the organisation); a series of high-profile, Tupamaro 
defections; and the Uruguayan military's expanded and systematic use of torture as a 
method of interrogation. 
Likewise, at the outbreak of The Troubles, the British and Northern Ireland 
Governments' ability to collect information about the Provisionals was lacking; 
largely due to the absence of a Republican threat in the six counties prior to 1970; the 
incompetence of the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC); and a lack of cooperation 
between the RUC and British Army. However, the mid- l 970s witnessed the gradual 
improvement of the authorities' intelligence collection capabilities. This was driven 
by: (1) Operation Motorman, which opened up 'intelligence blackspots' in Belfast and 
Derry; (2) the influence of Brigadier Frank Kitson; (3) the growing professionalism of 
'The Det' (the British Army's covert intelligence unit); and (4) the security forces' 
increasing exploitation of the PIRA's security deficiencies. Further evidence of the 
link between improving a government's intelligence collection capabilities and 
insurgent attrition is provided by the observation that the PIRA was able to reduce its 
loss of personnel during the late-1970s by, in part, implementing various reforms 
which hampered the authorities' ability to collect intelligence. These reforms 
included: the adoption of a cellular organisational structure; and the creation a system 
to educate new Volunteers about how to resist interrogations and maintain proper 
security etiquette. 
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These findings suggest that the literature's faith in the relationship between 
improving a government's intelligence collection capabilities and insurgent attrition is 
warranted, and that, for a government seeking to increase an insurgent actor's loss of 
personnel, enhancing its ability to gather information about the insurgent actor should 
be a priority, or, at the very least, part of its counter-insurgent efforts. However, it is 
important to note that, as the PIRA case highlights, an insurgency is an interdependent 
relationship. While a government can improve its intelligence collection capabilities 
and, consequently, increase an insurgent actor's attrition; the insurgent actor is also 
capable of undertaking its own measures to frustrate the government's ability to 
gather information and, as a result, minimise its loss of personnel. Thus, while 
improving a government's intelligence collection capabilities is important as a means 
of increasing an insurgent actor's attrition, it does have its limits. Policy-makers 
should both be aware of these and prepared to act within them - perhaps by exploiting 
any information collection advantage as quickly and strenuously as possible. 
Restricting Civil Liberties 
The second level of this thesis's examination provided little support for the 
notion that an insurgent actor's loss of personnel will increase if the opposing 
government restricts civil liberties. For instance, at first glance, the link between 
curtailing individual rights and Tupamaro attrition appears strong; given that the 
MLN-T's skyrocketing loss of personnel did coincide with the Uruguayan 
Government's declaration of a 'state of internal war'. However, two observations 
suggest that the authorities' restriction of civil liberties and the MLN-T's burgeoning 
attrition from April 1972 onwards was more coincidental than causative. These 
observations include: (1) that the Uruguayan Government had restricted civil liberties 
on three occasions prior to April 1972 (for a combined period of twelve months); and 
(2) that these efforts - which, at times, matched the 'state of internal war' in terms of 
severity - had no impact on the MLN-T's rate of attrition. Likewise, given that the 
British and Northern Ireland Governments' curtailed individual freedoms and 
protections for essentially the entirety of The Troubles, and that the authorities' 
restriction of civil liberties prior to mid-1972 and after 1977 had seemingly no impact 
on the PIRA's rate of attrition, it is likely that the relationship between the British 
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Government's restriction of civil liberties and the Provisionals' burgeoning loss of 
personnel from mid-1972 to 1977 was similarly weak. 
These results call into question the validity of two related concepts. First, that 
constitutionally- and legislatively-enshrined individual rights hamper the ability of 
governments to arrest and kills members of an insurgent actor. Second, that 
restricting said civil liberties (either fully or in part) will enhance the capacity of 
governments to increase an insurgent actor's loss of personnel. The repudiation of 
these concepts is in accordance with the broader literature's general scepticism about 
the relationship between restricting civil liberties and improving the efficacy of a 
government's counter-insurgent response. The above findings also suggest that: (1) 
governments seeking to favourably influence an insurgent actor's rate of attrition, 
rather than curtailing individual freedoms and protections, would be better served by 
concentrating their resources on other measures, such as improving their intelligence 
collection capabilities; and (2) greater testing of the alleged utilitarian benefits of 
restricting civil liberties is required. For example, researchers should examine 
whether curtailing individual freedoms and protections actually improves a 
government's ability to manage the rate and intensity of insurgent violence, or to 
influence public support for an insurgent actor. 
FINAL THOUGHT 
In his second labour, Heracles was tasked by Eurystheus with slaying the 
many-headed Lemaean Hydra. However, the hero soon found his strength and 
dexterity frustrated by the monster's ability to grow new heads in place of those that 
he destroyed. Fortunately for Heracles, he was able to call on the assistance of his 
nephew, Iolaus; who, through using a firebrand to sear the Hydra's damaged heads, 
gradually weakened its capacity to regenerate. 
This thesis framed itself as performing a task similar to that of Iolaus; but in 
the context of aiding scholars and officials in understanding why the regenerative 
capacities of insurgent actors weaken. So, what wisdom can this thesis impart? The 
key lessons are threefold. First, the relative strength of an increase in attrition and a 
decrease in recruitment as catalysts of regenerative decay is not static; but rather, 
varies across insurgent actors. Thus, scholars and officials should: (1) not assume that 
a declining intake of recruits is the primary driver of regenerative capacity 
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deterioration in all cases; and (2) realise that governments may have a greater range of 
options to weaken an insurgent actor's capacity to regenerate than simply trying to 
reduce the actor's recruitment. Though, in the case of al-Qaeda, this latter approach is 
likely to be the most productive. 
Second, if a government plans to weaken an insurgent actor's capacity to 
regenerate by attempting to reduce its intake of recruits, 'discrediting the actor's 
ideology' has some promise, employing 'government repression' has less so, and 
'ameliorating grievances' has less again. Though it is important to note that, with 
regard to the first, there appear to be limits on the extent to which governments can 
influence public perceptions about an insurgent actor's ideology; and, concerning the 
second, government repression can also just as easily provoke insurgent recruitment 
as it can deter. Third, if a government plans to weaken an insurgent actor's capacity 
to regenerate by attempting to increase its loss of personnel, the authorities should 
concentrate their efforts on 'improving their intelligence collection capabilities' (and 
endeavour to exploit any information advantage they derive as quickly as possible); 
but not on 'restricting civil liberties' -which appears to have a weak relationship with 
insurgent attrition. Hopefully, on the basis of such lessons and greater research, 
future Defence Secretaries can avoid asking their key lieutenants: 'are we winning of 
losing the global war on terror?' 
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